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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies three institutions of development in the United States during
the early twentieth century. The first chapter exploits a unique shift in agricultural produc-
tion in the American South to analyze how the cultivation of a child labor intensive crop
(cotton) impacted schooling, with a particular focus on racial differences. Since African-
American children were more likely to be employed as farm laborers than white children,
their educational attainment may have been more responsive to changes in cotton produc-
tion. I test this prediction using newly collected county-level panel data for Georgia, a
major cotton producer. The results reveal that reductions in cotton production increased the
school enrollment rate of African Americans. By contrast, I find little evidence that cotton
production affected the enrollment rate of whites. This suggests that the shift away from
cotton production after the arrival of the boll weevil can explain a significant amount of the
narrowing of the racial differential in enrollment rates. The second chapter explores how
Southern school boards responded to changes in their budgetary environment. I utilize ex-
ogenous variation in state school funds generated by discontinuous budget allocation rules,
and employ a differences-in-differences strategy, to investigate how the relative quality of
education for African Americans changed with the level of state funding for education. Re-
v
sults suggest whites, rather than African Americans, bore the brunt of budget cuts, perhaps
because there was little fat to trim from the budgets of African-American schools. The
third chapter of this dissertation (co-authored with Carola Frydman and Eric Hilt) estimates
the effect of President McKinley’s assassination on corporate valuations. McKinley acted
favorably toward business interests, and while in office he permitted significant merger
activity. His Vice President, Theodore Roosevelt, was a well known reformer and took a
stronger stance against trusts. Our analysis indicates that firms vulnerable to antitrust pros-
ecution saw greater decreases in their valuations following the assassination. The value of
railroads susceptible to antitrust litigation declined further when Roosevelt sought to apply
the Sherman Act to railroads, providing further evidence that firms benefited from regula-
tory forbearance during McKinley’s Presidency.
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1CHAPTER 1
From the Field to the Classroom:
The Boll Weevil’s Impact on Education in Rural Georgia
1.1 Introduction
A substantial body of research on developing countries documents the tradeoff parents face
in choosing between sending their children to work or to school by showing that child labor
reduces various measures of educational attainment and achievement, including attendance,
test scores, and years of schooling (see, for example, Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti 2009;
Boozer and Suri 2001; Gunnarsson, Orazem, and Sánchez 2006). However, this literature
largely ignores peculiar features—such as the informal employment of children on family
farms and the seasonality of labor demands—of the demand for child labor in agricultural
regions, which make up a majority of the developing world. To fill this gap, I exploit a
unique shift in agricultural production that occurred in the early twentieth-century American
South to analyze the role of a child labor–intensive crop (cotton) in determining school
enrollment and attendance rates, with a particular focus on racial differences.
In the early twentieth-century South, the harvesting of the cotton crop required a large
number of extra workers for three months of the year. Children were employed, both for-
mally and informally, to help fill this seasonal demand for extra farm hands. Indeed, chil-
drenwere particularly well suited to pick cotton due to their shorter stature and small, nimble
fingers. Because the harvest happened during the fall, it overlapped with the timing of the
traditional school year. Since whites were wealthier than blacks on average, theoretical
models of the time allocation of children predict the educational attainment of blacks to be
more responsive than that of whites to changes in cotton production (Baland and Robinson
22000; Collins and Margo 2006). Therefore, I pay particular attention to differential effects
of cotton production by race. Since farmers, when deciding how much cotton to plant,
likely took into account the availability of their children to help harvest the crop, cotton
production may be endogenous to the schooling decision. Thus, I use the timing of the ar-
rival of the boll weevil, an invasive agricultural pest that consumes the cotton plant, as an
instrumental variable.
This paper focuses on the experience in the state of Georgia, a major cotton producer in
the early twentieth century and, fortuitously, a state with excellent records on education and
wealth. Prior to the invasion of the boll weevil, Georgia was the second largest producer
of cotton in the United States. The largest cotton crop in the state’s history—2.82 million
bales—was produced in 1911, just four years before the boll weevil first arrived in Georgia
(Haney, Lewis, and Lambert 2012). After the insect’s appearance in 1915, the boll weevil
spread across the state quite rapidly, with nearly all of the cotton-growing regions infested
by 1919 (Hunter and Coad 1923). As a result of higher costs of production after the arrival
of the boll weevil, cotton production fell dramatically as farmers switched tomore profitable
alternatives, such as corn, sweet potatoes, and peanuts. These substitutes for cotton required
much less labor in the fall, and the tasks involved in making these crops were not as well
suited to the use of child labor. By 1923, cotton production in Georgia had fallen to a mere
600,000 bales, or 21 percent of the record high (Haney, Lewis, and Lambert 2012).
Since cotton generated more demand for child labor than did its substitutes, the shift
away from cotton production following the arrival of the boll weevil provides an exogenous
drop in the marginal product of child labor in agriculture. This shock to the marginal prod-
uct of child labor was not trivial; cotton was the primary crop of the South, a predominately
agrarian society at that time. Because a drop in child productivity reduces the opportunity
cost of education, it is predicted to have a positive impact on educational attainment. And,
while the shock itself is race blind, the schooling response is expected to be stronger for
3blacks than for whites since whites were on average wealthier and, therefore, less likely to
work in cotton production than blacks. If the cotton economy indeed had a differential im-
pact on educational attainment by race, then the shift away from cotton as the dominant crop
of the South could explain an economically significant amount of the substantial gains in
educational attainment made by blacks relative to whites during the early twentieth century.
Furthermore, this shift away from cotton could explain some of the long-run relative gains
in black wealth since the narrowing of the black-white education gap led to convergence in
the black-white income gap (see, for example, Donohue and Heckman 1991; Margo 1990;
Smith 1984; Smith and Welch 1989).
A significant contribution of this paper is to construct a novel database on education and
wealth. The study of education in the early twentieth century has been hampered by a lack
of annual data on schooling. The literature has, thus far, been largely limited to the use of
samples of census data supplementedwith indicators of school quality (Fishback and Baskin
1991; Margo 1987, 1990; Walters, McCammon, and James 1990). Yet published reports by
the Georgia Department of Education, as well as similar reports published by many other
states, contain detailed annual information on educational attainment, school finance, and
school quality. As for wealth, many states, including Georgia, also published annual reports
containing statistics enumerating everything of taxable value in the state. For this study,
I have compiled statistics from the reports of the Georgia Department of Education and
Comptroller-General into a large panel dataset at the county level with annual observations
from 1909 to 1922.
My results suggest that reductions in cotton production significantly increased the edu-
cational attainment of blacks, but I find little evidence that cotton production impacted the
education of white children. Specifically, I find that a 10 percent reduction in cotton pro-
duction increased the enrollment rate of blacks by 2 percent. Reduced-form results show
that the arrival of the boll weevil, through its impact on cotton production, caused a 4 per-
4cent increase in the black enrollment rate, or a 2.8 percentage point increase at the 1914
mean (the year prior to the arrival of the boll weevil in Georgia). This amounts to a 14.6
percent reduction in the racial gap in enrollment.
Beyond adding to our understanding of the black-white education gap, these results
show that the seasonal demand for child labor in agriculture can have substantial negative
impacts on educational attainment, particularly for the impoverished. Child labor–intensive
crops, such as cotton, tea, coffee, sugarcane, and tobacco, are the primary agricultural prod-
ucts of many regions of the developing world.1 Thus, my results are suggestive of the
broader impacts of subsidies and other programs that encourage the production of alter-
native (less child labor–intensive) crops or the adoption of labor saving technologies. For
instance, programs encouraging mechanization, which would reduce the demand for child
labor in agriculture, could be used in combination with school subsidies to further increase
school enrollment and attendance in rural areas.
1.2 Related Literature
By examining the impact of the cotton economy on various measures of educational at-
tainment, this paper contributes to the literature on the tradeoff between child labor and
schooling. A large number of studies on developing countries have documented a negative
association between child labor and schooling. For example, Akabayashi and Psacharopou-
los (1999) report a negative correlation between hours of study at home and hours of work
among children in Tanzania. Additionally, Psacharopoulos (1997) reveals that working
children attain fewer years of schooling and are more likely to repeat grades than nonwork-
1The US Department of Labor (1995) report By the Sweat and Toil of Children finds these crops to be par-
ticularly suited to the use of child labor and details the role of children in farming them in different regions of
the developing world. A recent report by the US Department of Labor (2012), known as the List, identifies 17
developing countries in which cotton is produced by means of child labor. A number of developing countries
producing coffee, sugarcane, tea, and tobacco are also on the List as exploiting the labor of children.
5ing children. Providing evidence that child labor and schooling are not perfect substitutes,
Ravallion and Wodon (2000) find that a school subsidy increased school enrollment and
reduced child labor. In an examination of the impact of child labor on exam performance,
Heady (2003) finds that child labor, especially work outside the home, is negatively corre-
lated with achievement in mathematics and reading in Ghana. Moreover, this result does
not appear to be driven by school attendance, suggesting exhaustion or a reduction in time
outside of school devoted to academic pursuits as the link between child labor and lower
academic achievement. While these studies show that child labor is negatively correlated
with a number of measures of educational attainment, they fail to establish a causal rela-
tionship between child labor and schooling.
A handful of more recent studies employing instrumental variables to address the endo-
geneity of child labor also show a negative relationship between child labor and educational
attainment. Gunnarsson, Orazem, and Sánchez (2006) analyze how child labor outside the
home affected performance onmath and language exams among third and fourth graders us-
ing cross-sectional data from a survey of nine Latin-American countries. Exploiting cross-
country variation in compulsory schooling laws as an instrumental variable, they find that
exam performance is decreasing in hours worked. In a similar study, Beegle, Dehejia, and
Gatti (2009) use panel data on children in Vietnam and employ rice prices as an instrumental
variable, finding that child labor substantially reduced years of schooling. Finally, utiliz-
ing cross-sectional data from Ghana and exploiting variation in rainfall as an instrument,
Boozer and Suri (2001) show that child labor has a negative effect on school attendance.
Thus, recent work on the tradeoff between child labor and schooling suggests that child
labor reduces achievement (in terms of exam performance), educational attainment, and
school attendance by substantial amounts.
This economic development literature has thus far focused on broadly establishing the
existence of a tradeoff between child labor and schooling, rather than examining the impact
6of child labor in specific sectors. By contrast, I focus specifically on the demand for child
labor generated by agriculture. The agricultural sector merits a separate analysis because
its labor demands are usually seasonal, and child labor is often supplied informally on the
family farm. As a result of these features it is reasonable to think that the relationship
between child labor in agriculture and schooling might differ from that of child labor in
general. Indeed, Walters and Briggs (1993) argue that, unlike industrial jobs, farm work
does not necessarily preclude schooling for children. In this paper, I show that under certain
conditions the demand for child labor in agriculture has a significant impact on educational
attainment.
Additionally, the papers mentioned above relied on cross-sectional policy variation or
transitory shocks to develop instruments for child labor. The use of a temporary shock as
the source of exogenous variation in child labor is potentially troubling in this context. It is
unlikely that household labor allocation and schooling decisions fully respond to short-term
changes in the marginal product of child labor. Thus, using results from these studies to in-
form policymay result in an undervaluation of the benefits of permanent programs to reduce
child labor. In contrast to previous work, the spread of the boll weevil provides an excellent
natural experiment for analyzing the impact of a long-term shock to the opportunity cost
of schooling. In order to demonstrate the potential problem of using a transitory shock to
inform long-term policies, I compare estimates produced using both this permanent shock
(the arrival of the boll weevil) and a temporary shock (summer rainfall) as instruments.
This paper also contributes to the empirical literature examining the sources of the large
racial gap in educational attainment (roughly three years of schooling) in the early twentieth-
century American South. Much of the work in this literature has focused on the effects of
differences in school quality on the black-white education gap. Measures of school quality
used in these studies include the student-teacher ratio, number of schools per 1000 chil-
dren, teacher salary, and length of the school term. Margo (1987, 1990) uses individual
7level census data from 1900 linked to school quality indicators to show that differences in
school characteristics account for up to 49 percent of the black-white school attendance gap.
Using data from Maryland, Orazem (1987) finds that school characteristics during the era
of segregation explain a substantial proportion of the racial difference in school attendance
and some of the racial difference in achievement. Using county-level data from six south-
ern states, Walters, James, and McCammon (1997) find that the availability of teachers has
a significant and positive impact on the enrollment rates of both blacks and whites.2 How-
ever, this impact is stronger for blacks than whites, suggesting that their enrollment rates
were more constrained by the lack of educational opportunities. This is just a sample of
the works in this literature that have explored how differences in school quality affected the
racial gap in education.
Besides the effects of differences in school inputs, studies have also shown that fam-
ily background characteristics account for a significant proportion of the racial difference
in educational attainment in the South. Margo (1987) finds that household characteristics
(in this case, parental literacy, age, homeownership, and occupational status) account for
up to 71 percent of the racial inequality in school attendance, with parental literacy being
the most important of these determinants. Walters, James, and McCammon (1997) show
that illiteracy was negatively correlated with enrollment at the county level in the early
twentieth-century South. Using data from the 1910 US Census, Walters, McCammon, and
James (1990) find that average wealth at the county level is positively correlated with black,
but not white, school enrollment rates. Fishback and Baskin (1991) show that family back-
ground characteristics account for as much as 53 percent of racial inequality with regard
to literacy of children in Georgia in 1910. Moehling (2004) shows that living apart from
one or both parents in the South in the early twentieth century is correlated negatively with
2Walters, James, and McCammon (1997) define the availability of teachers as the number of public school
teachers per 100 same-race children between the ages of 6 and 14, inclusive.
8school attendance and positively with child labor. This correlation is stronger for blacks
than whites, and blacks were also more likely than whites to be separated from one or both
parents. Taken together, this suggests that family structure could be an economically sig-
nificant determinant of racial differences with regard to educational attainment.
However, the above literature largely neglects the role of the cotton economy in its
examination of possible determinants of the black-white education gap. Only two of these
studies includemeasures of cotton production as exogenous control variables. Margo (1987)
includes cotton acreage as a percentage of total improved acreage at the county level but
fails to find that it has a significant impact on school attendance. Walters, James, and Mc-
Cammon (1997) include the proportion of acres planted in cotton, finding it to be positively
correlated with school enrollment for both races. However, the relationship between the
cotton economy and educational outcomes was not the focus of these studies, and the pos-
sibility that cotton cultivation might be endogenous was not considered. Thus, this is the
first paper to provide causal estimates of the cotton economy’s impact on educational at-
tainment by race. Additionally, all of the papers in this literature, with the exception of
Orazem (1987), have conducted cross-sectional analyses using samples of census data, or
published census data, supplemented with school quality information from state reports on
education. Thus, this paper differs from the previous literature in that it employs a novel
county-level panel dataset with annual observations in its analyses.
1.3 Historical Background
1.3.1 Cotton was King of the Southern Economy
At the beginning of the twentieth century the South was principally an agrarian economy.
Agriculture employed over 57 percent of the South’s labor force in 1910. In Georgia, a
state which was fairly representative of the South economically, 61 percent of the popula-
9tion lived on a farm and 63.3 percent of the labor force was employed in agriculture. The
agricultural sector was not only the primary employer in the American South, it was also
the principal source of income. The value of agricultural goods produced in Georgia in
1910 was more than twice the value added in manufacturing in the state (US Bureau of the
Census 1913).
The staple of this agrarian economy was cotton. Cotton was the single most valuable
crop in 10 of the 16 Southern states at the dawn of the twentieth century. In Alabama,
Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas—the states that formed the heart
of the Cotton Belt—cotton comprised more than half of the value of all crops produced (US
Bureau of the Census 1913). Cotton was particularly important to the economy of Georgia.
The state was second only to Texas in the number of bales produced, first when adjusting
for land area (Georgia State Department of Agriculture 1915). In 1909, 39.7 percent of
improved land was planted in cotton, and cotton represented 66.2 percent of the value of all
crops produced in the state (US Bureau of the Census 1913).
The dominance of cotton production in the South had important implications for the
entire household because, unlike other staples, in cotton’s production the labor of women
and children was equally as useful as the labor of men during much of the growing season.
Since the harvesting of cotton remained non-mechanized until the mid-twentieth century,
between 2.5 and 4.5 million tons of cotton were picked entirely by hand each year, roughly
2 grams at a time (US Bureau of the Census 1935).3 Thus, the cotton harvest, which be-
gan in September and stretched into December, was a family affair, with men, women, and
children working together from dawn to dusk in the fields. While most of the children that
3While machines to harvest cotton were developed in the nineteenth century, these mechanical devices
were useless in much of the Cotton Belt prior to the discovery of chemical defoliants and desiccants in the mid-
twentieth century (Crawford et al. 2001). Using a mechanical picker or cotton stripper, two different devices
developed to mechanically harvest cotton, on plants with green leaves unfortunately leads to staining of the
cotton fiber, greatly reducing its commercial value. Thus prior to the development of chemical harvest aids,
weather conditions limited the use of mechanical harvesters to the High Plains area of Texas and Oklahoma.
Only in the High Plains could fall freezes be counted on to kill, and thus defoliate, the cotton plant.
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worked in the cotton harvest supplied labor informally (that is, most children picked cotton
on their family’s farm without direct compensation), the formal labor market provides in-
sight into the value of child labor in the harvesting of cotton. Seasonal labor was employed
on a contract basis to harvest cotton, where pickers were compensated per pound of cotton
picked without regard for race, gender, or age. In fact, small nimble hands gave children
an advantage over adults in the tedious task; it was not unusual for children between ten
and fifteen years of age to pick more than adults. Due to the near perfect substitutability of
adult and child labor in the harvest season, cotton generated a high demand for child labor
for three months of the year.
Given the agrarian nature of the Southern economy and the dominance of cotton, it is not
surprising that agriculture was by far the largest employer of children in the South. In 1910,
34.4 percent of 10 to 15 year-olds living in the South worked, of which 86.7 percent were
employed in farm work. Moreover, these youth made up 17 percent of the agricultural
labor force in the South. In Georgia a larger share of the child population, 43.4 percent,
worked, with 88.3 percent of working 10 to 15 year-olds engaged in agricultural pursuits.
The majority of these child laborers undoubtedly worked the cotton fields (US Bureau of
the Census 1924).4
The timing of the peak demand for child labor in cotton production, the fall harvest,
conflicts directly with the traditional school term. Educators were well aware of this con-
flict and in some counties adjustments were made to the school term. To accommodate the
demand for children to work in the field, school superintendents both reduced the length of
the school term and altered its timing. Collins and Margo (2006, 143) observe that “schools
4In 1910, census enumerators were given specific instructions to inquire about the occupations of women
and children, as well as men. Moreover, enumerators were instructed to record children working for their
parents on a farm as farm laborers. Therefore, in comparison to earlier censuses, the 1910 census is an
unusually good source of data on the labor force participation of children (Moehling 1999, 82; 2004, 79).
Still, these figures might understate the extent of child labor in agriculture during the fall harvest since the
1910 census recorded employment on April 15th, at the beginning of the agricultural season when the demand
for child labor was comparatively low.
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in cotton counties (black and white) were open fewer days per year than elsewhere to ac-
commodate seasonal demands for child labor.” As an example of adjustments to the timing
of the school term, in Morgan County, Georgia, the black schools ran “4 months in the
Winter, December, January, February and March. Then two in the Summer, July, August”
(Georgia Department of Education 1913, 124).5 Given its length, however, the cotton har-
vest inevitably impacted school attendance despite these accommodations. Letters by the
county superintendents provide ample anecdotal evidence of the impact of child labor in
cotton on schooling. They often blamed low enrollment and attendance numbers on large
cotton harvests. For example, the superintendent of Jones County remarked, “The enroll-
ment of white children is slightly below former years, as is also the average, but the children
had to pick cotton” (Georgia Department of Education 1912, 152). A year later, the Baker
County superintendent made a similar statement: “We had a six months term, but our at-
tendance was not as good as we would have liked for it to have been, owing to the fact of a
very large cotton crop” (Georgia Department of Education 1913, 101).
The child labor demands of cotton were truly unique in comparison to other crops grown
in the Southern United States. The alternative crops to cotton—principally corn, but also
peanuts and sweet potatoes in Georgia—were much less suited to child labor.6 Thus, a shift
away from cotton production would have reduced the productivity of children in agriculture.
The resulting reduction in the use of child labor in farming could have caused an increase in
educational attainment in the South. Such a shift away from cotton production was caused
by the arrival of the boll weevil.
5 Such adjustments were frequently made to the schedule for black schools, as in this example, but less
often for white schools, suggesting that black children supplied more labor in the production of cotton.
6A few other crops grown in limited areas of the South had the potential to generate a high demand for
child labor, notably rice and sugarcane in Louisiana and tobacco in North Carolina. In these areas, a shift
away from cotton production might have had less of an impact on the productivity of children in agriculture.
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1.3.2 The Coming of the Boll Weevil
The cotton boll weevil, Anthonomus grandis, is a small beetle native to Central America
and Mexico.7 The adult boll weevil is grayish in color, has a long snout and wings, and
averages 6 millimeters in length. It is thought to have crossed from Mexico into the cotton
fields of southern Texas near the border town of Brownsville in 1892.8 From there it steadily
spread north and east. As shown in Figure 1.1, the boll weevil entered Georgia in 1915 and
infested nearly the entire state by 1920. In 1922, the boll weevil could be found in virtually
all cotton counties in the United States, from Texas to North Carolina (Hunter and Coad
1923).
The lifecycle of the boll weevil is closely intertwined with the cotton plant. Indeed,
the insect lives inside the squares and bolls of the cotton plant for three of the four stages
of its lifecycle (egg, larvae, and pupae), and as an adult it feeds almost exclusively on the
cotton plant.9 The reason for the boll weevil’s narrow appetite is that cotton is one of only a
few plants (the others being wild flora with geographically small habitats) that provide the
weevil with the nutrients required to produce the pheromones necessary for its reproduction.
This dependence on cotton causes the insect to spend its entire life in or near cotton fields
(Giesen 2011).
The boll weevil’s spread through the South had a disastrous impact on cotton production.
While a great deal of anecdotal evidence exists about the destruction caused by the boll
weevil, only recently has its impact been examined empirically. Lange, Olmstead, and
Rhode (2009), in an effort to quantify its destruction, show that the boll weevil reduced
7See Lange, Olmstead, and Rhode (2009) for a concise history of the boll weevil in the United States. See
Giesen (2011) for a more in-depth history of the insect.
8Recent work suggests that the boll weevil could have been present in Texas long before cotton was grown
there. A wild relative of cotton, native to a coastal region in South Texas near Brownsville, could have served
as a food source for a small weevil population prior to 1892 (Giesen 2011).
9A cotton square refers to a young flower bud of the cotton plant, and a cotton boll is the fiber producing
fruit.
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cotton production by approximately 50 percent within five years of its arrival in a county.
In contrast to many anecdotal accounts, the destruction caused by the boll weevil was not
absolute. While some farmers did experience near total crop losses, for the most part the
presence of the boll weevil did not preclude cotton production. Rather, the boll weevil
reduced yield and necessitated costly pest-control measures.10 The decreased returns to
farming cotton “under boll weevil conditions” caused farmers to substitute away from the
crop in favor of more profitable (and less child labor–intensive) alternatives.11
The arrival of the boll weevil reduced the South’s reliance on cotton, and thus the in-
fluence of the cotton economy. The reduction in cotton caused by the boll weevil had
substantial implications for the entire household due to the crop’s unique labor demands.
Thus, the spread of the boll weevil through the Cotton Belt provides a unique natural ex-
periment through which I examine the role the cotton economy played in household labor
allocation and schooling decisions.
1.3.3 Southern Schooling
Despite the significant expansion of public education in the United States in the early twen-
tieth century, there remained large disparities between blacks and whites with respect to
schooling.12 This was especially true in the South, where the policy of segregation man-
dated the creation of two separate school systems, which were in practice anything but
equal. Black schools in the South were on average inferior to white schools in various mea-
10Early insecticides such as Paris Green, London purple, and lead arsenate were recommended by the
USDA but were limited in their effectiveness against the boll weevil (National Research Council 1981). Not
until 1919 was calcium arsenate found to be an effective poison for the boll weevil, and it remained the best
insecticide to combat the insect until DDT became available in the 1940s (Haney, Lewis, and Lambert 2012).
11The phrase “growing cotton under boll weevil conditions” was commonly used in contemporary news-
papers and bulletins to refer to producing cotton in areas where the boll weevil was present.
12A number of policy changes in the early twentieth century greatly expanded the scope and quality of
public education in the United States. Among these were compulsory attendance laws, increased provision of
high schools in urban and rural areas, consolidation of one-room schools into graded schools, and the public
provision of transportation to and from school.
14
sures of school quality and quantity. Figure 1.2 shows the time trend of several measures
of school quality in Georgia over the first three decades of the twentieth century. Panel (a)
shows the number of teachers per 100 same-race children was significantly lower for blacks
relative to whites. Whites averaged 2.2 teachers per 100 school-age children, while there
were only 1.2 teachers per 100 black school-age children on average. Panel (b) reveals
that the disparity is lessened, but only slightly, by restricting the denominator to include
only enrolled children; the racial differential in the number of teachers per 100 same-race
enrolled students was only 0.75. In terms of student-teacher ratios, there were on average
39 white enrolled students per teacher, but 55 black students per teacher. Additionally, the
human capital of black teachers was on average lower than that of white teachers. While
the percentage of teachers having received “normal training” was increasing for both races
over this period, the percentage of normal-trained black teachers consistently lagged behind
that of whites by an average of 18 percentage points, as displayed in panel (c).13 Moreover,
the length of the school term, as panel (d) shows, was consistently shorter for blacks than
for whites by about a month on average.
Not only was the quality of black schooling lower than that of whites, but the educa-
tional attainment of blacks lagged behind as well. In the early twentieth-century American
South, there were large disparities between blacks and whites with respect to educational
attainment. In 1900, the school attendance rate of black children ages 5 through 20 was
34.4 percent, whereas 52 percent of comparably-aged white children attended school. This
13In the early twentieth century, normal-trained teachers were those that received one to two years of in-
struction in teaching standards at a normal school, or teachers college as it would be known today. Normal
training also indicated that the teacher was a high school graduate, as admission into a normal school required
a high school diploma. The rising percentage of normal-trained teachers over time likely reflects the replace-
ment of older generations with younger cohorts of more formally trained teachers, who benefited from the
recent establishment of postsecondary institutions for educators. Georgia established its first normal school
catering to whites, Georgia Normal and Industrial College, in 1889. The first normal school for blacks in the
state, Allen Normal and Industrial School, was established with private funds two years later. Several addi-
tional schools with the primary mission of training educators opened across the state in the late nineteenth
century and early twentieth century (Georgia Department of Education 1906).
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difference in school attendance culminated in a large gap in educational attainment. The
cohort of blacks born between 1890 and 1894 in the South completed just 5.1 years of
schooling on average, nearly 3 years fewer than their white counterparts. However, this
racial gap narrowed over time. By 1940, the racial gap in school attendance was just 3.8
percentage points, compared to 17.6 percentage points four decades earlier.14
The history of the black-white education gap in Georgia well illustrates these points.
Figure 1.3(a) presents the educational attainment of whites versus blacks by five year birth
cohorts in Georgia. While the educational attainment of both blacks and whites trended
upward over the early twentieth century, it is also clear that the educational attainment of
blacks was converging to that of whites during this period. Figure 1.3(b), which shows
white minus black educational attainment by five year birth cohorts, gives a better sense
of the timing of this convergence. The racial education gap remained relatively constant
at around 3.5 years of schooling until the 1910-14 birth cohort when it began to fall at a
fairly steady rate. The timing of the arrival of the boll weevil in Georgia, and the resulting
shift away from cotton production, corresponds to the beginning of the convergence of the
black-white education gap. The first cohort whose schooling decisions would have been
fully impacted by the boll weevil in Georgia was the 1910-1914 birth cohort. This suggests
that the fall in cotton production in the wake of the boll weevil’s arrival may explain part
of the initial convergence of the racial gap in education in the South, which is consistent
with the hypothesis of this paper. And, while the impact of the boll weevil on cotton can-
not explain subsequent convergence that occurred through to the 1980s, there were several
events after the boll weevil’s arrival that continued to reduce cotton production, or the labor
requirements of the crop,—namely the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the mechanization
of the cotton harvest—which may have contributed to the further narrowing of the black-
14See Collins and Margo (2006) for a review of racial differences in educational attainment in the United
States.
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white education gap in the decades that followed.15
1.3.4 The Case of Hancock County
The case of Hancock County, Georgia, provides additional suggestive evidence of cotton’s
impact on education.16 For Hancock County, which was fairly representative of rural Geor-
gia, I hand-collected daily school attendance data for two school years (1913-14 and 1914-
15) that varied significantly in their cotton intensity.17 In 1913, Hancock produced 18,259
bales of cotton, while 24,561 bales were produced in 1914, a year-to-year increase of 34.5
percent. Moreover, the cotton harvest concluded much earlier in 1913 than in 1914, perhaps
as a result of the smaller harvest in that year. Therefore, comparing patterns of attendance
across these two years provides insight into how cotton production affected schooling, de-
spite the fact that the boll weevil did not arrive in Hancock until 1916.
Figure 1.4 presents the daily attendance data by race and sex for the 1914-15 school
year, and Figure 1.5 presents the same for the 1913-14 school year. Several features of these
graphs suggest that cotton production might have had a negative impact on fall attendance,
15The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 reduced cotton production by paying farmers to leave their land
fallow in an effort to raise the price of cotton. This reduction in acreage would have reduced the demand for
child labor. The mechanization of the cotton harvest in the 1950s and 60s, while not reducing cotton produc-
tion, provided a viable and cost-effective substitute to manually harvesting cotton, thus nearly eliminating the
demand for child labor in the crop’s production.
Indeed, previous work on the impact of the mechanization of cotton production is suggestive of its effect
on the education of blacks. Cogan (1982) shows that black teenage employment fell by 50 percent between
1950 and 1970 in the South, nearly all of which can be accounted for by a fall in agricultural employment.
He argues that the mechanization of farm production, and principally the diffusion of the mechanical cotton
picker, explains this shift out of agricultural employment. If these black teenagers were going to school
instead, then mechanization could explain the continued narrowing of the black-white differential in years of
schooling from 1950 through 1970. Margo and Finegan (1993) cast doubt on this argument, suggesting that
the decline in black teenage labor force participation was part of a long-run trend dating to the early 1900s.
However, this paper suggests that the arrival of the boll weevil and its negative impact on cotton production
could explain the early part of this trend.
16Hancock was chosen as a “case study” because it is quite possibly the only county in Georgia for which
daily attendance data from the early twentieth century have survived.
17Table C.1 provides statistics comparing rural Georgia to Hancock County, and Table C.2 provides statis-
tics on cotton production in Hancock for the agricultural seasons of 1913 and 1914. See Appendix C for
discussion.
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especially for blacks. The general pattern of attendance across both school years shows
that school attendance was lowest at the start of the year, increased throughout the fall, and
plateaued in the winter. While this pattern holds for all races and sexes, it is a much more
prominent feature of the school attendance graphs for blacks. From the start of school to
the winter, white school attendance increased between 25 and 42 percent, whereas black
school attendance more than doubled. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that
the cotton harvest depressed school attendance during the fall and had a greater negative
effect on the schooling of blacks than whites.
A few additional features of Figures 1.4 and 1.5 lend support to this interpretation. First,
school attendance reached the winter average later in 1914-15 than in 1913-14, possibly
reflecting the longer cotton harvest of 1914. Second, the pattern for whites is relatively flat
in 1913-14 in comparison to 1914-15, suggesting a greater demand for child labor in the
cotton harvest in 1914. Furthermore, the depressed fall attendance for whites in 1914 is
primarily driven by the behavior of white males, who were perhaps more likely to respond
to an increase in the demand for labor in the cotton harvest than were white females. Both
of these observations could be explained by the significantly larger harvest in 1914.
In summary, the daily attendance data for Hancock County indicate that cotton produc-
tion suppressed school attendance during the fall harvest season, more so for blacks than
whites. As evidence, the patterns of attendance appear to respond to changes in both the
scale and timing of the cotton harvest. Unfortunately, I do not have the data to empirically
test for the seasonal impact of cotton production on school attendance, but I am able to an-
alyze the effect of cotton on annual measures of educational attainment at the county level.
The rest of this paper is devoted to that end.
18
1.4 Data
In order to analyze the role of the cotton economy in determining educational attainment,
I have collected county-level data from the Annual Report of the Department of Education
to the General Assembly of the State of Georgia and the Report of the Comptroller-General
of the State of Georgia for the years 1909 to 1922 inclusive. The reports of the Department
of Education include recommendations to law makers, narratives of progress, requirements
for teacher certification, letters from county superintendents, and statistical summaries of
schools. While the recommendations, narratives, and letters are useful for getting a sense of
the issues of the day and as sources of anecdotal evidence, the statistical summaries are of
primary importance to this study. The statistical summaries are a source of a wide variety
of data on school quantity and quality at the county level. Useful statistics on educational
attainment (or school quantity) include the number of children enrolled in school by grade
and by sex and average daily attendance.18 Controls for the quality of education available in
these reports include: number of schools, number of teachers, teacher qualifications, num-
ber of days of school per year, receipts, teacher salary, and various other expenditures.19 In
most years these reports also provide the total school-age population of each county by sex.
However, for 1913 this information was collected from theCensus of the School Population
of Georgia 1913, which was published separately.20 With the exception of receipts, all of
18While the reports of the Department of Education include the enrollment of children broken down into
twelve grades, it is not clear how grade was determined for the ungraded and one-room schools that predom-
inated rural Georgia during the early twentieth century.
19The statistics provided in the reports of the Georgia Department of Education were compiled from forms
submitted annually to the state by the superintendent of schools of each county (Georgia Department of Ed-
ucation 1910, 38, 43). These documents would prove valuable as a check against errors in the published
reports. They could also be a source of additional useful statistics that were not compiled at the state level.
Unfortunately, the original reports of the county superintendents from this time period are no longer available
for Georgia. They are likely among the many documents discarded or lost during the 1930s as the state’s
archives were moved from the State Capitol Building to the basement of a private home.
20While often reported in the Annual Reports of the Georgia Department of Education, the total school-age
population was not calculated annually. Rather, the school-age population was determined by a census of
children aged 6 to 18 conducted at five year intervals beginning in 1878. Between school census years, the
school-age population data were interpolated assuming a constant growth rate.
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the above mentioned educational statistics were reported separately for blacks and whites
until after desegregation. Therefore, these reports are uniquely suited to analyze the sources
of racial differences in education.
The Report of the Comptroller-General of the State of Georgia, in addition to document-
ing the receipts and expenditures of the state, provides county-level statistics on wealth.
The reports provide detailed statistics on everything of taxable value, many of which are
reported separately by race. Principally, this serial publication is a source for average wealth
by race at the county level, which is necessary to control for the negative impact the boll
weevil had on wealth.21 Beyond average wealth, useful statistics include acreage and value
of improved land and value of agricultural products. To my knowledge, this is the first time
much of these data have been collected and organized in annual panel form—an important
contribution of this analysis.
The data collected for this paper are combined with data from three additional sources
previously collected and used by Lange, Olmstead, and Rhode (2009) to analyze the impact
of the boll weevil on cotton production. First, Cotton Production in the United States, an
annual bulletin published by the US Census Bureau, provides county-level data on cotton
production. Specifically, the bulletin provides the number of bales of cotton ginned in each
cotton-producing county.22 Second, USDA maps of the boll weevil’s spread through the
Cotton Belt (see Hunter and Coad 1923, 3) are sufficiently detailed to allow for the creation
of a variable tracking the presence of the boll weevil at the county level. I code the boll
weevil as being present if the boll weevil is found in any part of the county. There are,
however, nine counties in which the boll weevil was first found in 1916, yet the boll weevil
21County-level figures on wealth from the reports of the Georgia Comptroller-General are calculated based
on the assessed value of property, as opposed to the appraised value or sale price.
22The ability of farmers to take their crops across county lines to be ginned raises concern that the amount
of cotton ginned may not accurately reflect the amount of cotton grown in a given county. Lange, Olmstead,
and Rhode (2009, 697) address this concern by showing that the ginning data are highly correlated with farm
level production data from the census, with a correlation coefficient of 0.99 in 1899. Therefore, cotton ginned
is a very good proxy for the number of bales of cotton produced in a county.
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was not present in 1917. For these nine counties I code the boll weevil as not present
in 1916.23 Third, weather data from the United States Historical Climatology Network
provides a historical data series including monthly totals of precipitation, which I use to
estimate total summer rainfall at the county level—an alternative exogenous shock to cotton
production.
1.5 Theoretical Framework
I now present a simple theoretical framework for understanding how the cotton economy
impacted school enrollment and attendance through its effect on the marginal product of
child labor. Following the literature, this model of the time allocation of the child is gener-
ally based on Becker’s (1976) model of household production. More specifically, the model
in this section is a simplified version of Baland and Robinson’s (2000) one-sided altruism
model.
In this model, a household consists of one parent and one child.24 The parent’s utility,
U , is a function of the household’s current consumption (C) and the child’s future earnings.
This assumes that parents are altruistic in that they care about their child’s future welfare,
where the degree of altruism is given by . Following Collins and Margo (2006), I assume
that the child’s future earnings are a function of schooling and school quality.25 Thus, the
23The boll weevil made unprecedented gains in 1916, partly because of a mild winter, invading 31,000
square miles of previously uninfected territory in Georgia (US Bureau of the Census 1918, 19). However,
the frontier of the boll weevil was beaten back due to unfavorable weather conditions in 1917, leaving nine
counties in Georgia that were first infected in 1916 free of the boll weevil in 1917. Since the boll weevil is
only sparsely present along the frontier of its spread, its impact on cotton production in these nine counties in
1916 was minimal. Thus, I can safely treat these counties as being unaffected by the boll weevil in 1916.
24This model could easily be expanded to accommodaten children and endogenize family size, as in Baland
and Robinson’s (2000) endogenous fertility model. Yet schooling is independent of family size in their en-
dogenous fertility model, and thus the modification would not change the implications of the model presented
in this section. Such a model could examine questions regarding the impact of the boll weevil on fertility, but
that is beyond the scope of this work.
25Collins and Margo (2006) also include parent’s income, Y , as a determinant of child’s future earnings.
While parent’s income is correlated with child’s future income, parental income is generally not thought to
directly impact the future earnings of the child, but rather is presumed to act indirectly through mechanisms
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earnings function is E(tS; q), where tS is time in school and q is an exogenous measure of
school quality. The earnings function is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and its cross-
partials are positive. Thus, the utility of the parent can be written as follows:
U = V (C) + E(tS; q); (1.1)
where the utility of consumption, V , is increasing and concave.26
The budget constraint is
C = Y + wtL; (1.2)
where Y is the income of the parent; w is the value of the marginal product of the child’s
labor (or the child’s wage); and tL is the amount of the child’s time devoted to work. The
parent is assumed to work and supply labor inelastically.
Finally, the parent decides how to allocate the child’s time endowment (T ) between
labor (tL) and schooling (tS). Therefore, the time constraint of the child is
T = tL + tS: (1.3)
The parent maximizes utility with respect to tS , which yields the following first order
condition:
wV 0 > E1(tS; q) if tS = 0;
wV 0 = E1(tS; q) if 0 < tS < T;
wV 0 < E1(tS; q) if tS = T:
(1.4)
Assuming an interior solution, equation (1.4) shows that the level of schooling is ineffi-
ciently low as long as V 0 > . An inefficiently low level of schooling results when house-
such as education (Blanden, Gregg, and Macmillan 2007). Furthermore, the inclusion of parental income as
a complement to time in school in the child’s future earning function does not change the implications of the
model.
26As a simplification, I assume that the parent cares about the child’s future income rather than the child’s
future utility of consumption.
22
hold consumption is relatively low, due to the inability of the parent to borrow against the
child’s future earnings.27 Only when V 0 =  is the level of schooling efficient; in this case,
the marginal benefit of schooling (E1) is equal to the marginal cost (w).
The optimal level of schooling as determined by the household can be written as a func-
tion of the parameters of the model: tS = tS(w; Y; q; ). It follows from equation (1.4), and
the assumptions made on the utility of consumption and future earnings functions, that the
level of schooling is increasing in the last three arguments: parental income, school quality,
and parental altruism. To establish the sign of the partial derivative of schoolingwith respect
to the value of the marginal product of child labor, it is necessary to make an additional as-
sumption on the functional form of the utility of consumption, V , thatV 0+w(T tS)V 00 > 0.
This inequality can be rearranged as follows:
C
w(T   tS) >
 CV 00(C)
V 0(C)
: (1.5)
In this form it becomes clear that the assumption imposes an upper bound on the degree
of relative risk aversion of the parent. Ultimately, equation (1.5) assures that the substitu-
tion effect dominates the income effect of a change in the child’s wage. Fortunately, this
assumption holds for many commonly used utility functions.28 Given this assumption, the
level of schooling is decreasing in the value of the marginal product of labor, suggesting
that a reduction in the demand for child labor would lead to an increase in schooling.
Therefore, four parameters of the model could explain racial differences in educational
27Alternatively, an inefficiently high level of schooling would occur when household consumption is very
high. This results from an implicit assumption that bequests (nonnegative transfers from the parent to the
child) are not allowed. I exclude bequests as a simplification; however, adding bequests does not change the
implications of the model as described below.
28Since the left hand side of equation (1.5) is at least greater than one, the assumption always holds for
the log (V (C) = log(C)) and exponent (V (C) = (C + ), 0 <  < 1,   0) utility functions. The
assumption will also hold for the isoelastic and exponential utility functions given additional restrictions on
their parameters. However, it does not necessarily hold for the quadratic utility function (V (C) = C  C2,
 > 0), which exhibits increasing absolute risk aversion.
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attainment: Y , q, w, and . First, parental income (Y ) was lower for blacks than whites
on average, suggesting that the time devoted to schooling for blacks was less than that of
whites.29 Second, school quality (q) was on average lower for blacks than whites in the
early twentieth century. This empirical fact suggests that the returns to schooling were
lower for blacks, and thus the amount of time blacks spent in school was lower than that of
whites. Third, the value of the marginal product of child labor (w) is not assumed to differ
by race in this study; rather I examine how changes in the child’s wage impacted schooling
by race.30 Finally, there is no evidence that the parental degree of altruism () differed by
race or changed over the period studied by this paper. Thus  is assumed to be constant
across race and time.
I have shown that a fall in the value of the marginal product of child labor leads to
increased education, but the second hypothesis of this paper, that a shock to the child’s
wage will have a greater impact on black schooling than white schooling, remains to be
shown. To understand how a change in the value of the marginal product of child labor
differentially impacted enrollment by race, it is necessary to consider the corner solution
where tS = 0, which occurs when parental income is low, when school quality is low,
or both. To simplify, assume that there were no racial differences in school quality, and
consider just the distribution of parental income.31 Suppose that parental income for both
29Since the census did not include questions on income until 1940, it is hard to get an accurate picture of
the racial disparity of income in the early twentieth-century South. However, Smith (1984) estimates that the
ratio of black-to-white male income was 0.455 in 1910 in the United States.
30As previously noted, laborers in the cotton harvest were paid per pound of cotton picked, without regard
for age, sex, or race. Thus, the marginal product of an individual’s labor in the cotton harvest was dependent
entirely upon how much cotton he or she could pick. While individual differences in motivation, physical
aptitude, tolerance of tedium, et cetera, generated significant variation in the marginal product of labor in the
cotton harvest, there is no evidence to suggest that members of one race were biologically better suited than
the other to pick cotton.
Differences in the value of the marginal product of child labor by race could have merit in other studies.
For example, Walters and James (1992) claim that segregation largely prevented blacks from employment in
the textile industry. Therefore, in areas dominated by the textile industry it is reasonable to suggest that the
value of the marginal product of child labor was lower for blacks since they did not have access to jobs in
textile mills.
31The same prediction can be derived by assuming the opposite (that parental income did not differ by race)
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blacks and whites is normally distributed, with the mean parental income for whites being
greater than that of blacks, as shown in Figure 1.6. Then, at an initial wagew0 the proportion
of white children enrolled (that is, attending some school) is greater than the proportion
of black children enrolled, as described above. Since the enrollment rate of both blacks
and whites was greater than 50 percent in early twentieth-century Georgia (see Table 1.1),
assume thatw0 is such that more than half of the black population is enrolled in school. Now
consider a negative shock to the value of the marginal product of child labor, where the new
wage is denoted by w1 (w1 < w0). As shown in Figure 1.6, the result of a negative shock
to the child’s wage is a larger increase in the enrollment rate of blacks than that of whites.
Thus, the model suggests that black enrollment would respond more than white enrollment
to a change in the value of the marginal product of child labor under the conditions that
prevailed in early twentieth-century Georgia.
In the context of the model, an exogenous negative shock to cotton production would
reduce both parental income (Y ) and the value of the marginal product of child labor (w).
These two parameters have opposite effects on the outcome of interest (tS). Empirically, I
am interested in isolating the effect of a shock to the child’s wage because it is also a shock
to the opportunity cost of schooling. Holding parental income constant, the model suggests
that cotton production is negatively related to school attendance and enrollment. Moreover,
it predicts that an exogenous change in cotton production will impact the enrollment rate of
blacks more than that of whites. Therefore, a negative shock to cotton production, such as
the arrival of the boll weevil, is predicted to increase the school enrollment rate of children,
with the effect being greater for blacks than for whites.
and instead considering only the distribution of school quality.
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1.6 Empirical Framework
The hypothesis of this paper is that exogenous reductions in cotton production in the South
increased the school enrollment rate of children by reducing the marginal product of child
labor in cotton production. This effect, moreover, is predicted to have been greater for
blacks than for whites. A simple regression of measures of education on bales of cotton
ginned could be used to test this hypothesis. This linear regression is represented by the
following equation:
yct =  +   COTTONct + Xct + c + t + "ct; (1.6)
which includes controlsXct for county c and year t, as well as county and year fixed effects.
The county-level controls include average wealth and measures of school quality (teachers
per 100 same-race children of school age, schools per 1000 same-race children of school
age, days of school per year, and school board receipts per child). The coefficient of interest
is , the effect of cotton production on measures of education.
However, one concern in testing the hypothesis in this manner is the likely endogeneity
of cotton production to the schooling decision. It is reasonable to think that a farmer, when
deciding howmuch cotton to plant in the spring, would consider whether his children would
be available to help with the fall harvest. If the children were to attend school, then their
labor could not be counted on in the fall. Thus, OLS estimates of equation (1.6) are likely
contaminated by reverse causation: increased schooling, and thus a reduction in the supply
of child labor, caused a fall in cotton production due to the higher marginal cost of labor.
I address this concern by using an instrumental variables strategy to estimate the effect of
cotton production onmeasures of educational attainment. Therefore, bales of cotton ginned,
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COTTONct, is treated as endogenous and modeled as
COTTONct = a+ bZct + cXct + c + t + ct; (1.7)
where Zct is an indicator variable taking a value of 1 if the boll weevil is present in county
c in year t, and 0 otherwise. The exclusion restriction for this instrument is that the boll
weevil impacted schooling only through its impact on cotton production. The assumption
that this holds is quite reasonable as the boll weevil’s only direct effect was on cotton. It
had no direct impact on humans, livestock, or other crops.
The spread of the boll weevil through the South provides an arguably exogenous source
of variation in the production of cotton at the county level during the time period covered by
this study. The boll weevil had a direct and substantial impact on cotton production in the
South as discussed in greater detail above. The larvae of the boll weevil live in and consume
the fiber-producing squares and bolls of the cotton plant, reducing yield. Efforts to control
the insect increased the cost of growing cotton in affected counties. The reduction in yield
and increased cost of farming cotton as a result of the presence of the boll weevil made
alternative crops, such as corn, more attractive to farmers. Lange, Olmstead, and Rhode
(2009) find that total cotton production fell by approximately 50 percent within five years
of initial contact with the boll weevil.
Little was known about the boll weevil prior to its spread into the United States; its
initial entry was unpredicted and the scale of its destruction unknown. However, as the boll
weevil progressed, knowledge about the pest increased, and farmers were able to predict
its arrival and modify their behavior. In fact, Lange, Olmstead, and Rhode (2009) show
that cotton production increased just prior to the arrival of the boll weevil, suggesting that
farmers tried to produce one last large crop before the boll weevil arrived. However, there
is no reason to think that schooling decisions could have affected the boll weevil’s spread.
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A potential concern with using cotton production as a proxy for the marginal product
of child labor is the existence of alternative mechanisms by which exogenous changes in
cotton production could affect the household schooling decision. First, a negative shock to
cotton production, such as the arrival of the boll weevil, would negatively affect household
wealth. Since wealth is positively correlated with schooling, while the marginal product of
child labor is negatively correlated with schooling, the wealth effect would bias the expected
results toward zero. Average wealth at the county level is included as a control in order to
mitigate this concern.32 Additionally, lower household wealth implies a reduction in the
tax base and, potentially, a reduction in the supply of funds for education. However, in
the case of Georgia, the vast majority of school board receipts were apportioned from the
State School Fund rather than being raised by local taxation in the early twentieth century.
Georgia’s School Fund did not change in response to cotton production, which suggests that
the destruction caused by the boll weevil had little impact on school finances. Nevertheless,
to address this concern, I control for receipts of county school boards per school-age child.
Two restrictions are imposed on the sample of counties included in the analysis. First,
the analysis is limited to those counties that maintained public schools for blacks throughout
the study period. There were 11 counties that had almost no black population, and, thus,
they did not always provide schooling for black children. Second, the analysis is limited to
cotton-producing counties. There are 12 counties in Georgia for which there are no data on
cotton production. Most of these are either in the mountainous area of northeast Georgia or
along the coast, both areas that are unsuitable for growing cotton.33 Additionally, in order
32Because the measure of average wealth I use is based on the assessed value of property rather than the
market value, it may understate the true effect of the boll weevil on property values. For this reason and
because I cannot control for changes in the distribution of wealth, some potential bias remains. Thus, my
results may understate the true impact of a change in the marginal product of child labor on schooling.
33Interestingly, there is a significant amount of overlap in the counties eliminated by the first and second
restrictions. That is, counties that did not produce cotton tended to have very few black residents. This is
perhaps an artifact of the distribution of the black population prior to the Civil War. Jointly, the first and
second restrictions only eliminate 14 counties.
28
to provide a balanced panel of consistently defined geographical units, counties whose bor-
ders changed within the time period studied are merged into the smallest consistent unit.34
Between 1909 and 1922, 14 new counties were created from parts of 22 existing counties.
The adjustment for border changes merges these 36 counties into 8 “super counties.” Al-
together, these restrictions and adjustments reduce the number of counties in the sample
from 160 to 121. Thus, data on 121 Georgia counties over 14 years are used to conduct the
analysis.
Finally, some school districts are reported separately from the county statistics in Geor-
gia’s Annual Report of the Department of Education. These school systems operated in-
dependently of the counties and consist of cities and towns. Since this paper is concerned
with rural areas, statistics for these “special systems” are not included in the county totals.
1.7 Results
In this section, I present summary statistics and an analysis of the impact of the cotton
economy on measures of educational attainment using data on 121 counties in Georgia
for the years 1909 to 1922. Table 1.1 contains summary statistics for the Georgia data
on schooling, cotton, and wealth in 1914, the year prior to the boll weevil’s arrival in the
state. Summary statistics are provided for blacks and whites separately where available. In
1914, 71 percent of school-age black children were enrolled in school, compared with 85
percent among whites, for a racial difference of 14.7 percentage points. The racial gap in
average daily attendance per enrolled child was smaller, 8.6 percentage points. However,
the average attendance rate, for both races, at these rural county schools was fairly low at
63 percent.
The summary statistics presented in Table 1.1 also show a substantial gap in school
34The results presented below are robust to the exclusion of the 36 counties (8 “super counties”) whose
borders changed between 1909 and 1922.
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resources. Since there are approximately 20 days of school per month, the statistics reveal
that white schools were open for roughly 6.5 months a year while black schools ran only
5.5 months on average. Additionally, there were 2.4 white teachers per 100 white children
of school age, but only 1.4 black teachers per 100 black children of school age. Even after
adjusting for differences in the enrollment rate, the racial differential in the student-teacher
ratio is still very large. On average, there were 51 enrolled black students per teacher,
but only 35 enrolled white students per teacher. In terms of schools, there were 2.9 fewer
schools for blacks per 1000 school-age children than for whites. However, blacks were
much more likely to attend one-room schools, whereas whites often attended multi-room
graded schools. Thus, this measure of access to schools likely understates the true disparity.
Finally, the average county school board received less than 5 dollars per school-age child.
While receipts were not provided by race, expenditures were. The statewide expenditures
for 1914 show that 73 percent of school board funds were spent on whites, 17 percent on
blacks, and the remaining 10 percent was spent on items not reported separately by race
(Georgia Department of Education 1915). Since blacks made up 46 percent of the school-
age population, this is evidence that black schools were clearly not equal to white schools,
which is consistent with prior work in the “separate-but-equal” literature (see, for example,
Kousser 1980; Margo 1990).
I now turn to an examination of the relationship between cotton and schooling using
the instrumental variables approach outlined in the previous section. Table 1.2 presents
the reduced-form effects of the boll weevil on log enrollment rate (total enrollment divided
by school-age population). Columns (1) through (5) provide estimates for blacks, while
columns (6) through (10) provide estimates for whites. The coefficients on the indicator for
the presence of the boll weevil suggest that the arrival of the insect had a positive effect on
the enrollment rate of blacks. Indeed, the coefficient of .039 in column (1) implies that the
boll weevil explains a 4 percent increase in the school enrollment rate of black children in
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Georgia. This result suggests the boll weevil increased the enrollment rate of blacks by 2.8
percentage points at the 1914 mean, or placed roughly an additional 10,000 black children
ages 6 through 18 in school in the state of Georgia alone. Column (2) shows this effect to
be robust to the inclusion of wealth and school quality controls. Columns (3) through (5)
further explore the robustness of this estimate, showing that it is robust to both the inclusion
of county-specific linear time trends and interaction terms between the boll weevil dummy
and county-level controls. Conversely, the results for whites, shown in columns (6) to (10),
suggest that the boll weevil caused less than a 1 percent increase in school enrollment rate,
but these estimates are not statistically different from zero at the 90-percent confidence
level.
The results shown in Table 1.2 confirm that the arrival of the boll weevil, an exoge-
nous, negative shock to cotton production, had a significant impact on the enrollment rate
of blacks. However, they do not reveal whether the estimated effect of the boll weevil dif-
fered significantly by race. To test this, I present in Table 1.3 reduced-form estimates of
pooled regressions of log enrollment rate on the presence of the boll weevil, including an
indicator for blacks and an interaction term between the black and boll weevil indicators.
The coefficients on the interaction term are positive and highly significant in all specifica-
tions, confirming that the boll weevil had a greater positive impact on the black enrollment
rate than the white enrollment rate. The various specifications show this result to be highly
robust to the inclusion of race-specific county-level controls, county-specific linear time
trends, an interaction term between the indicator for blacks and each school quality and
wealth control, and a control for the proportion of black, school-age children. Together, the
findings presented in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 suggest that the boll weevil reduced the racial gap
in enrollment by 14.6 percent at the 1914 mean. Moreover, the boll weevil accounts for 30
percent of the convergence in black and white enrollment rates between 1914 and 1929 in
31
Georgia.35
Table 1.4 presents two-stage least-squares estimates of the model given by equation
(1.6) with log enrollment rate as the dependent variable. Panel (a) provides the first-stage
results, while panel (b) shows the estimates for the corresponding second stage. I present
two sets of specifications: models considering only blacks in columns (1) through (3) and
models considering only whites in columns (4) through (6).
The first-stage results presented in panel (a) estimate the effect of the boll weevil on
the log number of bales of cotton ginned. The models presented show a strong negative
effect of the boll weevil on cotton production in Georgia, which is consistent with the work
of Lange, Olmstead, and Rhode (2009). The  :205 coefficient on the presence of the boll
weevil in column (1), for example, suggests that the boll weevil was associated with a 19
percent decline in total output. This result is robust across specifications, with the coeffi-
cient varying between :198 and :205, and is highly significant in all models. The fact that
the estimated effect of the boll weevil on cotton remains almost unchanged when controls
for either race are included suggests that the boll weevil is a good instrument. The first-
stage F-statistic for the excluded instrument ranges from 15.72 to 17.36, allaying concerns
that the boll weevil is a weak instrument. In summary, these first-stage results confirm the
relevance of the boll weevil and suggest that it is a strong instrument for cotton production.36
The second-stage results, shown in panel (b), reveal the impact of cotton production on
log school enrollment rate. These results are suggestive of strong racial differences in the
schooling response to changes in cotton production. The  :191 coefficient on log cotton
35This figure is calculated as follows: A 4 percent increase in the black enrollment rate is equivalent to a
2.61 percentage point increase in the statewide black enrollment rate in 1914. Similarly, a 1 percent increase
in the white enrollment rate is equivalent to a 0.87 percentage point increase in the statewide white enrollment
rate in 1914. Thus, the enrollment gap narrowed by 1.74 percentage points due to the boll weevil. Between
1914 and 1929, the black-white differential in enrollment rate fell by 5.8 percentage points, of which the boll
weevil can account for 30 percent.
36Including both the indicator for the presence of the boll weevil and log summer rainfall (discussed further
below) as instruments for cotton production and using Hansen’s J test of overidentifying restrictions, suggests
that both candidate instruments are independent of the second-stage error term.
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bales in column (1) suggests that a 10 percent reduction in cotton production caused a 2
percent increase in the school enrollment rate of blacks. The models in columns (2) and (3)
show that this result is robust to the inclusion of race-specific school quality controls and
a control for the average wealth of blacks at the county level. With the addition of these
controls the coefficient for log cotton bales is significant at the 95-percent confidence level.
Columns (4) though (6) show the corresponding results for whites. The coefficient for log
cotton bales in column (4) suggests that a 10 percent reduction in cotton production led to
a 0.4 percent increase in the enrollment rate of whites. However, the relationship between
cotton and white enrollment is not statistically significant in any of the specifications pre-
sented. The differential results by race are consistent with the prediction that blacks were
more sensitive to changes in cotton production than whites.
The results for the school quality controls in the regressions explaining enrollment are as
expected. The number of teachers, number of schools, length of the school year, and school
board receipts are all positively correlated with enrollment rate for both blacks and whites.
Interestingly, the number of schools per 1000 same-race children has a greater effect on
the enrollment rate for blacks than whites; a 10 percent increase in the number of schools
is associated with a 2 percent increase in the black enrollment rate, but only a 0.8 percent
increase in the white enrollment rate. The racial difference in this result might be because
an increase in the number of schools reduced the cost of attending school more for blacks
than whites, since whites had better access to transportation.
In order to understand how the boll weevil impacted enrollment relative to the date of
its arrival, I replace the indicator for the presence of the boll weevil with 10 leads and 5 lags
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for the year of its arrival.37 The empirical specification of the reduced form becomes
yct =  +
k5X
k 10;k 6=0
k  1[t BWc = k] + Xct + c + t + "ct; (1.8)
where BWc denotes the year the boll weevil entered county c. The specification retains a
subset of the county-level controls for school quality (teachers per 100 same-race children,
school per 1000 same-race children, and term length) and county and year fixed effects.
The indicator for the year of the boll weevil’s arrival is omitted, and thus all effects are
measured relative to the arrival date of the insect.
Figure 1.7 presents the coefficients on the leads and lags for log cotton bales and log
enrollment by race. The solid lines represent the main effects, while the dashed lines indi-
cate the 95-percent confidence interval. Panel (a) shows that the boll weevil had a relatively
small immediate impact on bales of cotton ginned, but by three years after its arrival pro-
duction had fallen by more than 50 percent. This result is quite similar to that of Lange,
Olmstead, and Rhode (2009) in a similar analysis that considered the boll weevil’s impact
on the entire Cotton Belt. Panel (b) shows that the enrollment rate of blacks began to in-
crease the year prior to the boll weevil’s arrival, suggesting that there may have been some
anticipation effects. Two years after the arrival date, the black enrollment rate had increased
by roughly 5 percent relative to the year of arrival, with no sign of a reversal five years after
being hit. This suggests that the household schooling decision fully responded to the pres-
ence of the boll weevil two years after its arrival. In comparison, the effect of the leads and
lags of the boll weevil’s arrival on the enrollment rate of whites yields a remarkably flat
line (shown in panel [c]).
The effect of cotton production on enrollment rates across sex is also worth exploring.
37In order to view a 10-year pretrend, I collected additional data on education and cotton ginning for the
years 1903 to 1908.
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If females had a lower marginal product of labor in the cotton harvest than males, then their
school enrollment might be less affected by cotton production.38 Indeed, the gap between
the male and female enrollment rate of black children, as seen in Table 1.1 and in the graphs
of daily attendance for Hancock County, may be in part due to a higher demand for black
males in the production of cotton. Table 1.5 displays the second-stage results of 2SLS re-
gressions on log enrollment rate broken down by race and sex. Column (1) shows that a 10
percent decrease in cotton production led to a 2.2 percent increase in the enrollment rate of
black males. The effect of a 10 percent reduction in cotton production on the enrollment
rate of black females, as shown in column (3), is a slightly smaller 1.7 percent increase.
The magnitude of these effects is only slightly reduced by the addition of wealth and school
quality controls, while the coefficients are statistically significant at the 90-percent confi-
dence level. However, the estimates of cotton’s effect on school enrollment for black males
and black females are not statistically different from one another. For completeness, the re-
sults of the corresponding models of white male and female enrollment rates are presented
in columns (5) through (8). I find the effect of cotton production on the enrollment rate of
white males and females to be negative but small and statistically insignificant.
1.7.1 Boll Weevil versus Summer Rain
While the boll weevil provides an excellent natural experiment with which to test the impact
of changes in cotton production on schooling, one might be concerned by the scale of the
boll weevil’s impact. That is, such a dramatic and sustained drop in the amount of cotton
grown would likely induce structural changes in the local economy. One change might be
that the relative returns to education increased as farming became a less attractive future
38Metzer (1975) suggests the opposite, that young females had a higher marginal product of labor in picking
cotton than youngmales. From the account books of one large antebellum plantation, he calculates that female
children ages 13 through 16 picked 91.7 pounds of cotton per day on average, in comparison to the 83.7 pounds
per day picked by their male counterparts. A difference in means test reveals the differential in picking rate
by sex to be statistically significant at the 95-percent level.
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occupation for one’s children. If this was the case, then the effect of cotton production on
enrollment rates shown in Table 1.4 would include both households’ responses to the lower
marginal product of child labor and changes in their expectations regarding the relative
returns to schooling. An alternative instrument with a more transient impact on cotton
production would be unlikely to have long-run impacts on the local economy, and therefore
would be useful in confirming the role of the marginal product of child labor in household
schooling decisions.
One potential alternative instrument with only a seasonal effect on cotton is total summer
rainfall (the sum of precipitation for the months of May, June, July, and August). Summer
rainfall was certainly a determinant of cotton yield; the crop required at least twenty-five
inches of rainfall in the absence of irrigation (Wright 1996, 81). Additionally, since school
was not in session during the summer, rainfall during this season would have no direct ef-
fect on school enrollment.39 Thus, summer rain satisfies both the relevance and exclusion
restrictions. Table 1.6 presents reduced-form effects of log summer rainfall on log enroll-
ment rate by race. The results in columns (1) through (5) confirm a positive and statistically
significant relationship between summer rainfall and enrollment rate for blacks. The coef-
ficient of .064 in column (1) suggests that a 10 percent increase in summer rainfall led to
a 0.6 percent increase in the black enrollment rate. The various specifications show this to
be a fairly robust result. Only in column (3), which includes school quality and wealth con-
trols and county-specific linear time trends, as well as county and year fixed effects, is the
estimate not significantly different from zero at the 90-percent confidence level. The esti-
mates for whites, shown in columns (6) through (10), suggest a negative correlation between
39 Reports by county school superintendents published in the Georgia Department of Education’s Annual
Reports reveal that a few counties opened schools for blacks in July and August as a way of adjusting the term
to accommodate the cotton harvest. While rainfall in the summer may have had some impact on attendance
during this two-month term, it is unlikely to have had an impact on enrollment. If summer rain did have a
negative impact on enrollment, then the results of 2SLS regressions of enrollment rate on cotton production
using summer rainfall as the instrument would produce conservative estimates of cotton’s impact.
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summer rainfall and enrollment rates, but once again they are not statistically significant.
Table 1.7 presents 2SLS regressions on log enrollment rate by race in the same format as
Table 1.4. The only difference is that in this case log summer rain is used as the instrument
instead of an indicator variable for the presence of the boll weevil. The first-stage results,
displayed in panel (a), show that log summer rain is a very strong instrument for cotton
production; the F-statistic for the excluded instrument is above 45 in every specification.
The  :496 coefficient in column (1) suggests that a 10 percent increase in summer rainfall
results in a 5 percent decrease in the number of bales of cotton ginned. This result is highly
significant and robust across specifications, confirming the relevance of summer rainfall to
cotton production.
The results of the second stage, presented in panel (b), look quite similar to those pre-
sented in Table 1.4. They show that reductions in cotton production have a positive and
statistically significant effect on the enrollment rate of blacks, while having little, if any,
effect on white enrollment. These results confirm the relevance of the marginal product of
child labor in the cotton harvest to the household schooling decision, at least for blacks. The
major difference between the estimates provided here and those in Table 1.4 is the magni-
tude of cotton’s impact on black enrollment rates. As shown in column (1) of Table 1.4(b),
using the boll weevil as the instrument reveals that a 10 percent reduction in cotton led to
a 2 percent increase in the black enrollment rate. In comparison, with summer rainfall as
the instrument the results show that a 10 percent reduction in cotton led to a 1.5 percent in-
crease in the black enrollment rate, as shown in column (1) of Table 1.7(b). The difference
between these two estimates increases to around .8 percent when school quality controls
are included.
As mentioned above, one reason for the difference in the magnitude of these results
might stem from the permanence of the shock caused by the instruments. Whereas the boll
weevil represents a long-term shock to cotton production, the effects of summer rainfall are
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limited to a single year. Previous work in the literature on child labor versus schooling has
utilized short-run shocks, such as rice prices (Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti 2009) and rainfall
(Boozer and Suri 2001), as instruments. This is potentially troubling since policies regard-
ing child labor could be both permanent and have long-run impacts on the local economy.
For instance, a tax credit incentivizing mechanization in order to reduce the marginal prod-
uct of child labor in agriculture would be perceived as permanent and increase the returns to
schooling for farmers (assuming the more educated are better able to maintain and operate
the newly adopted machinery). If the difference in my results is indeed due to the per-
manence of the shock, then reliance on short-term shocks as instruments to inform policy
decisions may result in the undervaluation of policies regarding child labor.
1.7.2 Alternative Measures of Education
I now consider the boll weevil’s impact on alternative measures of educational attainment,
starting with attendance rates. An analysis of attendance is complicated by cotton’s impact
on enrollment. Ideally, I would examine the impact of the boll weevil on the attendance
rate of only those children who would have been enrolled had the boll weevil not arrived.
Since this counterfactual is unobservable, I instead analyze the effect of the boll weevil on
two different measures of attendance: average daily attendance divided by enrollment and
average daily attendance divided by the school-age population.
Table 1.8 presents the results of regressions of log attendance rates on the indicator for
the presence of the boll weevil. The dependent variable in the odd columns is log attendance
rate relative to enrollment, while log attendance rate relative to the same-race school-age
population is the dependent variable in even columns. Columns (1) and (2) present estimates
for blacks. Columns (3) and (4) present estimates for whites. And columns (5) and (6)
present estimates of pooled regressions, including observations for both blacks and whites,
with a dummy variable indicating blacks and an interaction term between black and boll
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weevil (black X boll weevil).
While the coefficient for boll weevil is not statistically significant in any of the race-
specific regressions, the sign of these coefficients can be illuminating. The negative sign of
the coefficient of the boll weevil in column (1) is not as expected—a decrease in the conflict
between schooling and the cotton harvest due to reduced cotton production should increase
fall attendance, thus raising the attendance rate of blacks. However, this expectation does
not account for the attendance behavior of the marginal enrollees (those that would not
have been enrolled had the boll weevil not arrived). Thus, one possible explanation for the
negative coefficient is that the marginal enrollees had below average attendance records,
offsetting any increase in the attendance rate of those who were previously enrolled. This is
consistent with the idea espoused by many county school superintendents that farm children
were unlikely to attend school for the full term. The positive sign on the coefficient for the
boll weevil in column (2) is consistent with the above interpretation and suggests that the
overall impact on attendance—due to the attendance behavior of those previously enrolled
and the marginal enrollees—was positive.40
The estimates presented in column (5) of Table 1.8 show no evidence of an effect of the
boll weevil on attendance relative to enrollment, in absolute terms or differentially across
race. Again, this is possibly confounded by the attendance behavior of the marginal en-
rollees. In contrast, the estimates of the pooled regression of log overall attendance rate
(attendance relative to the school-age population) on the boll weevil, presented in column
(6), suggest the boll weevil had a differential impact on overall attendance by race. The
.043 coefficient on the interaction term black X boll weevil suggests that the overall black
attendance rate increased by 4.4 percent as a result of the boll weevil, in addition to its effect
on whites. This finding reinforces the results for enrollment as it confirms that there were
40I omit the results of 2SLS regressions of attendance on cotton bales since the estimates are imprecise, as
could be expected given the reduced-form results; however, the 2SLS estimates of cotton’s impact take the
same sign as the coefficients for the boll weevil in the reduced form.
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real gains, at least relative to whites, in the percent of the black population attending school
on a regular basis after the arrival of the boll weevil.
Another measure of academic performance that might be impacted by the demand for
child labor in cotton production is the first grade retention rate (the proportion of children
held back to repeat first grade). The infrequent school attendance of blacks due to their
participation in the cotton harvest led to a distortion in the age-for-grade distribution because
some children did not attend enough days of school to advance from one grade to the next.
Additionally, irregular enrollment often led to the repetition of grades. Thus, as Southern
farmers moved away from cotton, the first grade retention rate of blacks is expected to
fall. While the reports of the Georgia Department of Education do not provide the first
grade retention rate directly, it has been argued that the ratio of first grade to second grade
enrollment serves as a good proxy for the first grade retention rate in the absence of growth
in enrollment (Welch 1973). Since the above results suggest that the overall enrollment rate
changed significantly with the arrival of the boll weevil, at least for blacks, this simple ratio
must be adjusted for the growth rate of enrollment (as shown in Appendix B).
The results of pooled reduced-form regressions of first grade retention on an indicator
for presence of the boll weevil, an indicator for blacks, and the interaction of the two are
presented in Table 1.9. The results in column (1) suggest that the boll weevil reduced the
first grade retention rate of blacks 12 percent more than it reduced that of whites. This result
is significant at the 90-percent confidence level. Columns (2) through (8) show the result
to be fairly robust to the inclusion of county-specific linear time trends, an interaction term
between the indicator for blacks and each school quality and wealth control, and a control
for the proportion of the school-age population that is black. Only in the specification shown
in column (3), which includes the school quality and wealth controls, as well as year and
county fixed effects, is this result statistically insignificant. Thus, these results suggest that
the arrival of the boll weevil also reduced the racial difference in first grade retention, or
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the average number of years spent in first grade.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper documents the effect of the cotton economy on educational attainment in the
early twentieth-century Southern United States. More specifically, this paper analyzes how
reductions in cotton production following the arrival of the boll weevil impacted school
enrollment and attendance rates. While there is little evidence that the cotton economy
played a role in the schooling decision of whites, my results suggest clearly that the demand
for child labor in cotton production suppressed the enrollment rate of blacks. The fact that
cotton production does not seem to have a significant impact on the enrollment of whites
between 1909 and 1922 in Georgia may be because whites, who were wealthier on average
than blacks, relied on sources of hired labor rather than their children to harvest cotton.
The differential effect by race implies that the shift away from cotton after the coming
of the boll weevil significantly reduced the black-white education gap. Furthermore, this
suggests that other events that reduced the demand for child labor generated by cotton, such
as the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the mechanization of cotton production, may have
contributed to convergence of the racial gap in education through the mid-twentieth century.
The results of this paper demonstrate that the production of a child labor–intensive crop
impacted educational outcomes in the early twentieth century. This gives new insight into
the role of the seasonal demand for child labor in agricultural production in the house-
hold schooling decision. Specifically, the results of this paper suggest that the production
of child labor–intensive crops significantly reduces educational attainment. Further work
might consider long-run effects of the boll weevil on years of schooling, migration, and
labor market outcomes using linked census data. Additionally, an examination of how the
household schooling decision responds to different local cropping patterns would be ben-
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eficial to the literature. Understanding how school enrollment and attendance are affected
by the demand for labor generated by agriculture is key to understanding how to increase
educational attainment in rural areas of the developing world today.
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1.9 Figures
Figure 1.1: The Spread of the Boll Weevil through Georgia
Sources: Adapted from Hunter and Coad, 1923, The Boll Weevil Problem, p. 3. Base map
provided by National Atlas of the United States, July 30, 2013, http://nationalatlas.gov.
43
Figure 1.2: Trends in School Quality in Georgia by Race, 1900-1930
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Sources: Calculated using data collected from the Georgia Department of Education, An-
nual Report of the Department of Education to General Assembly of the State of Georgia,
1901-1931. The number of teachers with normal training is not available after 1922. The
length of the school term was not reported separately by race prior to 1909.
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Figure 1.3: Racial Gap in Years of Schooling by Birth Cohort in Georgia
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Source: Calculated using the IPUMS census data (Ruggles et al. 2010).
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Figure 1.4: Daily School Attendance, Hancock County 1914-15
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Notes: Weekdays (Monday to Friday) for weeks during which school was in session are
displayed on the x-axis. The total number of students attending is shown on the y-axis. The
vertical line labeled “White Start” indicates the start of the school year for whites, while the
line labeled “Black Start” indicates the start of the school year for blacks. For two school
holidays, a school fair on October 29 and 30 (white schools only) and Thanksgiving on
November 26, attendance is treated as missing. For these dates, the lines represent the av-
erage of attendance on the school days preceding and following the holiday. As school was
closed for winter break for the weeks of December 21 and 28, these two weeks are omitted
from the x-axis. The samples consist of all schools for which both male and female atten-
dance was regularly reported throughout the school year. Unfortunately, daily attendance
was not recorded for white schools after winter break, even though school was in session.
Source: Hancock County School Superintendent, “Daily Attendance Record,” Record
Group 170, Sub-Group 8, Series 100, Georgia Archives, Morrow, GA.
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Figure 1.5: Daily School Attendance, Hancock County 1913-14
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
35
0
At
te
nd
an
ce
White Start Black Start
Oc
t. 1
3
Oc
t. 2
0
Oc
t. 2
7
No
v. 
3
No
v. 
10
No
v. 
17
No
v. 
24
De
c. 
1
De
c. 
8
De
c. 
15
Ja
n. 
5
Ja
n. 
12
Ja
n. 
19
Ja
n. 
26
Fe
b. 
2
Fe
b. 
9
Fe
b. 
16
Fe
b.2
3
1913−14 Term School Day
(a) Whites, all students
30
0
50
0
70
0
90
0
11
00
13
00
15
00
At
te
nd
an
ce
White Start Black Start
Oc
t. 1
3
Oc
t. 2
0
Oc
t. 2
7
No
v. 
3
No
v. 
10
No
v. 
17
No
v. 
24
De
c. 
1
De
c. 
8
De
c. 
15
Ja
n. 
5
Ja
n. 
12
Ja
n. 
19
Ja
n. 
26
Fe
b. 
2
Fe
b. 
9
Fe
b. 
16
Fe
b.2
3
1913−14 Term School Day
(b) Blacks, all students
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
At
te
nd
an
ce
White Start Black Start
Oc
t. 1
3
Oc
t. 2
0
Oc
t. 2
7
No
v. 
3
No
v. 
10
No
v. 
17
No
v. 
24
De
c. 
1
De
c. 
8
De
c. 
15
Ja
n. 
5
Ja
n. 
12
Ja
n. 
19
Ja
n. 
26
Fe
b. 
2
Fe
b. 
9
Fe
b. 
16
Fe
b.2
3
1913−14 Term School Day
white female children white male children
(c) Whites, females and males
10
0
30
0
50
0
70
0
90
0
At
te
nd
an
ce
White Start Black Start
Oc
t. 1
3
Oc
t. 2
0
Oc
t. 2
7
No
v. 
3
No
v. 
10
No
v. 
17
No
v. 
24
De
c. 
1
De
c. 
8
De
c. 
15
Ja
n. 
5
Ja
n. 
12
Ja
n. 
19
Ja
n. 
26
Fe
b. 
2
Fe
b. 
9
Fe
b. 
16
Fe
b.2
3
1913−14 Term School Day
black female children black male children
(d) Blacks, females and males
Notes: Weekdays (Monday to Friday) for weeks during which school was in session are
displayed on the x-axis. The total number of students attending is shown on the y-axis. The
vertical line labeled “White Start” indicates the start of the school year for whites, while
the line labeled “Black Start” indicates the start of the school year for blacks. For two
school holidays, a school fair on October 30 and 31 (white schools only) and Thanksgiving
on November 27, attendance is treated as missing. For these dates, the lines represent the
average of attendance on the school days preceding and following the holiday. As school
was closed for winter break for the weeks of December 22 and 29, these two weeks are
omitted from the x-axis. The samples consist of all schools for which both male and female
attendance was regularly reported throughout the school year.
Source: Hancock County School Superintendent, “Daily Attendance Record,” Record
Group 170, Sub-Group 8, Series 100, Georgia Archives, Morrow, GA.
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Figure 1.6: Impact of a Change in Child’s Wage on Enrollment
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Figure 1.7: Cotton Production and School Enrollment Relative to the Boll
Weevil’s Arrival
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Sources: See the text.
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1.10 Tables
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for Georgia, 1914
Variable Definition Mean
All Black White Diff.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
enrollment Enrollment rate 0.780 0.707 0.854 -0.147***
(0.137) (0.136) (0.093) (0.015)
Enrollment rate, female 0.811 0.746 0.875 -0.129***
(0.141) (0.142) (0.107) (0.016)
Enrollment rate, male 0.751 0.669 0.834 -0.165***
(0.151) (0.150) (0.098) (0.016)
attendance
enrollment Daily attendance rate relative to enroll. 0.630 0.587 0.673 -0.086***
(0.098) (0.094) (0.082) (0.011)
attendance
school pop. Daily attendance rate relative to pop. 0.494 0.414 0.573 -0.159***
(0.123) (0.101) (0.087) (0.012)
teachers Teachers per 100 same-race children 1.902 1.378 2.422 -1.043***
(0.811) (0.482) (0.735) (0.080)
schools Schools per 1000 same-race children 13.461 12.035 14.886 -2.851***
(5.497) (4.850) (5.749) (0.684)
term length Days of school per year 119.984 108.711 131.256 -22.545***
(24.872) (19.311) (24.763) (2.855)
receipts School board receipts per child, cents 531
(224)
wealth County wealth per same-race child 1,124 121 2,126 -2,005***
(2,317) (129) (2,956) (269)
cotton bales Bales of cotton ginned 22,524
(19,322)
Notes: Columns (1) to (3) report means for 1914 with standard deviations in parentheses. Column (4)
reports the difference in means estimated from regressions with an indicator variable for blacks and presents
standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.4: 2SLS Estimates of the Impact of Cotton Production on Enrollment Rate, Boll
Weevil
Panel A: First Stage, Log Cotton Bales Ginned
Black White
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
boll weevil -0.205*** -0.198*** -0.211*** -0.205*** -0.203*** -0.203***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
ln(teachers) -0.078 -0.093 0.127 0.123
(0.121) (0.122) (0.098) (0.097)
ln(schools) -0.234 -0.234 -0.021 -0.053
(0.146) (0.151) (0.126) (0.140)
ln(term length) 0.207 0.209 -0.075 -0.085
(0.133) (0.134) (0.152) (0.155)
ln(receipts) 0.079 0.083 0.081 0.077
(0.054) (0.054) (0.052) (0.051)
ln(wealth) 0.151** 0.168
(0.074) (0.198)
Observations 1,667 1,633 1,632 1,668 1,641 1,640
No. of counties 121 121 121 121 121 121
R-squared 0.871 0.871 0.872 0.871 0.870 0.870
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 17.10 15.72 17.36 17.20 16.81 16.85
Panel B: Second Stage, Log Enrollment Rate
Black White
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(cotton bales) -0.191* -0.195** -0.176** -0.042 -0.041 -0.040
(0.099) (0.097) (0.090) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059)
ln(teachers) 0.310*** 0.304*** 0.269*** 0.270***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.048) (0.048)
ln(schools) 0.194*** 0.205*** 0.077** 0.084**
(0.075) (0.078) (0.034) (0.035)
ln(term length) 0.128** 0.126*** 0.060* 0.063**
(0.051) (0.048) (0.032) (0.031)
ln(receipts) 0.001 0.001 0.028** 0.028**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.014) (0.014)
ln(wealth) 0.040 -0.030
(0.030) (0.038)
R-squared 0.463 0.548 0.574 0.457 0.550 0.552
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering by county in parentheses. All regressions include county
and year fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.7: 2SLS Estimates of the Impact of Cotton Production on Enrollment Rates,
Summer Rain
Panel A: First Stage, Log Cotton Bales Ginned
Black White
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(summer rain) -0.496*** -0.489*** -0.494*** -0.497*** -0.515*** -0.518***
(0.074) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075)
ln(teachers) -0.094 -0.108 0.145 0.141
(0.121) (0.121) (0.097) (0.096)
ln(schools) -0.205 -0.204 -0.034 -0.068
(0.147) (0.152) (0.127) (0.141)
ln(term length) 0.206 0.207 -0.063 -0.073
(0.132) (0.132) (0.150) (0.153)
ln(receipts) 0.084 0.087 0.082 0.077
(0.054) (0.055) (0.052) (0.051)
ln(wealth) 0.138* 0.181
(0.074) (0.199)
Observations 1,667 1,633 1,632 1,668 1,641 1,640
No. of Counties 121 121 121 121 121 121
R-squared 0.872 0.873 0.873 0.872 0.872 0.872
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 45.01 45.19 45.84 45.39 48.24 47.91
Panel B: Second Stage, Log Enrollment Rate
Black White
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(cotton bales) -0.144** -0.111** -0.108** -0.013 0.010 0.011
(0.061) (0.054) (0.054) (0.038) (0.035) (0.035)
ln(teachers) 0.318*** 0.311*** 0.262*** 0.264***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.045) (0.046)
ln(schools) 0.212*** 0.220*** 0.078** 0.087**
(0.075) (0.078) (0.035) (0.036)
ln(term length) 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.063** 0.067**
(0.042) (0.042) (0.031) (0.030)
ln(receipts) -0.005 -0.004 0.023* 0.024*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014)
ln(wealth) 0.031 -0.039
(0.028) (0.038)
R-squared 0.514 0.641 0.643 0.474 0.567 0.569
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering by county in parentheses. All regressions include county
and year fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.8: The Boll Weevil’s Impact on Attendance Rates
Black White Both
attendance
enrollment
attendance
school pop.
attendance
enrollment
attendance
school pop.
attendance
enrollment
attendance
school pop.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
boll weevil -0.016 0.023 -0.011 -0.003 -0.011 -0.012
(0.020) (0.026) (0.014) (0.020) (0.015) (0.021)
black 0.009 -0.167***
(0.034) (0.048)
black X weevil -0.008 0.043***
(0.010) (0.014)
ln(teachers) -0.023 0.292*** 0.030 0.296*** 0.037 0.320***
(0.041) (0.074) (0.028) (0.060) (0.023) (0.040)
ln(schools) 0.077** 0.318*** 0.032 0.106* 0.081*** 0.107***
(0.037) (0.103) (0.031) (0.054) (0.021) (0.039)
ln(term length) -0.000 0.093* 0.010 0.089** 0.011 0.031
(0.036) (0.047) (0.029) (0.043) (0.027) (0.036)
ln(wealth) 0.003 0.016 0.027 -0.007 0.030** -0.017
(0.023) (0.032) (0.031) (0.046) (0.015) (0.020)
ln(receipts) -0.033** -0.045** -0.023* 0.003 -0.027*** -0.017
(0.013) (0.020) (0.012) (0.019) (0.010) (0.017)
Constant -0.121*** -0.107* -0.046 0.013 -0.061*** 0.002
(0.042) (0.055) (0.039) (0.053) (0.018) (0.025)
Observations 1,654 1,654 1,663 1,663 3,317 3,317
No. of counties 121 121 121 121 121 121
R-squared 0.499 0.659 0.581 0.585 0.516 0.696
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering by county in parentheses. All regressions include
county and year fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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CHAPTER 2
Finding the Fat:
The Relative Impact of Budget Fluctuations on African-American Schools
2.1 Introduction
The 1896 Supreme Court ruling on Plessy v. Ferguson constitutionally sanctioned the seg-
regation of schools by race, as long as schools were “equal.” Despite the prevailing doctrine
of “separate but equal,” it is well known that African-American schools in the South were
substantially inferior in measured school quality to white schools during the early twentieth
century (see, for example, Collins and Margo 2006; Margo 1990). The racial gap in school
quality and expenditures is suggestive evidence of the bias of school boards in supporting
white schools.
While it is known that school boards spent less per pupil on average in the African-
American schools than in the white schools, very little is known about how these school
boards reacted to changes in their budgetary environment. To further illuminate how school
boards made funding decisions with regard to race in the early twentieth-century South, this
paper considers the following questions: When faced with budget cuts, or surpluses, how
were funds reallocated? And in particular, in times of budget distress, did school boards
cannibalize the quality of African-American schools to prop up white schools? Or, was
there simply no fat to be found in African-American school budgets?
The impact of suffrage restrictions intended to limit the political participation of African
Americans, commonly referred to as disfranchisement, on the apportionment of public
school resources by race has been analyzed by several economic historians (Kousser 1980;
Margo 1982, 1990; Pritchett 1985). The general consensus of this literature is that school
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boards diverted to whites funds that were appropriated for the education of African Amer-
icans. This is evidenced not only by higher per pupil expenditures for whites relative to
blacks, but it has also been shown that per pupil expenditures for whites were increasing in
the proportion of African-American children of school age in the locality. Thus, whites in
predominantly African-American counties benefited the most from “disfranchisement.”
This study builds on the above literature by examining how school boards respond to
exogenous shocks to their budgets. Specifically, I exploit a funding discontinuity resulting
from the rules regarding the apportionment of the School Fund for the state of Georgia. The
law required that the State School Fund be distributed from the treasury to the counties in
proportion to the school-age population of each county. However, the official figures for the
school-age population were infrequently updated. In Georgia, a census of the school-age
population was conducted every five years by law beginning in 1888. Thus, apportion-
ments from the School Fund changed discretely at five-year intervals. My identification
strategy is a regression discontinuity approach since the actual school-age population likely
changes only slightly from year to year but the official school-age population may show
large changes in adjustment years.
This approach takes the literature beyond cross-sectional analyses to explore the issue of
racial bias in school finance. Given that the electorate was predominately white, it might be
expected that budget cuts would be met disproportionately with reductions in expenditures
on schooling for African Americans. However, such a finding would run counter to the
view that African-American schools were already kept at some minimally acceptable level
of quality. As Margo (1982) points out, school boards had an incentive to spend as little as
possible on the education of African Americans. The lower bound was perhaps determined
by a desire to avoid legal action or the need to maintain a local labor supply (Margo 1991).
If this was the case, then expenditures on African-American schools should be relatively
unaffected by county-level budget shocks.
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I begin by analyzing the impact of budget shocks on overall expenditures at the county
level. The results reveal that a reduction in state appropriations caused a decrease in total
expenditures approximately dollar for dollar. Additionally, I show that instructional ex-
penditures are the most sensitive to funding discontinuities, which is not surprising as they
account for more than half of county school board expenditures in early twentieth-century
Georgia. I next test for differential changes in expenditures by race in response to budget
shocks, finding that whites, rather than African Americans, bore the brunt of budget cuts.
This suggests that there was little fat to trim from the budgets of African-American schools.
2.2 Background on School Finance in Georgia
Three characteristics of school law in Georgia provide the conditions necessary for sub-
stantial funding discontinuities, which I use to examine the impact of budget shocks on
expenditures. First, in contrast to early school finance in most of the United States, rev-
enues for education in Georgia were primarily raised at the state level. Second, the State
School Fund was distributed to the counties based on the share of their school-age popula-
tion in relation to that of the state as a whole. Third, the reported school-age population was
updated infrequently, only every five years. Together these produced significant shocks to
county school revenues in adjustment years, that is in the calendar year directly following
each school census.
2.2.1 State versus Local School Finance
Not until after the Civil War was the idea of free public schooling for all children adopted
in Georgia, as mandated by the Georgia Constitution of 1868.1 To finance this endeavor,
1Free schooling is perhaps one positive legacy of Reconstruction, for the majority of the 169 delegates
attending the constitutional convention were northerners or northern sympathizers, who were “greatly influ-
enced by radical Republicans,” which led some to call it the “Unconstitutional Convention” (Hill 2011, 11).
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the constitution required that the proceeds of several state taxes be set aside to constitute a
State School Fund. These included the poll tax, a tax on shows and exhibitions, and a tax on
the sale of spirits. Moreover, the General Assembly was given the power to levy additional
taxes on property as necessary.2 Thus, from their inception, public schools in Georgia were
intended to be centrally funded by the state, rather than by municipalities.
As prescribed by the Georgia Constitution of 1868, the General Assembly passed legis-
lation in 1870 providing for a state-wide system of public schools. The legislators favored a
more mixed approach to the financing of public schools than intimated by the constitution,
as they delegated some of their power of taxation to local school authorities. Local school
districts were given the power to levy taxes and assess labor to provide for the building and
maintenance of schoolhouses.3 However, county school boards were not permitted to use
tax revenue to pay teachers. Thus, teachers’ salaries, the largest single expense, were paid
only from disbursements from the State School Fund.
The following year 1,352 schools for whites and 221 schools for African Americans, to-
gether enrolling 70,035 students, were put into operation. The monies accruing to the State
School Fund over the three years preceding amounted to approximately $400,000, enough
to keep schools in operation for three months, as mandated by law. Unfortunately, it was
discovered that much of the State School Fund had been misappropriated by the General
Assembly and replaced with bonds that were illiquid (Georgia Department of Education
1871).4 Unable to pay the $300,000 Georgia owed its teachers, the public schools of Geor-
gia closed for the 1872 school year, in order to replenish the State School Fund (Georgia
Department of Education 1872).
2See the Georgia Constitution of 1868, Article 6, Secs. 1 and 3.
3An Act to Establish a System of Public Instruction, GA No. 53, Sec. 31, October 13, 1870, in Acts and
Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia, Passed in Atlanta, Georgia, at the Session of
1870, Part 1, Title 6, p. 57.
4The details of this case are well described in a letter published at the end of the First Annual Report of the
State School Commissioner of the State of Georgia, which can be viewed at http://dlg.galileo.usg.edu/ggpd/
docs/1871/ga/e300/_pa1/1871.con/1.pdf#page=91.
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The General Assembly initially responded to this fiscal crisis by passing legislation
in January, 1872, allowing counties to fully finance schooling themselves through local
taxation.5 However, their actions came too late to save the 1872 school year. In the end,
this legislation was short lived, being repealed in August of the same year as part of a
complete rewrite of school law in Georgia. In writing this new law, the General Assembly
again favored a centralized approach to school finance. The power of the County Boards
of Education to levy taxes was further limited, allowing them to finance only the building
of schoolhouses through taxation.6
Immediately following the end of Reconstruction, Georgia adopted a new constitution
that seemingly favored more local autonomy in the financing of education. However, pur-
poseful or not, the exact wording of the Georgia Constitution of 1877 made it all but impos-
sible to raise local taxes in support of education in any school district.7 While local taxation
was permitted, the new constitution required that the power of local school authorities to
levy taxes be “approved by a two-thirds vote of persons qualified to vote.”8 This bar proved
too high for any county.9 Not until a constitutional amendment approved in 1904 did local
taxation become a realistic option. The amendment changed the wording to require only
the approval by “two-thirds majority of persons voting.”10 The importance of county-level
taxation increased rapidly after 1905 as more and more counties and school districts voted
5An Act to amend an Act entitled “an Act to establish a system of Public Instruction,” approved October
13th, 1870, and for other purposes, GA No. 252, Sec. 16, January 19, 1872, in Acts and Resolutions of the
General Assembly of the State of Georgia, at a Session in November and December, 1871; Comprising, also,
the Acts and Resolutions Passed at the Session of January, 1872, p. 282.
6An act to perfect the Public School System and to supersede existing school laws, GA No. 71, Secs. 17
and 35, August 23, 1872, in Acts and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia, Passed at
its Session in July and August, 1870, Part 1, Title 18, p. 69.
7As the new constitution contained a grandfather clause for schools in localities governed by special leg-
islation, the counties of Bibb, Richmond, Glynn, and Chatham, as well as several city school systems, could
raise local taxes for schools under special laws passed prior to 1877.
8See the Georgia Constitution of 1877, Article 8, Sec. 4.
9The fact that prior to 1908 many African-American men over 21 were legally eligible to vote but were
de facto disfranchised may have prevented counties from meeting this requirement.
10Local Taxation for Public Schools, GA No. 471, Sec. 1, August 17, 1903, in Acts and Resolutions of the
General Assembly of the State of Georgia 1903, Part 1, Title 3, p. 23.
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in favor of funding education locally. Figure 2.1 shows the sources of county school rev-
enues in 1902, 1912, and 1922. The dramatic increase in the contribution of local taxation
is clear, making up 19 percent of revenues by 1912 and 39 percent by 1922. over this pe-
riod. Still, in 1922, appropriations from the State School Fund remained an important part
of school finance, making up over a third of all receipts.
2.2.2 Apportionment of State Funds and the School Census
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the distribution of the School
Fund to the counties followed a quite simple and seemingly equitable rule. Disbursements
from the School Fund were “based upon the proportion which the school population in each
county bears to the school population in the State as shown by the last school census.”11
Initially, this made sense as Georgia conducted an annual enumeration of the school-age
population. Indeed, 36 other states had similar apportionment rules, with the vast majority
of these enumerating the school population annually or biennially (Neystrom 1910).
However, this changed in the late nineteenth century as the General Assembly ordered,
“the enumeration of the children between six and eighteen years taken under instructions
from the State School Commissioner, in the year 1888, and every ten years thereafter.” Also,
a census could optionally be ordered “in the year 1893, and every ten years thereafter,” at
the discretion of the State Board of Education.12 The result of this law was a school census
every five years from 1888 until 1948.13 ThismadeGeorgia fairly unique in that only 5 other
11To Systematize the Finances and Increase the Efficiency of the Common Schools, GA No. 137, Sec. 2,
December 13, 1894, in Acts and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia 1894, Part 1,
Title 6, p. 60.
12An Act to provide a more correct and efficient mode of taking the enumeration of the school population
and to supersede existing laws upon that subject, GA No. 420, Secs. 1 and 2, September 28, 1883, in Acts
and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia 1882-3, Part 1, Title 6, p. 84.
13While Georgia continued to take a census of the school-age population into the mid-twentieth century, it
moved away from distributing funds on this basis starting in the mid-1920s. Beginning in 1926, an equaliza-
tion fund was administered by the Department of Education “for the purpose of more nearly equalizing the
educational opportunities.” These funds were distributed in addition to funds apportioned according to the
school-age population. By 1938, Georgia had completely abandoned the practice of distributing school funds
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states took school censuses less frequently than biennially (Neystrom 1910). In combination
with the large contribution of the State School Fund to local education revenues, it becomes
clear how the infrequent enumeration of the school population led to significant shocks to
school revenues at the county level.
2.2.3 Local Distribution of School Board Receipts
While this system of distribution seems quite egalitarian at the state level, it is important to
note that there was little legislation regarding how funds were to be distributed by county
school boards. The law was silent on how the County Board of Education should distribute
revenues to school districts. Indeed, the Georgia Attorney General opined that it is the
policy of the legislature to bestow “the several Boards of Education in this State with almost
supreme power in the administration of the public school fund” (Brittain 1912, 81). With
regard to the distribution of funds by race, the law only required that the County Board of
Education “shall, as far as practicable, provide the same facilities for both races in respect
of attainments and abilities of teachers and length of term-time.”14 It is clear from Table
2.1 that this law had no bite. Instructional expenditures per pupil for African-American
schools amounted to just over a quarter of instructional expenditures per pupil on white
schools in 1912 and 1924. Given the substantial racial differential in enrollment rates, this
likely underestimates the degree of inequality. No doubt this arrangement was convenient
since the state could claim perfect compliance with separate but equal, while the counties
could follow a policy of separate and unequal.
Since the law provides little guidance on how funds should be distributed at the county
level, it then becomes important to understand themotivations of themembers of the County
in proportion to the school-age population. See Extra Appropriation to Common School Fund, GA No. 2,
Sec. 1, March 13, 1926; and Equalizing Opportunities, GA No. 33, February 10, 1937.
14Revising, Amending and Consolidating the Common School Laws, GA No. 587, Sec. 21, October 27,
1887, in Acts and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia 1886-7, Volume 2, Part 1, Title
8, p. 74.
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Board of Education. If school board members were popularly elected, then they would
be considered to represent the values of the median voter. However, the members of the
County Board of Education were not held accountable to the voters. Rather, each County
Board of Education was composed of five residents selected by a grand jury to serve a four
year term.15 The grand juries, in turn, were composed of between 18 and 23 jurors selected
from a list of “the most experienced, intelligent and upright men,” containing not more
than two-fifths of eligible voters. Where this list was made by jury commissioners, who
themselves were appointed by the Superior Court Judge.16 Therefore, the members of the
County Boards of Education were representatives of the local elite, almost certainly upper-
class, white men. The analyses below will shed light on how school boards in Georgia
represented the interests of elites given budget constraints.
2.3 Data
In the early twentieth century, the departments of education of most Southern states an-
nually, or biennially, issued reports on the status of schools. These reports provide a rich
source of statistics on the quality and quantity of schooling at the local level, often by race
and sex. This study focuses on the case of Georgia in order to take advantage of the funding
discontinuity created by the infrequent taking of the school census. Fortunately, Georgia
was among the best at consistently providing detailed statistics by race in its annual reports.
The Annual Report of the Department of Education to the General Assembly of the
State of Georgia provides race-specific county-level data on expenditures by type (including
expenditures on teachers, buildings, and supplies), average monthly salary paid to teachers,
number of teachers, enrollment, and the school-age population.17 The reports also provide
15Revising, Amending and Consolidating the Common School Laws, GA No. 587, Sec. 16, October 27,
1887, in Acts and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia 1886-7, Volume 2, Part 1, Title
8, p. 71.
16Georgia Code of 1895, Article 7, Secs. 812, 813, and 818.
17Data on expenditures were not separated by race prior to 1906. However, average monthly salary paid to
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county-level data on the apportionment of the State School Fund and school board receipts
by type (including receipts from the state, local taxation, and tuition). I have collected these
data for all counties for the years surrounding the 1903, 1913, and 1923 school censuses,
from 1902 to 1904, 1912 to 1915, and 1922 to 1924.18
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics for school revenues and expenditures for 1902,
1912, and 1922, the years prior to the school censuses of interest. For each year, statistics
are reported separately by whether the counties would gain or lose state appropriations due
to the proximate updating of the school-age population. For example, a county is included
in the “losers” sample in 1902 if its appropriation from the State School Fund in 1904 was
less than its appropriation in 1902. This divides the sample into roughly equal groups in
1902 and 1912, whereas the majority of counties lost funds as a result of the 1923 school
census. The two groups are comparable in size, or enrollment, in all years, but the “losers”
have a statistically higher enrollment rate on average. Additionally, relative to “gainers,”
appropriations and state receipts per pupil are greater on average in 1912 and 1922 for those
counties that lost state funds as a result of the census update. Since the school census has
an equalizing effect on appropriations, this difference is expected as the “losers” were over-
funded with respect to their actual school-age population in the year prior to the school
census. 19 Other differences across groups in receipts and disbursements are small.
teachers by race and grade of teaching certificate, the number of teachers by race and certificate, and length
of the school term are available. This information is used to reconstruct expenditures on teachers by race for
1902 to 1904.
18Data surrounding the school census years of 1908 and 1918 may also be utilized. Unfortunately, the
reports of the Georgia Department of Education do not provide enough information to reconstruct any expen-
ditures by race prior to 1895. Beginning in 1926, the Georgia Department of Education published a biennial
report, making a similar analysis around the school census of 1928 impossible.
19Notice that appropriations per pupil differ from state receipts per pupil. In 1902 and 1912 state receipts
per pupil are slightly below appropriations per pupil. This is likely due to the fact that appropriations were
paid by the State Treasury to the County Board of Education on a reimbursement basis, with any unused
funds carrying over to the next year. The difference, however, is small as State Attorney General John C. Hart
warned against taking advantage of this as a savings device as he argued, “using money appropriated for one
year for another, would run counter to the legislative scheme and would be an abuse of discretion” (Brittain
1912, 81). In 1922, state receipts are slightly greater than appropriations on average because, in addition to
the foundation grant that appropriations represent, the state also disbursed $100,000 to incentivize four-year
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2.4 Estimation
A standard analysis to determine how the marginal dollar of education revenue was spent
would exploit longitudinal changes in county school board receipts to estimate the effect
of a change in receipts on various local school expenditures. The following ordinary least
squares specification illustrates this approach:
Teacher Exp PP c =  + Receipts PP c + "c (2.1)
where Teacher Exp PPc denotes the change in per pupil expenditures on teachers and
Receipts PPc the change in per pupil receipts in county c over a given period of time.
The problemwith this approach is that changes in receipts and expenditures are likely corre-
lated with concurrent shifts in the demand for education (for example, the actual school-age
population). Thus, the endogeneity of receipts would lead Equation 2.1 to yield biased es-
timates.
Instead, my identification strategy relies on the laws regarding the allocation of the State
School Fund to the counties. In early twentieth-century Georgia, the apportionment of the
State School Fund was entirely dependent on quinquennial census data on the school-age
population. While the amount of education revenue raised locally varied annually and in a
contemporaneous fashion with population changes, the official school-age population fig-
ures jumped discretely. This caused appropriations from the State School Fund to change
discretely every five years. Additionally, there was approximately a one year delay in incor-
porating the new school census data into the apportionment formula.20 Thus, adjustments in
state funds were not a function of contemporary changes in population but of prior popula-
high schools and school consolidation (Georgia Department of Education 1923, 465).
20Apportionments for the next school year were decided in January of each year. The school census was
taken in April/May in census years. Thus, for example, the 1913 school census, taken in Spring, 1913, was
first used in January, 1914, to set apportionments for the 1914 school year.
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tion change. Because of the infrequent update of the school-age population figures used to
apportion the State School Fund, this endogeneity problem can be addressed by considering
changes in revenue and expenditures surrounding census years.
The appropriation for county c from the State School Fund (State) in a given year t can
be written as a function of latest school-age population figures:
Appropriationct = Statet  Populationcs
State Populations
; (2.2)
where s is the year in which the last school census was taken.21 The school-age population
of county c is given by Populationcs and the total school-age population of the state is
given by State Populations, as reported by the school census taken in year s. Therefore,
the change in appropriations for county c from 1912 to 1914, for example, is written as
follows:
Appropc = Appropriationc;1914   Appropriationc;1912
= State1914  Populationc;1913
State Population1913
  State1912  Populationc;1908
State Population1908
:
(2.3)
Each school census had a substantial impact on the distribution of the State School Fund
to the counties. County-level changes in state appropriations surrounding the school census
years of 1903, 1913, and 1923 are displayed in Figure 2.2. There is significant variation in
the extent to which counties gain and lose funds as a result of school census updates, driven
entirely by differences in relative population growth rates during the preceding five years.
For comparability across counties, I analyze changes in state appropriations per pupil
(that is, per enrolled student). The change in appropriations per pupil from 1912 to 1914 is
21The relevant school census year, s is a piecewise function of t, which can be expressed as s(t) = 3 +
(5 b t 45 c).
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expressed as follows:
Approp PPc =
Appropriationc;1914
Enrollmentc;1914
  Appropriationc;1912
Enrollmentc;1912
: (2.4)
Table 2.3 shows the county-level distribution of the change in appropriations per pupil
surrounding school census years. The mean and median change in state appropriations per
pupil from 1902 to 1904 and from 1922 to 1924 is close to zero. From 1912 to 1914, state
appropriations per pupil fell by 57 cents on average, which is likely driven by increasing
enrollment rates.22 The changes in the tails, however, were substantial surrounding each of
the census years. These counties that gain or lose state funding in adjustment years provide
exogenous variation school funds.
As described above, the State School Fund was distributed in the form of flat grants, or
foundation grants, to the counties on a per school-age child basis without regard to race, or
any other characteristics. The County Board of Education was instructed to distribute these
funds to the schools or districts “as may be for the best interests of the district and county as
a whole” (Brittain 1912, 77). In order to examine how school funds were actually allocated
at the margin, I assess the impact of the exogenous change in appropriations per pupil on a
variety of school board expenditures: total expenditures, expenditures on teachers, support
expenditures (administration), and capital expenditures (building and repairs). Equation
2.5 shows the regression specification for the effect of changes in per pupil appropriations
(Approp PP ) on changes in per pupil expenditures on teachers (Teacher Exp PP ):
Teacher Exp PP c =  + Approp PP c + Enrollmentc + "c (2.5)
where c indexes the county and Enrollment gives the change in enrollment. The spec-
22The total amount of school funds disbursed annually by the state remained unchanged at $2,550,000 from
1912 to 1914 (Georgia Department of Education 1915, 507).
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ification remains the same for other dependent variables. By using a first-differences esti-
mation strategy, I am controlling for time invariant county-level characteristics.
While the county school boards were also instructed to provide equal educational facil-
ities to both African Americans and whites, large gaps in school quality and expenditures
persisted across race. However, it is unclear how school boards reacted to budget shocks.
Therefore, I further analyze differential effects of changes in appropriations on expendi-
tures across race. In this analysis, I focus on total expenditures, expenditures on teachers,
and capital expenditures, as these are often available for both races. I, therefore, add to
equation (2.5) an indicator for African-American schools (Black) and its interaction with
the change in appropriations:
Teacher Exp PP cr =  + Blackr + Approp PP c + (Blackr Approp PP c)
+ 1Enrollmentcr + 2Enrollmentc + "cr (2.6)
where r indexes race. The change in race-specific enrollment of county c is given by
Enrollmentcr, whileEnrollmentc denotes the total change in enrollment, that of both
races combined, at the county level.
The racial analysis is largely limited to changes in expenditures around the 1913 and
1923 census years, as expenditures by race are not reported from 1902 to 1904. However,
as described above I have reconstructed instructional expenditures by race for those years
from other statistics provide.
2.5 Results
Using this framework, I examine short-run responses to budget shocks around the 1903,
1913, and 1923 school censuses. I focus on the effects of two-year changes in appropriations
around these census years, from the year before each census to the year after, on various
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school expenditures.23
Table 2.4 presents estimates of the effects of changes in appropriations per pupil on
various school expenditures. The top panel examines the change in expenditures around
the 1903 school census, from 1902 to 1904; the middle panel the 1913 school census; and
the bottom panel the 1923 school census. Each column represents a separate regression
with the dependent variable noted at the top.
The effect of changes in state appropriations on total expenditures is positive in all years,
as shown in column (1). A one dollar increase in state appropriations per pupil caused
an increase in total school expenditures per pupil by 64 cents around 1903, and 84 cents
around 1913. Both of these estimates are statistically different from zero, with the latter
insignificantly different from one. Similarly, the estimate around the 1923 school census
suggests expenditures increased one for onewith state appropriations; however this estimate
is quite imprecise. This suggests a classic “flypaper effect” (Hines and Thaler 1995; Fisher
and Papke 2000). However, given that the County Board of Education in Georgia was quite
insulated from the demands of the median voter, this is perhaps not as surprising as modern
evidence.
Column (2) shows that the change in state appropriations has the strongest effect on
instructional expenditures. The effect of a one dollar per pupil increase in state appropria-
tions ranges from a 36 cent per pupil increase in expenditures on teachers per pupil, around
1913, to a 87 cent increase per pupil, around 1923. The effect is positive and statistically
significant in all years.
The effect on support expenditures, which includes the salaries and expenditures of
23Examining one-year changes in expenditures would be ideal from the standpoint of assuming no popu-
lation change, but the timing of the release of census figures makes this less informative. Take for example
the school census of 1913. The new census figures became known in May of 1913, allowing county school
boards to predict their state appropriation for the 1914 school year. They likely used the 1913 school year to
smooth their expenditures. Thus, comparing 1913 to 1914 would bias estimates of the effect of budget shocks
toward zero. I consider two-year changes in order to avoid such bias.
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county-level administrators, is a consistent and statistically significant 4 to 5 cent increase
in response to a one dollar increase in per pupil appropriations, shown in column (3). I also
consider the impact of budget shocks on the County Superintendent’s salary, a component
of support expenditures. The results shown in column (4) indicate that a large part of the
increase in support expenditures per pupil can be accounted for by the increase in the salary
of the County School Superintendent. If the effect is symmetrical for budget gainers and
losers, then this just shows that the County Superintendent’s salary is responsive to budget
shocks. The impact of budget shocks on capital expenditures, shown in column (5), is less
clear, possibly due to the fact that capital expenditures are lumpy.24
I next consider whether the effects of budget shocks are symmetrical around zero. To
test this, I group counties by whether they gained or lost state funds as a result of the up-
date in official school-age population figures. Table 2.5 presents results in the same fashion
as Table 2.4, but each regression now includes an indicator variable for the counties that
gained state funds (Gainer) and its interaction with per pupil appropriations. Changes
in support expenditures and superintendent salary differ by whether the county gained or
lost state appropriations. For the most part, other effects on expenditures do not signifi-
cantly differ across the two groups (the exception being total expenditures around 1903).
As shown in column (4), the impact on the salaries of Superintendents in counties losing
state appropriations is insignificantly different from zero around 1903 and 1923, while in
1913 a one dollar per pupil loss of state funds yields a 3 cent per pupil loss in superintendent
salary. This translates to approximately a $100 fall in salary from a one standard deviation
fall in per pupil appropriations at the 1912 mean.25 However, the School Superintendents
in counties gaining state appropriations benefit significantly. They gain between 5 and 11
24By lumpy, I mean that county school boards spend zero dollars on new buildings in most years punctuated
by years of large expenditures.
25A 93 cent fall (one standard deviation) in appropriations per pupil results in a 3.162 (.98 * 3.4) cent loss
in superintendent salary per pupil. With losing counties having an average enrollment of 3081 this translates
into a $97.42 (0.03162 * 3081) loss in superintendent salary.
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cents per pupil as a result of a one dollar increase in state appropriations per pupil. For com-
parison, this implies a one standard deviation increase in appropriations, led to over a $300
increase in superintendent salary at the 1912 mean.26 It seems that County Superintendents
disproportionately benefited from gains in state funds. However, recall that those counties
gaining state funds were underfunded relative to their actual school-age population in the
years prior to the school census. Thus, this effect may be explained by County Superinten-
dents receiving deferred compensation or forgone raises after the increase in revenues.27
One concern with the first-differences framework as outlined by Equation 2.5 is that dif-
ferencing does not control for contemporaneous county-specific trends unrelated to the im-
pact of changes in appropriations. As I have shown, the use of local tax revenues to support
schooling was rapidly expanding during the early twentieth century in Georgia. If local tax
revenues were positively correlated with population growth rates, then the estimates of the
impact of population driven changes in state appropriations on school expenditures might
be upward biased. To address this concern, I control for the concurrent change in local tax
revenues per pupil (Local Tax PP ). The results displayed in Table 2.6 show that the
estimates reported above are robust to controlling for the change in local tax revenues per
pupil.28
Anecdotal evidence of how school boards economized in times of budget distress is con-
sistent with these results. County School Superintendents most often cited teacher salaries
and length of the school term as margins for trimming the budget. This is evidenced by
the Clarke County School Superintendent, who stated: “After this year we shall have only
26Calculated as follows: (0.034 + 0.077) * 0.93 * 3081 = $326.62.
27It is worth noting that the County Superintendent’s salary was set by the County Board of Education
so any raise would have to be justified; although this does not rule out side payments. I do not separately
investigate the effect of budget shocks on compensation to the members of the County Board of Education
because they were paid a per diem set by the General Assembly.
28Admittedly the concurrent change in local tax revenues is potentially a “bad control” as local taxation is
a substitute for state funds, and thus it could be considered a dependent variable. The fact that estimates of
the effect of appropriations are unchanged when controlling for local taxation, however, is enough to allay
the above concern of bias.
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the school fund received from the State to depend on, and unless some plan is devised to
supplement this, we shall be compelled to shorten our school term, or so reduce salaries as
will drive away our best teachers” (Georgia Department of Education 1910, 86). The effect
of both courses of action is to reduce instructional expenditures.
I now analyze the impact of budget shocks on expenditures by race. Table 2.7 presents
the results of estimates of Equation 2.6. Column (1) of the top panel shows that per pupil
expenditures on teachers decreased for both whites and African Americans as a result of de-
creased state appropriations per pupil. However, the estimated effect on expenditures does
not significantly differ across race. The lack of a result here may be due to measurement
error because instructional expenditures by race from 1902 to 1904 were reconstructed from
average teacher salaries, whereas total instructional expenditures by race in later years are
reported directly. Undoubtedly, the latter is more accurate than the former.
The middle panel of Table 2.7 presents the result of analyses surrounding the 1913
school census. As shown in column (1) a one dollar decrease in county-level per pupil
appropriations resulted in a 82 cent decrease in white per pupil expenditures on teachers,
but only a 14 cent decrease in African-American per pupil expenditures on teachers. The
difference in the estimates across race is significant at the 99-percent confidence level. Col-
umn (2) shows this result to be robust to the inclusion of the change in local tax revenues
per pupil and its interaction with the indicator for African-American schools. Again, the
estimated effect on capital expenditures, displayed in columns (3) and (4), are imprecise.
Since instructional expenditures made up three-quarters of all expenditures in 1912, it is
not surprising that the analysis of the change in total expenditures, presented in columns (5)
and (6), also reveal differential effects across race.
The bottom panel of Table 2.7 presents results from a similar analysis around the 1923
school census. The estimated effect of budget shocks on expenditures on teachers around
1923 are larger in magnitude than those around 1913. As column (1) shows, a one dollar
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decrease in county-level per pupil appropriations is associated with a 137 cent decrease in
per pupil expenditures on white teachers, but only a 56 cent decrease in per pupil expendi-
tures on African-American teachers. The difference in estimates across race is significant
at the 95-percent confidence level. This suggests that decreases in appropriations per pupil
reduced the racial gap in per pupil expenditures on teachers nearly dollar for dollar. As be-
fore, the results are robust to the inclusion of per pupil receipts from local taxation, shown
in column (2).
The estimates presented in columns (3) and (4) of the bottom panel seem to suggest that
capital expenditures on white schools varied negatively with state appropriations. However,
these results are highly sensitive to the inclusion of counties that sold large amounts of bonds
to finance the construction of schools in either 1922 or 1924. Excluding just six outliers that
sold bonds amounting to revenues of $10 per pupil or more produces results (not shown)
that closely resemble those presented in the middle panel, but with insignificant effects of
appropriations across race.
2.5.1 Specification Tests
The validity of the above estimates relies on the assumption that county school boards could
not accurately predict changes in the school-age population, and thus the shock to their bud-
gets in adjustment years.29 However, school boards had access to information on enroll-
ment trends and the demographic characteristics of new enrollees. This information should
have given them some insight regarding the growth rate of the school-age population. The
County Boards of Education might have used this information to help smooth expenditures
over the long run. If so, my estimates would understate the effect of an unforeseen shock
to school revenues.
29Since the State School Fund was disbursed based on each counties relative school-age population, an
accurate prediction of education funds received from the state after the next school census would require not
only an understanding of the school-age population growth rate of the county but also that of the state.
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For evidence of the validity of my estimates, I test whether changes in state appropri-
ations per pupil from 1912 to 1914 affect prior changes in various expenditures per pupil
from 1910 to 1912, controlling for county-level change in enrollment. Table 2.8 presents
the results of this test. The change in appropriations from 1912 to 1914 does not have pre-
dictive power for anterior changes in expenditures. Indeed, the coefficients are very close
to zero in the top and bottom panels of Table 2.8. For example, a one dollar increase in
appropriations per pupil from 1912 to 1914 is associated with a 0.04, or 4 cent, decrease in
total expenditures from 1910 to 1912, with a standard error of 0.44 (as shown in Column (1)
of the top panel). So while school boards might have had some knowledge of population
trends, it seems that they did not effectively use that information to smooth expenditures.
Indeed, the County Board of Education may have been limited in its ability to borrow
and save, necessary tools for smoothing expenditures. While school boards were not legally
limited in their ability to save, they saved very little. The balance on hand of the average
county at the end of the 1912 school year amounted to a mere 41 cents per pupil. This
“savings” was less than ten percent of the average appropriation from the state in 1912 and
would cover little more than the County Superintendent’s salary (see Table 2.2). Borrowing,
on the other hand, was limited by law. TheCounty Board of Educationwas only permitted to
take out short-term loans in order to pay teachers in a timely manner, with the total amount
of loans limited to the county’s appropriation from the State School Fund.30 Starting in
1912, the County Board of Education could raise revenues by issuing bonds but only for the
purpose of building school houses. Any bond issues were paid by additional local taxation
on property.31
30An Act to allow county Boards of Education to borrow money to pay the salaries of the public school
teachers, GA No. 296, Sec. 1, July 15, 1910, in Acts and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of
Georgia, 1910, Part 1, Title 6, p. 77.
31An Act to provide for issuing bonds for the purpose of building school houses in school districts in which
a local tax is now or may hereafter be levied for school purposes, GA No. 537, August 17, 1912, in Acts and
Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia, 1912, Part 1, Title 5, p. 176.
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2.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides additional insight into the behavior of county school boards in the South
after the de facto disfranchisement of African Americans. School board expenditures re-
sponded approximately one for one to adjustments in revenue. This provides historical evi-
dence of a flypaper effect, at least in the short run, in the school finance context. An analysis
of differential effects in expenditures by race suggests that African-American schools were
little affected by budget shocks, in comparison to white schools. This result suggests that
there was little fat to trim from the budgets of African-American schools, implying that
school boards kept them close to whatever was the perceived lower bound of quality.
Important questions remain regarding the physical impact of these budget shocks. Fu-
ture work will consider how changes in appropriations affected measured school quality,
such as term length, the qualifications of teachers, number of teachers, and number of
schools. This will provide further insight into the margins along which expenditures were
reduced in response to budget cuts.
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2.7 Figures
Figure 2.1: Sources of County School Revenues by Year
99%
1%
(a) 1902
68%
19%
5%
8%
(b) 1912
37%
39%
2%
22%
(c) 1922
State receipts per pupil
Local tax receipts per pupil
Tuition receipts per pupil
All other receipts per pupil
Notes: Displays the county-level mean percentage of total school revenues per pupil from
various sources. Source: Reports of the Georgia Department of Education, various years.
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Figure 2.2: Percent Change in County-Level Appropriations around Census
Years
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(c) 1922 to 1924
Note: Each new school census caused varied changes in appropriations from the State
School Fund at the county level in adjustment years. Each bar represents the percent change
in state appropriations received by a county as a result of the relevant census update. Source:
Reports of the Georgia Department of Education, various years.
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2.8 Tables
Table 2.1: Mean County-Level School Expenditures by Race
1902
Black White Difference
Enrollment 1263 [959] 1872 [1143] -609 (147)***
Enrollment rate (%) 69 [47] 80 [14] -11 (5)**
Teacher salary per pupil 198 [102] 439 [208] -241 (23)***
Number of counties 103 103 206
1912
Black White Difference
Enrollment 1336 [977] 1805 [1147] -470 (134)***
Enrollment rate (%) 62 [15] 80 [12] -18 (2)***
Teacher salary per pupil 231 [128] 823 [395] -592 (37)***
Capital expenditures per pupil 6 [11] 114 [171] -108 (15)***
Total expenditures per pupil 237 [131] 937 [498] -701 (46)***
Number of counties 127 127 254
1922
Black White Difference
Enrollment 1528 [1130] 2395 [1602] -867 (162)***
Enrollment rate (%) 77 [17] 90 [10] -12 (2)***
Teacher salary per pupil 379 [192] 1470 [678] -1090 (58)***
Capital expenditures per pupil 44 [256] 415 [1041] -370 (89)***
Total expenditures per pupil 424 [355] 1884 [1232] -1461 (106)***
Number of counties 146 146 292
Notes: The columns labeled “Black” and “White” report means for the respective race with
standard deviations in brackets. The column labeled “Differences” reports differences in means
estimated from regressions and presents standard errors in parentheses. All monetary figures are
in nominal cents.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
81
Table 2.2: Summary Revenue and Expenditure Statistics for 1902, 1912,
1922
1902
Losers Gainers All
Enrollment 2942 (1403) 3367 (1494) 3166 (1462)
Enrollment rate (%) 77 (14) 69 (14) 73 (15)
Appropriation per pupil 328 (67) 311 (64) 319 (66)
Receipts and Expenditures:
State receipts per pupil 324 (75) 309 (67) 316 (71)
Total receipts per pupil 338 (83) 320 (72) 328 (78)
Teacher salary per pupil 292 (63) 276 (59) 283 (61)
Support expenditures per pupil 26 (17) 24 (9) 24 (13)
Superintendent pay per pupil 18 (10) 17 (6) 18 (8)
Capital expenditures per pupil 7 (10) 9 (14) 8 (12)
Total expenditures per pupil 325 (75) 308 (67) 316 (71)
Number of counties 60 67 127
1912
Losers Gainers All
Enrollment 3081 (1497) 3164 (1582) 3116 (1528)
Enrollment rate (%) 74 (13) 69 (11) 72 (12)
Appropriation per pupil 479 (120) 441 (73) 464 (104)
Receipts and Expenditures:
State receipts per pupil 471 (143) 427 (102) 453 (129)
Local tax receipts per pupil 111 (181) 144 (208) 125 (192)
Total receipts per pupil 707 (312) 718 (279) 712 (297)
Teacher salary per pupil 491 (179) 495 (132) 492 (161)
Support expenditures per pupil 41 (18) 42 (20) 41 (19)
Superintendent pay per pupil 32 (13) 33 (15) 33 (14)
Capital expenditures per pupil 53 (73) 65 (87) 58 (79)
Total expenditures per pupil 653 (299) 668 (267) 660 (285)
Number of counties 76 54 130
1922
Losers Gainers All
Enrollment 3936 (2000) 3875 (2746) 3922 (2175)
Enrollment rate (%) 84 (11) 80 (11) 83 (11)
Appropriation per pupil 602 (94) 522 (74) 584 (96)
Receipts and Expenditures:
State receipts per pupil 621 (161) 525 (131) 600 (159)
Local tax receipts per pupil 598 (470) 717 (439) 624 (464)
Total receipts per pupil 1651 (859) 1703 (930) 1663 (872)
Teacher salary per pupil 940 (314) 981 (387) 949 (331)
Support expenditures per pupil 58 (28) 63 (23) 59 (27)
Superintendent pay per pupil 48 (22) 52 (18) 49 (21)
Capital expenditures per pupil 275 (587) 182 (248) 255 (532)
Total expenditures per pupil 1522 (801) 1627 (937) 1545 (831)
Number of counties 114 32 146
Notes: Means are reported by whether counties gained or lost state funds after the respec-
tive school censuses of 1903, 1913, and 1923. Standard deviations are in parentheses. All
monetary figures are in nominal cents. A gray background denotes the difference in means
across groups is statistically significant at the 90-percent confidence level or higher.
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Table 2.3: Distribution of Change in State Funds per Pupil
1902 to 1904 1912 to 1914 1922 to 1924
1st percentile -122 -320 -196
5th percentile -70 -210 -130
10th percentile -52 -134 -94
25th percentile -26 -78 -49
50th percentile 1 -43 3
75th percentile 31 -16 72
90th percentile 87 11 135
95th percentile 97 43 213
99th percentile 119 92 350
Mean 6 -57 17
Standard deviation 53 93 103
No. of counties 127 135 146
Notes: All figures are in nominal cents.
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Table 2.4: Estimates of the Effect of Budget Shocks on Various Expenditures
1902 to 1904
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Exp PP Teacher PP Support PP Super: PP Capital PP
Approp PP 0.638*** 0.484*** 0.042*** 0.020*** 0.084**
(0.10) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
Constant 12.647*** -10.897*** 2.922*** 1.468*** 3.568**
(3.69) (4.12) (0.57) (0.28) (1.42)
R-squared 0.476 0.215 0.223 0.336 0.040
Counties 127 127 127 127 127
Dependent Variable:
Mean 16.891 -8.394 3.286 1.705 3.787
Std. Dev. 56.739 51.725 7.127 3.883 16.138
1912 to 1914
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Exp PP Teacher PP Support PP Super: PP Capital PP
Approp PP 0.839*** 0.357** 0.039** 0.041*** 0.117
(0.32) (0.15) (0.02) (0.01) (0.20)
Constant 53.388** 14.093 -0.145 0.415 3.085
(23.20) (10.55) (1.18) (0.88) (15.16)
R-squared 0.158 0.230 0.169 0.192 0.006
Counties 130 130 135 135 135
Dependent Variable:
Mean -5.960 -21.446 -3.530 -2.136 8.027
Std. Dev. 237.989 113.208 12.309 9.285 144.047
1922 to 1924
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Exp PP Teacher PP Support PP Super: PP Capital PP
Approp PP 0.972 0.867*** 0.046** 0.027* -0.186
(0.76) (0.26) (0.02) (0.02) (0.61)
Constant 175.474** 20.290 3.053* 3.069** -69.002
(71.22) (24.31) (1.73) (1.53) (56.97)
R-squared 0.016 0.200 0.210 0.175 0.014
Counties 146 146 146 146 146
Dependent Variable:
Mean 185.063 61.380 6.811 6.339 -102.412
Std. Dev. 742.902 281.224 20.199 17.388 593.713
Notes: All regressions control for the contemporaneous change in enrollment. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. All monetary figures are nominal.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.5: Estimates of the Effect of Budget Shocks on Expenditures by Sign of Shock
1902 to 1904
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Exp PP Teacher PP Support PP Super: PP Capital PP
Approp PP 0.095 0.232 -0.002 -0.006 0.036
(0.24) (0.27) (0.04) (0.02) (0.09)
Gainers 5.670 7.066 0.255 -1.006 -3.076
(10.04) (11.48) (1.57) (0.77) (3.96)
Gainers X Approp PP 0.785*** 0.288 0.065 0.053** 0.116
(0.28) (0.32) (0.04) (0.02) (0.11)
Constant -0.043 -17.713* 2.011 1.333** 3.757
(7.86) (8.99) (1.23) (0.60) (3.10)
R-squared 0.511 0.230 0.238 0.390 0.059
Counties 127 127 127 127 127
1912 to 1914
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Exp PP Teacher PP Support PP Super: PP Capital PP
Approp PP 1.213** 0.498** 0.019 0.034* 0.223
(0.52) (0.23) (0.02) (0.02) (0.34)
Gainers -32.427 -61.842** -4.981* -3.542* -2.259
(54.96) (24.68) (2.65) (1.99) (36.14)
Gainers X Approp PP 0.212 -0.067 0.123*** 0.077*** 0.073
(0.86) (0.39) (0.04) (0.03) (0.53)
Constant 72.883** 33.148** 0.807 1.285 7.336
(30.75) (13.81) (1.48) (1.11) (20.21)
R-squared 0.178 0.268 0.271 0.278 0.013
Counties 130 130 135 135 135
1922 to 1924
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Exp PP Teacher PP Support PP Super: PP Capital PP
Approp PP 1.299 1.033*** 0.002 0.003 -0.957
(1.11) (0.38) (0.03) (0.02) (0.88)
Gainers -101.665 -76.416 -3.403 -4.270 85.338
(214.67) (72.87) (5.08) (4.53) (170.37)
Gainers X Approp PP -0.105 0.182 0.150*** 0.100** 1.336
(2.20) (0.75) (0.05) (0.05) (1.75)
Constant 213.159** 36.968 0.099 1.895 -119.635
(103.38) (35.10) (2.45) (2.18) (82.05)
R-squared 0.018 0.210 0.257 0.202 0.031
Counties 146 146 146 146 146
Notes: All regressions control for the contemporaneous change in enrollment. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. All monetary figures are nominal. Gainers is an indicator variable for those counties that
gained state appropriations in adjustment years.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6: Estimates of the Effect of Budget Shocks on Expenditures, Controlling for Local
Tax Revenues
1912 to 1914
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Exp PP Teacher PP Support PP Super: PP Capital PP
Approp PP 0.812*** 0.352** 0.039** 0.041*** 0.111
(0.28) (0.14) (0.02) (0.01) (0.20)
Enrollment -0.027 -0.045* -0.003 -0.001 0.034
(0.05) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04)
Local Tax PP 0.829*** 0.142** -0.008 -0.001 0.118
(0.14) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10)
Constant 36.264* 11.171 0.044 0.427 0.459
(20.68) (10.52) (1.20) (0.89) (15.30)
R-squared 0.348 0.255 0.176 0.192 0.017
Counties 130 130 135 135 135
1922 to 1924
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Exp PP Teacher PP Support PP Super: PP Capital PP
Approp PP 0.611 0.780*** 0.044** 0.024 -0.266
(0.74) (0.26) (0.02) (0.02) (0.62)
Enrollment 0.043 -0.080* -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.102
(0.13) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11)
Local Tax PP 0.690*** 0.168** 0.005 0.006 0.153
(0.19) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16)
Constant 131.045* 9.471 2.761 2.655* -78.861
(69.34) (24.22) (1.76) (1.54) (57.86)
R-squared 0.101 0.235 0.215 0.189 0.020
Counties 146 146 146 146 146
Notes: All regressions control for the contemporaneous change in enrollment. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. All monetary figures are nominal.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7: Estimates of the Effect of Budget Shocks on Expenditures by Race
1902 to 1904
(1)
Teacher PP
Approp PP 0.408*
(0.24)
Black -19.154
(14.88)
Black XApprop PP -0.151
(0.29)
Constant 6.615
(10.52)
Local Tax Controls NO
R-squared 0.096
Counties 206
1912 to 1914
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Teacher PP Capital PP Total Exp PP
Approp PP 0.823*** 0.800*** 0.106 0.081 0.930*** 0.881***
(0.21) (0.20) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34)
Black -50.942** -45.364* -11.569 -5.100 -62.511 -50.464
(24.29) (24.33) (40.30) (40.70) (40.57) (40.43)
Black XApprop PP -0.681*** -0.643*** -0.096 -0.051 -0.777** -0.694*
(0.23) (0.23) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38)
Constant 41.512** 35.380** 15.724 9.802 57.237* 45.182
(17.59) (17.62) (29.18) (29.47) (29.37) (29.28)
Local Tax Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
R-squared 0.166 0.186 0.001 0.009 0.078 0.109
Counties 254 254 254 254 254 254
1922 to 1924
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Teacher PP Capital PP Total Exp PP
Approp PP 1.370*** 1.228*** -0.977 -1.102 0.392 0.126
(0.29) (0.29) (0.81) (0.82) (0.93) (0.94)
Black -36.319 -22.280 122.333 137.282 86.015 115.002
(37.31) (37.85) (103.33) (106.30) (117.96) (120.89)
Black XApprop PP -0.810** -0.678* 1.690* 1.831* 0.880 1.152
(0.36) (0.37) (1.01) (1.04) (1.15) (1.18)
Constant 37.281 20.985 -122.506 -136.757* -85.226 -115.772
(28.34) (28.57) (78.48) (80.25) (89.59) (91.26)
Local Tax Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
R-squared 0.178 0.203 0.032 0.034 0.038 0.048
Counties 292 292 292 292 292 292
Notes: All regressions control for the change in race-specific enrollment and the change in total enroll-
ment at the county level. Regressions represented by columns (2), (4), and (6) control for the change in
local tax revenues per pupil and its interaction with the indicator variable for race. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. All monetary figures are nominal.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
87
Table 2.8: Estimates of the Effect of Changes in Appropriations (1912-1914) on Prior
Changes in Expenditures (1910-1912)
Corresponds to Table 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Exp PP Teacher PP Support PP Super: PP Capital PP
Approp PP -0.039 0.055 -0.033 -0.026 0.003
(0.44) (0.23) (0.02) (0.02) (0.20)
Constant 106.914*** 35.195** 10.048*** 5.798*** -10.334
(26.72) (14.28) (1.25) (1.06) (12.27)
R-squared 0.044 0.051 0.092 0.096 0.002
Counties 115 115 115 115 115
Dependent Variable:
Mean 116.983 38.055 11.829 7.262 -9.596
Std. Dev. 223.141 119.732 10.731 9.108 100.321
Corresponds to Table 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Exp PP Teacher PP Support PP Super: PP Capital PP
Approp PP 0.048 -0.167 -0.019 -0.024 0.186
(0.57) (0.30) (0.03) (0.02) (0.26)
Gainers -15.049 40.499 -1.188 -0.398 -30.334
(55.00) (29.22) (2.57) (2.19) (25.15)
Gainers X Approp PP -0.501 0.450 -0.041 0.003 -0.430
(1.02) (0.54) (0.05) (0.04) (0.47)
Constant 110.982*** 14.833 10.642*** 6.105*** 4.622
(38.43) (20.41) (1.80) (1.53) (17.57)
R-squared 0.049 0.068 0.099 0.099 0.016
Counties 115 115 115 115 115
Corresponds to Table 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Exp PP Teacher PP Support PP Super: PP Capital PP
Approp PP 0.023 0.075 -0.032 -0.026 0.012
(0.34) (0.22) (0.02) (0.02) (0.20)
Local Tax PP 0.986*** 0.318*** 0.013* 0.008 0.141**
(0.12) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07)
Constant 75.112*** 24.930* 9.641*** 5.525*** -14.871
(21.22) (13.49) (1.26) (1.07) (12.28)
R-squared 0.421 0.187 0.119 0.112 0.040
Counties 115 115 115 115 115
Notes: All regressions control for the change in enrollment from 1910 to 1912. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. All monetary figures are nominal.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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CHAPTER 3
From Plutocracy To Progressivism?
The Assassination of President McKinley as a Turning Point in American History
(with Carola Frydman and Eric Hilt)
3.1 Introduction
In many countries, powerful interest groups dominate political and economic life. Far from
the competitive markets described in textbooks, the economies of these places are charac-
terized by high levels of corruption and “crony capitalism.” Recent research has argued
that such environments hinder economic growth, and that inclusive political and economic
institutions are the key to development (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Other work has
shown that in the absence of inclusive institutions, the political connections of firms can
account for a substantial fraction of their values (Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003;
Ferguson and Voth, 2008).
Relative to most economies, the United States has facilitated broad access to economic
opportunity and political participation (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002). And in general,
the value of political connections among American firms is relatively low (Roberts, 1990;
Jayachandran, 2006; Fisman et al, 2006), except in extraordinary circumstances, such as
financial crises (Acemoglu et al, 2013). Yet the inclusive nature of American institutions
has been threatened at times by powerful groups that have sought to attain control over
them. In particular, the period known as theGildedAge is commonly characterized as one of
rampant corruption, with railroad barons and industrialists manipulating the political system
in order to protect and perpetuate their interests. How significant was this corruption? And
if American political institutions were subsequently strengthened, how was the influence
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of the ‘robber barons’ brought under control?
We study the assassination of President William McKinley in September 1901 to es-
timate the value of political connections among large American corporations in the early
twentieth century, and to assess the significance of the accession of Theodore Roosevelt,
McKinley’s progressive Vice President, to the presidency. The quasi-random nature of the
assassination enables us to estimate the market’s reaction to the change from McKinley to
Roosevelt in a way that election outcomes, which were generally well anticipated, do not
(see Rhode and Strumpf, 2004). In response to the shooting of McKinley, the value of
NYSE-traded firms fell by an average of 6.2%. We find little evidence that firms with close
ties to McKinley, such as those affiliated with major campaign donors, suffered differen-
tially. We also find no evidence that firms led by executives with personal connections
to Roosevelt benefited. However, we do find that firms that were likely to be targets of
antitrust prosecution saw a decline in their share prices of an additional 2.4%. Our results
suggest that regulatory forbearance was an important mechanism by which firms benefited
from McKinley’s Presidency.
A possible source of concern regarding these results is that the effects of the unexpected
change from McKinley to Roosevelt may be confounded with the effects of a presidential
assassination. For example, the fact that an anarchist was able to murder the President
may have been perceived by the markets as a sign of rising unrest or political instability.
Fortunately, the experience with McKinley offers a unique opportunity to address this con-
cern. The President survived the initial shooting, and three days following the shooting
his doctors announced that they expected him to make a “full recovery.” On that day, the
losses experienced following the announcement of his shooting were largely reversed, and
firms particularly vulnerable to antitrust enforcement saw differentially large gains. Then,
seven days following the shooting, it was announced that McKinley was in fact near death.
Upon this news, the market reversed again, with an overall fall in share prices of similar
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magnitude and with differentially greater losses for the antitrust targets.
An additional source of concern might be that the transition from McKinley to Roo-
sevelt may have been regarded as generally bad for business, for example since Roosevelt
had no business experience, or that Roosevelt’s accession may have been harmful to par-
ticular firms for reasons unrelated to antitrust policy, such as Roosevelt’s stance toward
labor relations. Yet in a placebo test, we find no differential effects on share prices of Roo-
sevelt’s surprise October 1, 1902, announcement that he would invite labor union leaders to
the White House to help resolve an ongoing coal mining strike, a deviation from historical
precedent. If the differential effects on the share prices of likely antitrust targets surround-
ing Roosevelt’s accession to the Presidency were due to his labor relations agenda, then the
surprise announcement of this first-ever presidential effort to mediate a labor dispute should
have caused the same pattern of share price declines as his accession to the presidency.
In order to analyze the significance of Roosevelt’s policy agenda once he took office,
we also use an event study methodology to estimate the stock market’s reaction to the an-
nouncement of his first antitrust suit. In another surprise announcement, on February 19,
1902, Roosevelt’s Attorney General stated that he was going to file suit against the Northern
Securities Company, an enormous holding company formed in 1901 that controlled several
competing railroads. In response, we find that cumulative returns of railroads that were
likely antitrust targets fell by as much as 4.5% relative to other railroads.
Overall, our results suggest that Roosevelt’s accession to the Presidency marked an im-
portant change in the regulation of American businesses. His agenda likely helped restrain
the power of the “trusts” over the economy, relative to the counterfactual had McKinley
recovered. At the same time, Roosevelt’s policies were perceived by economic elites as a
much more palatable alternative to the radical populism then prevailing within the Demo-
cratic Party, and many of the same large donors who had backed McKinley in 1896 and
1900 would help fund Roosevelt’s campaign in 1904. Roosevelt eventually developed a
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stance toward the large industrial combinations that differentiated the “good trusts” that
created efficiencies from the “bad trusts” that merely cartelized markets.
The results of this paper contribute to a growing literature that uses asset prices to mea-
sure the value of political connections for firms. Precisely how political connections ben-
efit firms is not well understood. Earlier work has found that political connections are
positively associated with bailouts (Faccio et al, 2006), the allocation of procurement con-
tracts (Goldman et al, 2013), and access to external financing (Khwaja and Mian, 2005;
Claessens, Feijen and Laeven, 2008). Our findings suggest that protection from govern-
ment regulation may be an important mechanism, and that direct personal connections to
politicians—a metric often used by this literature to measure connections—are not always
of value to corporate interests.
The results of this paper also add to a literature that uses deaths of individual national
leaders to study their effect on economic performance and institutional development (for
example, Jones and Olken, 2005; 2009). In contrast to theories that hold that social and
economic forces, rather than particular individuals, determine the course of history, this
literature finds that individual leaders do matter and emphasizes the role of historical con-
tingency in economic development. The results of this paper are generally consistent with
that literature in that they imply that the accession of Roosevelt to the Presidency resulted
in significant changes in economic policy.
The quantitative estimates of the impact of the transition from McKinley to Roosevelt
presented here may also shed some light on the longstanding debate among historians re-
garding the nature and significance of the McKinley and Roosevelt presidencies. For ex-
ample, scholars have traditionally viewed McKinley as a weak president, largely controlled
by Mark Hanna, the Republican Party chair who raised enormous sums from financiers and
industrialists for McKinley’s campaign (see, for example, Josephson, 1934). According to
this view, Hannah’s ties to business interests and major donors explain the lack of action by
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the McKinley administration in enforcing antitrust statutes. On the other hand, a revisionist
view of McKinley has recently emerged, which portrays him as a shrewd and pragmatic
politician, who had shifted toward a more reformist orientation by the time of his assassi-
nation (Phillips, 2003). Several have claimed that McKinley would have acted against the
trusts had he not suffered an untimely death (for example, Morgan, 2003).
Likewise Roosevelt is sometimes portrayed as a Progressive hero, who boldly stood up
to the plutocrats within his own party and enacted important reforms in the public’s interest
(for example, Morris, 2001; 2002). Yet other scholarship has concluded that Roosevelt was
in fact quite conservative, and he “might not perhaps have been a progressive at all if it were
not for the necessity of fending off more radical threats” (Hofstadter, 1955). This latter view
holds that, in spite of Roosevelt’s ‘trust-busting’ rhetoric, his antitrust efforts were generally
weak and ineffectual, and the regulations imposed during his presidency actually served
the interests of big business (Kolko, 1967). However, the large stock price movements
documented in this paper around McKinley’s assassination imply that the market perceived
Roosevelt to be quite different from McKinley in his stance toward business.
Finally, an earlier literature has also utilized stock prices to evaluate the effects of an-
titrust regulation of American companies. These studies often find modest to negligible ef-
fects of antitrust enforcement (Binder, 1988; Bittlingmayer, 1993), merger activity (Eckbo
and Wier, 1985), and forced dissolution of trusts (Burns, 1977).1 One potential limitation
of these studies, however, is that they focus mostly on events that were well known by
the market. Contrariwise, we study unanticipated events and find large negative effects of
antitrust enforcement on potential targets.
1In contrast, Prager (1992) finds that various decisions related to the Northern Securities case had a signif-
icant legal precedent effect on the value of other railroads from 1901 to 1905. Mullin et al (1995) find large
positive effects on the value of downstream customers of US Steel following the initiation of the (unsuccess-
ful) suit for its dissolution in 1911.
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3.2 McKinley, Roosevelt, and the Assassination
3.2.1 William McKinley, Mark Hanna, and Big Business
Perhaps more than any other politician before him, William McKinley’s rise to the Pres-
idency was due to the efforts of one man, Mark Hanna. A businessman with interests in
street railways, banking, shipping, newspapers, and a growing range of other sectors, Hanna
became active in politics as a representative of “the business interest” in the Ohio Repub-
lican Party (Croly, 1912: 145). He met then-Congressman McKinley at the Republican
convention of 1888 and found McKinley’s genial personality and demonstrations of loy-
alty to Republican figures quite appealing. Hanna engineered McKinley’s campaigns for
Governor of Ohio, in 1891 and 1893, and for President of the United States, in 1896 and
1900.
Hanna’s own success as a chair of the Republican party can be attributed in part to his
innovations as a fundraiser. He appealed directly to the wealthiest financiers and industrial-
ists for contributions, framing them as “assessments” proportional to their means (Pollock,
1926), and quickly amassed unprecedented sums for the campaign. The 1896 political plat-
form of the Democratic Party also aided Hanna’s fundraising. Whereas the Republicans
endorsed the gold standard, the Democrats abandoned their former support for gold and
nominated the populist William Jennings Bryan, who advocated for free coinage of silver
at an overvalued rate. Additionally, Bryan repeatedly called for the regulation of trusts;
in one speech he colorfully stated, “one of the most important duties of government is to
put rings in the noses of hogs” (Bryan, 1896: 378). Hanna solicited contributions from the
financial and industrial interests that were most threatened by the prospect of a Bryan presi-
dency. He received individual donations of $250,000 each from Standard Oil and from J.P.
Morgan, and raised a total of at least $3.5 million for the 1896 campaign.2 In comparison,
2In contrast, the Republicans had raised only $1.6million for the presidential campaign of 1892. Testimony
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the Democrats’ total campaign budget for 1896 was just over $400,000 (Croly, 1912: 220).
The financial support of wealthy industrialists and bankers for McKinley actually pre-
ceded his presidential campaigns and extended into his personal finances. In the wake of the
Panic of 1893, McKinley faced financial ruin after guaranteeing enormous debts for a friend
who went bankrupt. Hanna was able to rescue his rising Republican star by raising more
than $100,000 in financial aid for McKinley from individuals such as Andrew Carnegie,
Henry Clay Frick, Philander Knox, George Pullman, and Philip Armour (Morgan, 2003:
133). There is some evidence that the more politically active among these donors sought to
cash in on their “investments” once McKinley was elected President.3
Once in office, McKinley presided over the greatest wave of industrial mergers in Amer-
ican history, which gave rise to hundreds of new “trusts.”4 As interpreted by the courts, the
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, the first federal antitrust statute, prohibited several anti-
competitive practices, such as price fixing and pooling arrangements. Yet one of its unin-
tended consequences was to encourage the further consolidation of big business—a process
described by contemporaries as the “trustification” of the economy. Following the E. C.
Knight case in 1895, in which the supreme court upheld the Sugar Trust consolidation, it
was generally believed that mergers were permitted, whereas other anticompetitive prac-
tices were not (Bittlingmayer, 1985). In the years that followed, the American economy ex-
of C. N. Bliss, Jr., in Senate Subcommittee on Campaign Finance (1913: vol 1, p. 204), indicated that the
official total of campaign receipts was $3.5 million. However, Bliss also testified that the official records of
the campaign of 1896 and list of donors was later destroyed (vol.1, p. 210). Some have speculated that the
budget of the campaign was in fact much larger.
3The wealthy and influential Mrs. Bellamy Storer, whose family had given McKinley $10,000, sought
senior appointments for her husband and for others in the McKinley Administration (see Leech, 1959: 58,
138; and Morris, 2001: 563).
4The onset of this merger wave was triggered by several legal and economic developments. New Jersey’s
liberal incorporation laws facilitating the creation of holding companies; legal precedents that “loose com-
binations”—cartels enforced among competitors through trade associations—violated the Sherman Act; the
economic recovery following the Panic of 1893 and the surge in the stock market’s appetite for the securities
of the newly merged companies; and the Supreme Court’s 1895 United States v. E. C. Knight case, which
held that manufacturing was not subject to the federal government’s powers to regulate interstate commerce,
all contributed to the onset of the merger wave. See Lamoreaux (1985).
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perienced the largest consolidation of business in its history—the Great Merger Movement
(Nelson, 1959; Lamoreaux, 1985). Many of these new enterprises individually controlled
more than 70% of the national markets for their goods (Moody, 1904).
Already alarmed by the emergence of large railroad systems that monopolized trans-
portation, much of the nation greeted the emergence of these new institutions with the
sense that they were “eating like a canker into the very vitals of society” (Josephson, 1962:
446). The new trusts increasingly seized control of economic life, and they entrenched their
monopoly positions by using what were seen as unfair business tactics. Local business own-
ers founded “antitrust leagues” and agitated for strict regulation. Several states even passed
stricter regulations than the Sherman Antitrust Act, and they often enforced them against
the trusts more severely than the federal government (Troesken, 2000).
Yet the McKinley administration did little to impose regulations on the new enterprises,
or even to enforce the Sherman Act against these firms. From 1897 to 1901, the federal
government initiated only three suits for violation of federal antitrust laws. Scholars skepti-
cal of McKinley’s character suggest that this inaction was a way to conform to the national
Republican Party’s preferences. A more benign view is that McKinley was considering
taking a more forceful stance against the trusts by the time of his death (Phillips, 2003).5
Regardless of which of these two portraits is more accurate, it is likely that the public would
have expected a government led by Theodore Roosevelt to enact policies against the trusts
in a more expedient and, perhaps, stronger manner than those followed under McKinley’s
leadership.
In September 1901, PresidentMcKinley was assassinated by an anarchist, and Theodore
Roosevelt succeeded him as President. As the President and Vice President of the United
States are chosen together, one would normally expect that they would share a common
5As a Congressman, McKinley had supported the Sherman Act, and he spoke strongly against combina-
tions that restrained competition in his address to Congress in 1899 (Morgan, 2003).
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agenda, and therefore that the assassination of the president would not result in a significant
policy change. Yet in this very particular instance, that was not the case.
3.2.2 Theodore Roosevelt
The son of a wealthy merchant, Theodore Roosevelt was born into an elite New York City
family, attended Harvard University, and was a member of the Union League Club, one of
the most exclusive and prestigious of its kind in the United States. Yet he was also a one-
time cattle rancher in the Dakota territory and leader of a volunteer cavalry brigade during
the Spanish-American War, and his immense popularity transcended regional prejudices.
While theremay be questions aboutMcKinley’s orientation toward the Republican Party
“machine” and the business interests it served, there is little doubt that Roosevelt was much
more independent of it. From the beginning of his political career, he fought for the passage
and enforcement of civil service reform measures, which threatened the ability of political
parties to allocate civil service jobs to loyal partisans. Moreover, Roosevelt’s signature
political achievements were efforts to regulate or discipline big business. In the New York
State Assembly, he attacked the corrupt manipulations of the judicial system by Jay Gould
and his associates (who he said “belong to that most dangerous of classes, the wealthy
criminal class”).6 As Governor of New York, he enacted important pieces of progressive
legislation, including a corporate franchise tax, and successfully opposed the reappointment
of a corrupt “machine politician” as the regulator of insurance companies (Roosevelt, 1920:
285-304).
Following the battle over the choice of insurance commissioner, representatives of New
York’s insurance companies and franchise corporations urged Senator Thomas C. Platt,
boss of New York’s Republican machine, to find a way to remove him from office. Since
Roosevelt was an extremely popular politician, challenging his renomination for Governor
6Quoted in Morris (2001: 177).
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would have been folly. Instead, a plan to add him to the national ticket to replace the re-
cently deceased Vice President Hobart was devised. At the 1900 Republican convention in
Philadelphia, machinations were put in place for a groundswell of support from the dele-
gates. As Platt himself put it, “Roosevelt might as well stand under Niagara Falls and try
to spit water back up as to stop his nomination at this convention.”7 Roosevelt privately
expressed genuine opposition to taking the office, knowing that as Vice President he “could
do nothing.” Yet he was too ambitious to resist the nomination and worked to ensure he
would receive it when he arrived at the convention.
While neither Hanna nor McKinley publicly expressed reservations about the popular
Governor, behind the scenes Mark Hanna strongly opposed the nomination of Roosevelt
and tried frantically to build support for other candidates. In one heated outburst, Hanna
reportedly threatened to resign as party chairman and presciently exclaimed, “Don’t any of
you realize that there’s only one life between that madman and the Presidency?”8 But the
support Roosevelt received at the Republican convention eventually proved impossible to
resist; Hanna quietly withdrew his objections, and Roosevelt himself accepted.9 A charis-
matic speaker, Roosevelt was a great asset to the campaign and spoke vigorously in favor
of the McKinley Administration’s accomplishments during its first term.
3.2.3 The Assassination and the Roosevelt Presidency
In September 1901, President McKinley traveled to Buffalo, New York, to attend the Pan-
American Exhibition. On September 6, he was shot twice by the anarchist Leon Czolgosz.
The best qualified surgeon available to treat him was a gynecologist with no experience
with bullet wounds. The surgery, performed in the small hospital at the Exhibition, was
7Quoted in Morris (2001: 757).
8Quoted in Leech (1959: 537). Morgan (2003: 376) presents a slightly different version of this quotation.
9Hanna’s support was attained partly through blackmail. Platt’s allies proposed a procedural reform that
would have undermined the party chairman’s ability to control the convention. Their price for withdrawing
the proposal was support for Roosevelt. See Morris (2001: 766).
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only partially successful as one of the bullets within his abdomen was never found.
Following the surgery, McKinley’s condition initially improved, and over the ensuing
days the press was filled with optimistic reports of his health. By September 9 his doctors
pronounced that he would make a full recovery. However, on September 13, McKinley’s
condition suddenly deteriorated, as gangrene had developed. He died early in the morning
on September 14.
Roosevelt had come to Buffalo following the shooting but had left for a vacation with his
family in the Adirondacks once the doctors had pronounced that McKinley would recover.
In response to an urgent telegram sent on the 13th, Roosevelt returned to Buffalo on the
14th and took the oath of office there. After taking the oath, he made a brief but important
statement: “In this hour of deep and terrible national bereavement I wish to state that it
shall be my aim to continue absolutely unbroken the policy of President McKinley for the
peace and prosperity and honor of our beloved country.” This statement dispelled fears that
he would shake up the cabinet, which was filled with old-guard Republicans, or break with
McKinley on key policy issues.
Over the following weeks, Hanna pressured Roosevelt to pursue a moderate path and
“go slow.” Partly on Hanna’s advice, Roosevelt reached out to important figures from the
world of business and sought their advice (Pringle, 1931). Prominent figures from the world
of finance also sought to influence Roosevelt. In October, two J.P. Morgan & Company
partners, George W. Perkins, who had known Roosevelt since he was Governor of New
York, and Robert Bacon, one of Roosevelt’s Harvard classmates, met with Roosevelt to try
to persuade him against imposing new regulations on industrial trusts. They were greeted
politely, but Roosevelt did not reveal to them how he intended to proceed.
The first indication that Roosevelt would pursue an aggressive stance toward the trusts
came in the form of Roosevelt’s first address to Congress in November 1901. In this mes-
sage, he argued that there were “real and grave evils” among large corporations, called
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for disclosure requirements to be imposed on corporations with interstate operations, and
argued that they should be “subject to proper governmental supervision” by the federal
government (Roosevelt, 1901). Although this message revealed much about Roosevelt’s
intentions, it had been leaked to important Senators, including Hanna, well before it was
released, and when presented to Congress its contents surprised no one.
Amuch more telling and surprising announcement came in February 1902. In the fall of
1901, after Roosevelt had become President, J.P. Morgan had created an enormous holding
company, the Northern Securities Company, which held the capital stocks of two competing
railroads, the Northern Pacific and Great Northern, as well as a railroad that connected
them to Chicago, the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy.10 The shear scale of the firm, along
with its potential to monopolize rail transportation in a large area of the country, concerned
Roosevelt, who asked his Attorney General, Philander Knox, to quietly study the possibility
of pursuing an antitrust action against the company. On February 19, Knox filed a bill
in equity against Northern Securities, shocking the financial world. In response, Morgan
himself went to Washington to meet with Roosevelt and Knox, bringing Senators Mark
Hanna and Chauncey Depewwith him to the February 23 meeting. Unaccustomed to policy
decisions that concerned his interests being made without his consultation, Morgan said
“If we have done anything wrong, send your man [the Attorney General] to my man [his
attorney Frank Stetson] and they can fix it up.”11 Over the subsequent weeks, Morgan
conferred repeatedly with Hanna regarding the case, but the case against Northern Securities
followed its course (Strouse 2000: 442).
The contrast between the McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations in antitrust enforce-
10Northern Securities was created as a way of accommodating competing railroad interests—those aligned
with E.H. Harriman, and those aligned with James J. Hill and Morgan—who had fought for control of the
Northern Pacific because it held control of the Burlington. With the single firm controlling all three roads
being jointly owned by the Harriman and Hill interests, conflict between the two competing railroad groups
was resolved.
11Quoted in Bishop (1920: 184).
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ment is illustrated in Figure 3.1. While McKinley’s administration pursued just three an-
titrust cases, a historically low number, Roosevelt initiated unprecedented numbers of them.
The contrast in the counts of cases actually understates the difference across the two ad-
ministrations, since it does not distinguish among the size or economic importance of the
defendants. Whereas McKinley’s administration pursued cases against coal dealers in Cal-
ifornia, and livestock dealers in Kansas City, Roosevelt initiated suits against Standard Oil,
American Tobacco, Du Pont, and several major railroads.
3.3 Impact of the Assassination in Historical Perspective
The news that President McKinley had been shot after the market closed on Friday, April 6,
triggered a wave of selling on Saturday, April 7, at the NYSE. A comparative perspective on
the market’s reaction is presented in Table 3.1, which presents the stock market’s reaction
to assassination attempts on U.S. Presidents in which someone actually fired a gun at the
President.12 It should be noted that the variation of the timing of the different shootings
relative to the opening hours of the NYSE, and the variation in the institutional response of
the NYSE to the news of the shooting, limits the comparability of the data across events.
Nonetheless, some suggestive evidence on the perceived significance of the transition from
McKinley to Roosevelt relative to previous assassinations can be found in Table 3.1.
On average, the shootings resulted in a decline in share prices of 2.55%. The generally
small effect is consistent with the notion that since Presidents andVice Presidents are chosen
together, the transition from one to the other typically does not signify a dramatic change in
policy. Yet the stock market’s decline in reaction to the shooting of McKinley—6.2%—was
more than twice as large as the historical average. Another way to put this into perspective
12Numerous other assassination attempts have been made on U.S. Presidents. The table includes all at-
tempts in which someone actually shot at the President. An attempt on the life of President Andrew Jackson
on January 30, 1835 is excluded from the table, as it occurred prior to the invention of the telegraph.
101
is to note that the second-largest stockmarket reaction, to the shooting of President Garfield,
was only -3.3%. The only event we could identify that provoked a reaction similar in mag-
nitude to the one caused by McKinley’s shooting was the heart attack suffered by President
Eisenhower on the evening of Saturday, September 24, 1955. On the following Monday,
shares on the NYSE fell by an average of 6.6%.13 The market reacted so dramatically to
Eisenhower’s heart attack because it came so late in his first term that it was believed he
would not be able to run for reelection and a Democrat would likely win the Presidency
in 1956.14 Thus, one way to interpret the magnitude of the stock market’s response to the
accession of Roosevelt to the Presidency is that it was roughly comparable in magnitude to
the effect of a surprise transition from a Republican to a New-Deal Democrat.
This evidence strongly suggests that Roosevelt was perceived to be quite different from
McKinley, and less friendly toward business interests. It contradicts the arguments of some
revisionist historians that Roosevelt’s administration is best understood as a continuation of
trends that developed under McKinley (for example, Phillips, 2003). Roosevelt was clearly
expected to be pursue a substantially different agenda than McKinley.
3.4 The Effect of McKinley’s Assassination on Non-Financial Firms
3.4.1 Data Sources
The analysis that follows analyzes the variation in the changes in market values of publicly
traded firms in response to the assassination. It focuses on a variety of firm characteristics,
most of which were hand-collected for this paper. In this section, we present a description
of the sources and methods used in the creation of the dataset.
13Calculated from CRSP; 950 price changes relative to the previous day were observed.
14“Stock market trading, brokers said, appeared to be dominated by the conviction that President Eisen-
hower would not again be a candidate, and ... that only he could win in 1956 for the Republicans. Traders
were credited with believing that a Democratic Administration would not be so friendly to business” (New
York Times, 27 September 1955).
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Our initial sample includes all railroads and industrial firms with shares listed on the
NYSE in 1901 (a total of 75 railroads and 86 industrials), as identified in the 1901 vol-
umes of the Moody’s Manual and The Manual of Statistics: Stock Exchange Handbook.15
For each firm, we collect financial information for the fiscal year 1900 or 1901 from those
two sources, as well as the New York Times’ Investor Supplement published on September
15, 1901, and various editions of the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. The availabil-
ity of financial data is very limited at the onset of the twentieth century, particularly for
industrial firms. When we cannot obtain information for 1900 or 1901, we fill in the data
using later years from various volumes of theMoody’s Manual.16 Our final dataset contains
information on firm age, size, profitability, and various financial policies.
No readily available dataset contains high frequency price data for our period of anal-
ysis. Thus, we collect daily closing prices of shares of common stock from the New York
Times. We also obtain information on dividend payouts from the New York Times to adjust
prices on the days shares went ex-dividend. It should be noted that many firms of interest
for this analysis are not included in our data because they were not listed on the NYSE, as
was the case with Standard Oil.
3.4.2 Variables and Hypotheses
Ties to McKinley or Roosevelt
Webeginwithmeasures of political influence or ties to the President. An expected transition
of power from President McKinley to Roosevelt would have differentially affected firms
with close ties to McKinley or to Roosevelt.
15Prior to the Securities and Exchange Acts, publicly traded firms were not required to disclose finan-
cial data. Beginning around 1900, the NYSE began to require listed corporations to disclose basic income
statement and balance sheet data, so our sample is restricted to NYSE-listed firms.
16For 29 of the 86 industrial firms, we fill missing accounting information with data from later years col-
lected from theMoody’s Manuals of 1902 to 1908.
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To measure ties to McKinley and/or Hanna, we construct indicator variables for firms
owned or managed by major donors to the McKinley campaign. Although no compre-
hensive list of donors exists, the two largest donors by far were J.P. Morgan and Standard
Oil. We therefore construct variables for firms affiliated with J.P. Morgan, and for firms
affiliated with the Rockefellers or Standard Oil, from Moody (1904).17 If those donations
were perceived to buy influence with McKinley, but not with Roosevelt, the affiliated firms
should have suffered differentially in response to the assassination.
We also consider the possibility that personal ties to Roosevelt may have mattered as
well. To study this, we identify whether any director of a firm had a connection to Roosevelt
while he was a student at Harvard. Specifically, we identify the names of graduates of
Harvard in 1880 (Roosevelt’s class) and the names of members of clubs of which Roosevelt
was also a member (Alpha Delta Phi, Delta Kappa Epsilon, Hasty Pudding, Phi Beta Kappa,
and the Porcellian Club) that were in the graduating classes of 1877 to 1883. We create an
indicator variable Roosevelt that takes the value one for those companies that had a director
or officer (as listed in theMoody’s Manual) who was in one of these clubs or graduated from
Harvard in 1880. Approximately 13% of the firms in our sample had such a connection.
Pursuing a similar strategy to identify social or personal connections to McKinley is
muchmore difficult, because he was from amodest family in Ohio, did not attend prominent
educational institutions, and was not a member of prominent social organizations.18 An
attempt to link members of McKinley’s Civil War regiment, the 23rd Ohio Infantry, to
17WilliamRockefeller, brother of John D. Rockefeller and an executive at Standard Oil, also assisted Hanna
in raising funds from other wealthy donors for the McKinley campaign (Rhodes, 1922). The firms designated
with the Morgan variable are a subset of those with J.P. Morgan & Company partners on their boards. They
are the firms listed by Moody as being under “Morgan domination” or “Morgan control.” The Standard Oil
firms include a number of firms founded by or strongly affiliated with the Rockefellers or Standard Oil.
18McKinley graduated from Albany Law School with William E. Barnett, future director of the New York,
NewHaven and Hartford Railroad, and Goodwin Stoddard, future director of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Company. While these two companies were listed on the NYSE in 1901, their shares were illiquid and did
not trade on days of interest surrounding the assassination of President McKinley.
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corporate directors and officers produced no matches.19
Ties to Financiers
Faced with a sudden change in presidential power, investors’ expectations about the firms’
futures may have also differed by the level of connection that publicly-traded companies
had to financiers. McKinley was perceived to be more favorable to the interests of bankers
and industrialists than Roosevelt. Negative news on the President’s condition may have
had a detrimental effect on the value of firms with well-connected bankers on the board,
suggesting that these connections made a non-financial corporation a more attractive target
for legal attacks. However, some well-connected bankers had personal ties to Roosevelt
that may have enabled them to try to influence him. Moreover, influential bankers usually
helped their client firms in times of turmoil, for example by buying their shares to support
their market value. Thus, it is possible that the presence of well-connected bankers on a
firm’s board had a positive effect on market values, relative to firms without these connec-
tions.
To study the differential effect of connections to important financiers, we use the board
interlocks between non-financial and financial firms. We collect the names of the direc-
tors of railroads and industrial firms as listed in the 1901 Moody’s Manual or, when not
available fromMoody’s, in the 1901Manual of Statistics. To identify which directors were
bankers, we obtain the names of directors of commercial banks and trust companies in New
York, Chicago, and Boston from the Rand-McNally Bankers’ Directory in 1900. We match
individuals across firms based on last name, suffix, and first and second initial. Once we
identify the presence of bankers on boards, we define the degree of Banker Centrality by
calculating the eigenvector centrality of the bankers’ connections in the network of non-
19The 23rd Ohio Infantry did, however, produce a number of successful politicians in addition toMcKinley,
including President Rutherford B. Hayes, Supreme Court Justice Thomas Stanley Matthews, and Congress-
man Robert P. Kennedy.
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financial firms (see Bonacich, 1972). Essentially, this measure captures how connected a
firm is to other firms in the sample through board interlocks with commercial banks, where
the value of each bank interlock is weighted by how connected that commercial bank is
to the rest of the sample. Thus, for those firms with representatives of the most important
and well-connected financial institutions, such as National City Bank, on their boards, this
measure takes a higher value.
Vulnerability to antitrust prosecutions
If McKinley and Roosevelt differed in their stance toward antitrust enforcement, we would
expect the market performance of firms that could be subject to antitrust suits to suffer
disproportionately on days of negative news concerning McKinley’s health. To assess this
hypothesis, we construct an indicator variable Antitrust Target to identify the firms in our
sample with a high risk of becoming a target of antitrust lawsuits.
Antitrust doctrines at the time were changing rapidly, and it would not have been easy to
anticipate how the courts would have interpreted the Sherman Act with respect to mergers.
In the early part of the nineteenth century, American corporations were often considered
monopolistic simply because they were chartered by special legislation. As general incor-
poration laws began to spread across states, the distrust of corporations changed form. In
the post-Civil War period, the criticism of the corporate form, and the calls for govern-
ment regulation, were mostly concerned with abuses of power and unreasonable practices
(Letwin, 1956).
These concerns were further heightened in the 1880s, as industrial interests organized
in large combinations, or “trusts.” State attorneys first used quo warranto suits—a law suit
brought by a firm’s state of incorporation for violating its charter or engaging in illegal
acts—but trusts often evaded state courts by reincorporating in friendlier states or adopting
different organizational forms. Between 1888 and July 1890, thirteen states passed antitrust
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statutes. These laws typically included stronger penalties than those later introduced by the
Sherman Act and gave most state courts the power to effectively terminate a trust in that
state by revoking its charter (Troesken, 2000).
However, the U.S. Constitution confers Congress the authority to regulate interstate
commerce, which severely curtailed the states’ abilities to efficiently restrain “bad” combi-
nations by applying common law and their own antitrust laws. It was in this context that in
July 1890 Congress passed the first federal piece of antitrust legislation, the Sherman Act.
The Act banned any contract in restraint of trade, but the broad terms of the law allowed
sufficient leeway to distinguish between beneficial forms of cooperation that promoted eco-
nomic growth from those that suppressed competition (Kovacic and Shapiro, 2000). Which
specific practices (such as predatory pricing, price fixing, and many others) were consid-
ered violations of the law was evolving slowly over time as the courts were confronted with
interpreting the Act’s vague terms. Most importantly, the Act did not condemn monopoly
or large concentration of market power per se. In United States v. E. C. Knight Co. (156
U.S. 1 [1895]), the Supreme Court ruled that a series of mergers that gave the American
Sugar Refining Company (the Sugar Trust) 98% of the nation’s sugar refining capacity did
not constitute interstate commerce, and was therefore not a violation of the Sherman Act.
It was not until the case against Northern Securities Corporation, which we analyze later in
the paper, that the Act was used to forestall mergers that conferred monopoly power.
In light of this legal history, it is not straightforward to determine which firms were
likely to be held in violation of the Act if it were enforced more vigorously. We develop two
alternative measures indicating a greater likelihood of an antitrust prosecution, which we
denote Antitrust Target andMonopoly. Each identifies firms that a policy maker concerned
with anticompetitive behavior might attempt to prosecute.
For the industrials, for the Antitrust Target variable, we hypothesize that firms with a
high degree of market concentration were likely attractive targets for antitrust prosecutions.
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Although a high degree of market concentration would not per se indicate a violation of
the Sherman Act, it is reasonable to expect that firms in highly concentrated markets would
have made attractive targets for prosecutions for any illegal tactics they may have employed
in expanding and protecting their market shares. Thus, we create an indicator variable based
on the relative extent of monopoly at the two-digit SIC level, as calculated by Nutter (1951),
to identify whether a firm was an Antitrust Target.20 Specifically, we construct an indicator
that takes a value of one for manufacturing firms in industries that were above the median
level of relative extent of monopoly (more than 49% ofmarket concentration). According to
this measure, firms in the metal mining, paper, transportation equipment, rubber, primary
metal refining, water transportation, transportation services, and tobacco industries were
likely Antitrust Targets.21
As an alternative measure of industrial firms’ vulnerability to antitrust enforcement, for
the Monopoly variable, we use Moody’s (1904) description of the strength or stability of
the “element of monopoly” enjoyed by each industrial firm included in his volume. This
measures the degree of barriers to entry faced by potential competitors to the firms listed in
his volume, and may therefore provide an indication that antitrust enforcement against the
firms, especially if antitrust enforcement was perceived to have been directed against firms
that enjoyed the strongest degree of monopoly power. We therefore create an indicator
variable equal to one for firms where Moody identified the degree of monopoly was the
strongest.22
20To establish the industrial code for the manufacturing firms in our sample, we use the code assigned to
each of these firms for the year 1917 by Chandler (1990). When a firm in our sample is not listed by Chandler,
we match the industry description provided in the Moody’s Manuals to the definitions of standardized codes
provided by the U.S. Department of Labor (http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html). For firms that
Chandler scored, the two methods produce the same codes.
21We exclude public utilities from our analysis because all NYSE-listed utilities would be a likely target
for antitrust scrutiny, according to Nutter’s data.
22Moody does not always provide clear rankings of the strength of the element of monopoly. We code firms
as equal to one when he states that it was “Large” or “Major,” or that it was “Moderate,” but was founded on
“patent rights.” Those that were listed as “Moderate” but without patent rights, or “Fair,” or where there was
no element of monopoly listed, were coded as zero.
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In the case of railroads, vulnerability to antitrust prosecutions is more difficult to pre-
dict. Antitrust enforcement actions prior to the McKinley administration were focused on
“pooling” agreements among competing roads, which were held to be in violation of the
Sherman Act. In subsequent years, the railroads responded by forming what were called
“communities of interest,” or groups of firms bound together by common ownership or
cross-ownership. These are difficult to observe, but available sources suggest two alterna-
tives.
The first, for the Antitrust Target variable, is based on recent merger activity. There
was a significant wave of mergers among railroads in 1901, and many of these more recent
consolidations were probably undertaken in order to restrain competition and form minor
or major “communities of interest.” These are clearly identified in the 1902Moody’s Man-
ual.23 The indicator variable Antitrust Target takes a value of one for NYSE-listed railroads
that acquired or purchased a major stake in another railroad, and for those railroads in which
another one obtained a controlling stake in 1901. Since the wave of acquisitions and cross-
holdings among railroads in 1901 was substantial, this definition gives us sufficient power
for our analysis: 19 out of the 75 railroads in the sample are identified as likely Antitrust
Targets.24 Recent mergers may also have been more salient in the eyes of the Roosevelt
Administration.
The second, for the Monopoly variable, is based on a list of the major communities
of interest among railroads, as provided by Moody (1904). Moody identifies a number of
different railroad groups—for example, those controlled by the Vanderbilts, the Morgans,
the alliance between the Goulds and Rockefellers, the Pennsylvania Railroad, etc.—and
23These include, for example, the acquisition of the Southern Pacific by the Union Pacific, the acquisition
of the Denver & Rio Grande by the Missouri Pacific, and the acquisition of the Burlington jointly by the Great
Northern and Northern Pacific.
24Contemporaneous commentary emphasized the role of these acquisitions in bringing competitive rail-
roads together, and highlighted their importance for the railroads’ valuations. See, for example, Sage et al
(1901).
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specifically identifies the railroads within each group. We therefore create an indicator
variable equal to one for all railroads belonging to a “community of interest,” excluding
the dominant railroad within the group, whose role was often to facilitate anticompetitive
behavior among the other affiliated roads. This variable differs from the one based on recent
acquisitions, since it is limited to the major railroad groups, and includes some affiliations
that were established prior to 1901.
3.4.3 Summary Data
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics. Column (1) reveals that 38% of the firms in the sam-
ple were likely targets for antitrust scrutiny by our Antitrust Target measure. While the
measure of banker centrality does not lend itself to intuitive interpretation, its mean sug-
gests that the average firm was connected to approximately two percent of our sample of
NYSE-traded companies through board interlocks with commercial banks.25 Railroads and
other transportation enterprises made up 55% of the sample, while the highest concentration
of industrials was in heavy and light manufacturing. Firms in our sample were large enter-
prises, with an average value of total assets of about $50.2 million. The average firm had a
leverage ratio of 0.28 and held about 4% of its assets in cash. We calculate two measures
of profitability: Return on Assets (ROA), defined as net income divided by total assets,
and Return on Equity (ROE), defined as net income divided by the book value of common
shareholders’ equity and surplus. The mean ROA and ROE in the sample were 0.04 and
0.06, respectively
Column (2) of Table 3.2 reports the difference in various characteristics between firms
that were and were not likely Antitrust Targets.26 We find no differences in board size, the
25This is an approximate interpretation because the calculation of eigenvector centrality weights interlocks
by their importance in the network of firms. More precisely, the average firm is connected to 2.5 percent (or
nearly 4 firms) of our sample through board interlocks with commercial banks.
26Except when analyzing differences in industry composition, these differences in means are estimated
from a regression of each dependent variable on the Antitrust Target dummy and an indicator for railroads.
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connectedness to bankers, or social connections to Roosevelt. These two groups of firms
also showed no noticeable differences in their ages (measured by year of incorporation)
or in their financial policies as indicated by their cash holdings and level of indebtedness.
Likely Antitrust Target firms were larger (as measured by assets), less profitable, less likely
to be in light manufacturing, and more likely to be in heavy manufacturing.
Column (3) of Table 3.2 presents the differences in these characteristics between firms
that had “central” bankers on their board of directors (defined by being above the median
eigenvector centrality of the sample) and firms that were not connected to such prominent
bankers. We observe no differences in the likelihood of being a target of antitrust lawsuits
among these two groups of firms. Firms with a stronger presence of “central” bankers on
their boards were larger, more profitable, less likely to be in light manufacturing, and more
likely to be in transportation.
3.5 Results
An indication of the significance of the assassination of President McKinley for firms that
could be subject to antitrust scrutiny is found in Figure 3.2, which shows average daily
net stock returns from September 3 to September 21, 1901.27 The blue solid line shows
the average return for the likely Antitrust Target firms, while the red dashed line displays
the mean return for firms with a low probability of being subject to antitrust litigation.
As expected, average net returns were close to zero for all days prior to the attempt on
McKinley’s life.
President McKinley was shot on Friday, September 6, at around 4 PM, just as the stock
market closed. Thus, we expect the market to respond to the news of an attempt on his
27The stock market lacked liquidity at that time, and not every share transacted every day. Our sample
contains an unbalanced panel of returns, where a firm is included only when we observe a transacted price in
two consecutive days. The results are similar, albeit a bit more muted, when we impute a zero net return in
days in which we do not observe a price.
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life on the following day. Fortunately for our analysis, the NYSE was open for half-day on
Saturdays in 1901. As indicated by the vertical line ‘Shot’ in the top panel of Figure 3.2,
firms lost 6% of their market value on average on September 7. The decline in firm value
was somewhat larger (by about 200 basis points) for high Antitrust Target firms. Despite
some “conflicting rumors” on the President’s condition, most of the news that circulated
over the weekend suggested that he was recovering favorably and that doctors expected him
to make a full recovery.28 When the markets reopened on Monday, September 9 (indicated
by the vertical line Health+), firms’ valuations largely recovered. It is worth noting that the
increase in market values was also larger for firms that were more likely to be targets of
antitrust litigation.
The pronounced reaction of stock prices for likely Antitrust Target firms to the news
of the President’s condition suggests that investors may have feared that a transition of
power to Roosevelt would have negative consequences for these corporations. However,
these changes in firm value could also simply reflect the realization that an anarchist was
able to make an attempt on the President’s life. The effects on September 7 could capture
investors’ view that larger firms, for example, weremore exposed to rising unrest or political
instability. However, the market’s reaction when it became known that McKinley would
die, point to the first interpretation.
Following a few days of mixed news on McKinley’s health, it finally became clear that
he was near death on Friday, September 13. The morning newspapers reported that he
had had a “sinking spell” and that his death was feared.29 As indicated by the vertical line
Health- in the top panel of Figure 3.2, the stock market reacted negatively to this news, with
likely Antitrust Target firms losing roughly 6% of their value and non-Antitrust Target firms
28For example, the front page of the New York Times reported that “Mr. Roosevelt gets reassuring news”
on September 8, and that “Physicians say they are certain he will get well. All symptoms favorable” on
September 9.
29The physician’s bulletin issued at 3 AM stated that “the worst is feared. His death might occur any time
from heart exhaustion,” New York Times, September 13, 1901.
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experiencing a smaller 4% decline. These magnitudes are remarkably similar to the decline
in values experienced by these two groups of firms on the day in which the McKinley was
shot. Because any effect related to social unrest should have been priced in by September 13,
the larger decline in the valuations of firms that could be the target of antitrust litigation is
suggestive of investors’ perceptions of an unexpected change fromMcKinley to Roosevelt.
As we discussed earlier in the paper, there is much dispute among scholars on the true
portrait of President McKinley. Revisionists argue that McKinley’s views on the trust prob-
lem were much closer to Roosevelt’s preferences and that his administration would have
actually enforced antitrust statues more forcefully had he not been assassinated. If this was
the case, however, we would not expect to find much of a difference of a transition in power
on the value of potential targets of antitrust enforcement. Our results are therefore consis-
tent with the view that McKinley was perceived by investors to be much less of a threat to
the trusts’ interests than Roosevelt.
McKinley passed away at 2:15 AM on Saturday, September 14. We cannot investigate
the effect of his death because the NYSEwas closed that day in mourning. The reassurances
Roosevelt made when he was sworn in on the 14th appear to have been convincing; stock
prices rebounded when the markets reopened on Monday, September 16, with the values
of likely Antitrust Target firms increasing by about 190 basis points more than those of
non-target firms.
The middle and the bottom panel of Figure 3.2 separately display the average returns
for railroads and industrial firms. Although the pattern is similar for both types of firms,
the magnitude of the effects on the days on which significant news on McKinley’s health
was disclosed are more pronounced for railroads.
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3.5.1 Results: Stock Market Reaction to McKinley’s Shooting
To perform a more rigorous analysis of the variation of the effects of the assassinations
across firms, we estimate the following specifications:
Rit = + AntitrustTargeti + 1Sept7t + 2Sept9t + 3Sept13t
+1(Antitrusti  Sept7t) + 2(Antitrusti  Sept9t) + 3(Antitrusti  Sept13t)
+Xi + it; (3.1)
where Rit is firm i’s net return on day t; AntitrustTargeti (or, for brevity, Antitrusti) is an
indicator for firms that were more likely to be targets of antitrust litigation; Sept7t, Sept9t
and Sept13t are indicators for those respective dates, on which substantial information on
the President’s health was released to the market; and Xi includes controls for firm charac-
teristics, such as firm size, age, and leverage. Of special interest are the estimates of 1 to
3, which capture the differential effect of very negative or positive news on McKinley’s
condition for those firms that were likely targets of antitrust litigation, relative to those
firms that were low Antitrust Targets. In all specifications, standard errors are clustered at
the firm level to correct for serial correlation.
In regressions where we investigate the effects of ties to McKinley or Roosevelt, we
replace our Antitrust Target variable with indicators for such ties. In order to understand
the effect of such ties conditional on a firms status as a likely antitrust target, we estimate
specifications that include both variables (and their interactions with Sept7t, Sept9t and
Sept13t, the indicators for the three relevant dates for the President’s condition).
We begin with the analysis of the effect of political ties. These regressions analyze
whether firms managed or owned by major donors to the McKinley campaign, or by in-
dividuals with close ties to Theodore Roosevelt, performed differently on the days when
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news regarding McKinley’s health was released.
Table 3.3 presents the results of these regressions. There is some evidence that firms
strongly affiliated with J. P. Morgan performed differentially worse on September 7 and
better on September 9. However, there is generally no evidence that firms affiliated with
Standard Oil or the Rockefellers were differentially affected on those days, or on the 13, or
that firms with personal connections to Roosevelt did differentially better.
Table 3.4 presents the results of the same specifications, in which the interactions of
interest are for the Banker Centrality measure, which captures the strength of the firms’
ties to prominent financial institutions. Contradicting any notion that McKinley favored
the firms affiliated with such institutions, or that Roosevelt was perceived to be hostile
to them, the firms with higher levels of this index performed differentially better on days
when bad news about McKinley was released, and worse on days when good news about
him was released. This is consistent with the notion that such firms were perceived to have
had an advantage in influencing Roosevelt, or that their more robust financial relationships
would help them weather any economic instability or uncertainty that would come with the
transition to a new President.
The effect of firms more vulnerable to antitrust prosecutions is analyzed in Table 3.5,
which utilizes the Antitrust Target variable, and Table 3.6, which utilizes the Monopoly
variable. The results of the two variables are generally consistent. On days when news
regarding the President’s health was released, firms designated as Antitrust Targets expe-
rienced differential changes in their returns of around 2.5% in absolute value, and those
designated asMonopolies (our alternative definition of likely targets of antitrust investiga-
tions or prosecutions) saw differential changes in their returns ranging from 1.5% to 3% in
absolute value. This is clear evidence that a substantial portion of the fluctuations in firms’
values around the assassination was driven by investors’ expectations that Roosevelt would
be a more aggressive enforcer of antitrust regulations.
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Finally, Tables 3.7-3.10 study the combined impact of the antitrust Target variable along
with the variables for connections to McKinley or Roosevelt, and the extent of ties to fi-
nanciers. The results in these tables indicate that whatever statistical support there was for
the importance of ties to McKinley or Roosevelt in the regressions above—which mainly
consisted of evidence that firms affiliated with J. P. Morgan did worse when McKinley was
shot—disappears when one controls for firms’ status as Antitrust Targets. Evidently, the
J. P. Morgan firms that performed worse around the time of the shooting were themselves
likely antitrust targets. It is worth noting, however, that the positive differential effects of
the degree of ‘centrality’ of the firm’s bankers is robust to controlling for firms’ status as
Antitrust Targets. Most importantly, the effect of firms’ status as likely antitrust targets on
their returns is robust to the inclusion of all of these variables.
3.5.2 Results: Litigation against Northern Securities
Our analysis of McKinley’s assassination suggests that investors may have feared that the
replacement of McKinley by Roosevelt would result in more aggressive enforcement of
antitrust statutes. To provide further evidence, we study the stock market reaction around
another event that surprised the market with new information on Roosevelt’s stand on an-
titrust cases: the announcement on February 19, 1902, that the Attorney General was going
to file a bill of equity against Northern Securities Company.30 This was the first clear ev-
idence that Roosevelt intended to enforce antitrust statutes against railroad mergers and
potentially other mergers as well.
A common problem with this type of analysis is that anticipated events are not reflected
in changes in stock prices. However, the filing of the suit, and the contents of the suit, were
30On this date, Attorney-General Knox released the following statement: “Some time ago the president
requested an opinion as to the legality of this merger, and I have recently given him one to the effect that,
in my judgment, it violates the provisions of the Sherman Act of 1890, whereupon he directed that suitable
action should be taken to have the question judicially determined” (quoted in Meyer, 1906: 258). The actual
suit was filed on March 10, 1902.
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surprises to the market. Roosevelt and Attorney General Knox had kept their preparations
for the suit a closely guarded secret.31 More importantly, the exact timing of the filing of
the bill in equity came as a shock. The Supreme Court was considering a case filed by
the Attorney General of Minnesota against the railway combination, and it was supposed
to announce its decision on Monday, February 24, 1902.32 Reports suggest that the mar-
ket expected the Supreme Court to throw Minnesota’s suit out of court, and no one was
prepared for the announcement of a federal suit just before the Supreme Court’s decision.
The Washington Post, for example, stated that the “announcement from Washington was
therefore a rude shock to all of this optimistic sentiment that has been carefully nurtured
in the financial district” (February 21, 1902). Because the announcement of the federal
lawsuit was disclosed after the stock market closed on February 19, the full effect of the
announcement was not felt until the following day.33 Thus, we study the differential effect
of the announcement of the federal case against Northern Securities on the market values
of firms that were likely to be antitrust targets, relative to those corporations less likely to
be affected by antitrust regulation, on February 20.
Because the announcement of the federal case against Northern Securities affected all
firms on the same date, and no other relevant information was revealed on the days fol-
lowing the filing, we use cumulative returns to analyze the full effect on the market value
of firms. To provide an illustration, Figure 3.3 displays average cumulative returns for the
31Attorney General Knox initially believed that nothing could be done to prevent the merger because of the
many loopholes of the Sherman Act. Roosevelt convinced him that it was not the government’s job to point
out these loopholes, but that the courts should decide whether the regulation was applicable to this case.
32Northern Securities was incorporated as a holding company under the laws of New Jersey on November
31, 1901, to combine the interests of the Great Northern Railway Company, the Northern Pacific Railroad,
and other smaller railroad interests. On January 7, 1902, the Attorney General of Minnesota, on behalf of his
state and with the support of several other western states, moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against
the company before the U.S. Supreme Court (Meyer, 1906).
33Stock prices do not seem to have been affected in any way on February 19. In fact, the market was
described as “dull” on that day, because of the “customary hegira of many capitalists and operators to Southern
resorts” (Chicago Daily Tribune, February 20, 1902).
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firms in our sample from February 11 to March 1, 1902.34 The blue solid line shows the av-
erage cumulative return for the Antitrust Target firms, while the red dashed line displays the
average cumulative return for firms with a low probability of the being subject of antitrust
litigation. The top panel of Figure 3.3 shows that average cumulative returns were close to
zero for all firms in the sample prior to the filing of the suit—if anything, Antitrust Target
firms performed slightly better, perhaps in anticipation of the dismissal of Minnesota’s bill.
This evidence further corroborates that actions by the federal government were unantici-
pated by investors. On February 20 (indicated in the figure by the vertical line Dissolve!),
the stock market declined on average by about 2%. Although the decline was a bit larger
for Antitrust Target firms, the difference relative to other firms was small.
Analyzing the effect of the filing for all firms in the sample obscures important differ-
ences across groups. Indeed, a large surprise of the Northern Securities litigation was that
Roosevelt was attempting to apply the Sherman Act to railroads. Thus, the middle panel of
Figure 3.3 displays the evolution of cumulative returns for railroads, and the bottom panel
shows similar evidence for industrial firms. The filing of the suit had a much larger ef-
fect on railroads. The decline in returns on February 20 was about 132 basis points larger
for Antitrust Target railroads, relative to those less likely to be targets of antitrust attacks.
Moreover, Figure 3.3 shows that this initial difference persisted over time. On March 1,
1902, the difference in cumulative returns for the two groups of railroads was about 500
basis points. Interestingly, the filing of the suit does not appear to have had much of a dis-
cernible effect on industrial firms on February 20, and those firms that were potential targets
of antitrust suits experienced, if anything, a larger increase in their market valuations in the
days following the filing.
To provide a more formal analysis of the effect of the Northern Securities litigation on
34To be able to add returns for a particular security on days in which the security did not trade, we assume
that prices did not change when we observe no trading (that is, we assume a return of zero in the absence of
trading).
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the market value of firms, next we employ an event study methodology. For each firm in
the sample, we calculate cumulative daily returns from February 20 to March 1, 1902, and
relate them to our measure of the threat of being subjected to antitrust suits. Our empirical
strategy consists of estimating:
CRi =  + AntitrustTargeti + Xi + i
where CRi is firm i’s cumulative net return from February 20 to March 1; AntitrustTargeti
is an indicator for firms that were more likely to be targets of antitrust litigation; and Xi
includes controls for firm characteristics (firm size, age, and leverage).
Table 3.11 presents the results.35 We begin by analyzing the effect of being a likely
antitrust target on the entire sample of firms.36 Antitrust Target firms had lower returns by
about 225 basis points over this period when controlling for firm characteristics (column
[2]). As suggested by Figure 3.3, these findings obscure important differences across firms.
Column (3) shows that being an Antitrust Target reduced cumulative returns by about 4.5
percent for railroads. This difference in returns is similar and statistically significant when
we control for firm characteristics (column [4]). It is important to note that these coeffi-
cients likely underestimate the overall effect of the lawsuit for railroads, because none of the
railroads involved in the Northern Securities combination had common shares that traded
on the NYSE. Finally, we find no effects of Antitrust Target on the cumulative returns of
industrial firms over this period (columns [5] and [6]).
A common objection to event studies is that the documented effects could potentially
be driven by other news that was disclosed on the same date. Given the important nature
35Since we do not observe prices for many firms in our sample during this event, our analysis here is limited
to 52 railroads and 38 industrials. The number of industrials is further reduced to 31 due to a lack of accounting
data.
36Results are robust to cumulating returns from February 19, to allow for a possible anticipation of the
filing of the suit. We also find similar effects when we add returns over shorter horizons.
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of the bill of equity, we do not think that this criticism applies to our case. Indeed, descrip-
tions of the stock market performance on February 20 claimed that the government’s action
“obscured all other considerations” (Chicago Daily Tribune, February 21, 1902).
Why did the filing of the suit against Northern Securities have a large effect on railroads
but not on industrial firms? Our view is that investors were surprised to learn that the
Sherman Act could be applied to railroads, rather than to mergers overall.
3.6 Placebo Test: Coal Strike
One concern that might be raised about our results is that our Antitrust Target variable may
be correlated with other firm characteristics unrelated to antitrust enforcement, and that
those other firm characteristics may be responsible for the fluctuations in firm values we
observe around the assassination.
One firm characteristic that could plausibly be responsible for our results centers on
labor relations. Roosevelt was known to be more supportive of the interests of organized
labor than his predecessor. If firms more vulnerable to strikes or to stricter labor regulations
were also more likely to be among our Antitrust Targets, then our estimated results could be
attributed to the perceived change in labor relations policy that the transition to Roosevelt
created.
To address this possibility, we use an event study methodology to analyze the market’s
reaction to Roosevelt’s intervention to attempt to resolve an ongoing coal strike amongmin-
ers in Pennsylvania’s anthracite coal fields. Previous presidents had generally intervened
on behalf of employers, if they intervened at all, in response to major labor relations dis-
putes. As the strike dragged on, mine operators called for Roosevelt to end the strike by
deploying federal troops to ensure the safety of those miners who desired to work and their
families. Somewhat ironically, the operators argued that the president was granted the au-
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thority to do so under the Sherman Act of 1890, as they viewed the union as a unlawful
cartel. Roosevelt disagreed; only in response to concerns that the coal strike, which began
in May 1902, might substantially raise coal prices for households over the winter did Roo-
sevelt decided to intervene, but he did so in a relatively neutral way. On October 1, 1902,
Roosevelt announced that he would meet with representatives of government, management,
and labor at the White House in order to facilitate a resolution to the dispute. This marked
a substantial change from historical precedent.
If our Antitrust Target variable is correlated with sensitivity to labor relations, then An-
titrust Target firms should perform differentially worse in response to the announcement
of the conference. Table 3.12 presents the results of regressions that follow a similar spec-
ification to those of Equation 3.2, using cumulative returns during an eight day window
around the October 1 announcement. The results indicate very clearly that the Antitrust
Target firms did not perform differentially worse.
3.7 Conclusion
We study the assassination of President William McKinley in September 1901 to estimate
the value of political connections among large American corporations in the early twenti-
eth century, and to assess the significance of the accession of Theodore Roosevelt to the
Presidency. The news of McKinley’s shooting provoked a significant fall in stock prices,
suggesting that Roosevelt was expected to pursue a different agenda from his predeces-
sor. However, we find little evidence that firms with close ties to McKinley, such as those
affiliated with major campaign donors, suffered differentially in response to his shooting.
Although McKinley is commonly portrayed as a puppet of the plutocrats, the firms com-
monly portrayed as his puppet-masters were not expected to perform worse following his
replacement with a more reform-minded politician. Even in the Gilded Age, personal or
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financial connections to the President did not matter very much.
However, we also find that firms that were likely targets of antitrust prosecutions saw
a decline in their share prices of an additional 2.5% in response to McKinley’s shooting.
These results suggest that regulatory forbearance was an important mechanism by which
firms benefited from McKinley’s Presidency. But these benefits were enjoyed by all firms
that could be judged to be in violation of antitrust laws, not just some politically favored
group.
Overall, our results suggest that Roosevelt’s accession to the Presidency marked an im-
portant change in the regulation of American businesses. His agenda likely helped restrain
the power of the “trusts” in the economy, relative to what they would have been under
McKinley. At the same time, Roosevelt’s policies were perceived by economic elites as a
much more palatable alternative to the radical populism then prevailing within the Demo-
cratic Party, and many of the same large donors who had backed McKinley in 1896 and
1900 would help fund Roosevelt’s campaign in 1904. Roosevelt eventually developed a
stance toward the large industrial combinations that differentiated the “good trusts” that
created efficiencies from the “bad trusts” that merely cartelized markets.
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3.8 Figures
1890 1892 1894 1896 1898 1900 1902 1904 1906 1908
0
2
4
6
8
10
12 Harrison Cleveland McKinley Roosevelt
Figure 3.1: Annual Number of Federal Antitrust Cases Under Different Pres-
idents, 1890-1908
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Figure 3.2: Average net returns surrounding the assassination of President
McKinley.
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Figure 3.3: Average cumulative returns surrounding the United States De-
partment of Justice’s announcement of its plans to file suit against the North-
ern Securities Company on behalf of President Roosevelt.
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3.9 Tables
Table 3.1: Presidential Assassination Attempts and the Stock Market: Price Response to
News of Shootings
Date and Time of Date of Trading on NYSE Mean Outcome for
President Shooting News of Shooting Change President
Lincoln Friday April 14, 1865, Monday April 17 -0.7% Death,
10:25 PM (NYSE closed April 15) Next day, 7:22 AM
Garfield Saturday July 2, 1882, Same day -3.3% Death,
9:30 AM 79 days later
McKinley Friday Sept. 6, 1901, Following day -6.2% Death,
4:07 PM 8 days later
Roosevelt Wed. Feb. 15, 1933, Following day -2.1% Survived;
9:35 PM Was unhurt
Kennedy Friday Nov. 22, 1963, Same day -2.8% Death,
1:30 PM (Trading halted 2:07 PM) Same day, 2:00 PM
Reagan Mon. March 30, 1981, Same day -0.2% Survived
2:27 PM
Note: Franklin D. Roosevelt was President-Elect at the time of the shooting attempt on his life.
For shootings prior to Roosevelt, the percent change in share prices computed as an equal-weighted
index from closing NYSE prices reported in the New York Times. For the subsequent shootings, the
percent change in share prices is calculated from closing NYSE prices as reported in CRSP. The
number of securities for which prices were observed on the day prior to the shooting, and also on
the day when trading reflected the news of the shooting, was 16 for the Lincoln assassination, 63 for
Garfield, 79 for McKinley, 311 for Roosevelt, 1,144 for Kennedy, and 1,520 for Reagan. All times
are reported as EST.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Difference: Difference: Difference:
Mean Antitrust Connection Connection
[Std. Dev.] Target Firms to Banks to Roosevelt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Indicator for Antitrust Target 0.3841 – 0.0113 0.1407
[0.4880] (0.0813) (0.1253)
Banker Centrality 0.0208 0.0004 – 0.0119
[0.0257] (0.0042) (0.0075)
Connection to Roosevelt 0.1258 0.0702 0.0818 –
[0.3328] (0.0637) (0.0562)
Board Size 11.7616 0.4002 0.1777 1.5373
[3.6308] (0.6718) (0.6423) (0.9418)
Log(Firm Age) 2.2665 0.0440 0.0274 -0.5193**
[1.1409] (0.1804) (0.1750) (0.2538)
Log(Assets) 17.7321 0.5570*** 0.5117*** 0.6091*
[1.0591] (0.1715) (0.1775) (0.3141)
Cash/Assets 0.0386 -0.0129 -0.0098 -0.0036
[0.0925] (0.0125) (0.0211) (0.0125)
Book Leverage Ratio 0.2821 0.0196 0.0035 0.0185
[0.2143] (0.0273) (0.0268) (0.0434)
ROA 0.0373 -0.0168** 0.0127* 0.0280
[0.0400] (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0272)
ROE 0.0584 -0.0197** 0.0201** 0.0038
[0.0525] (0.0086) (0.0092) (0.0159)
Industry: SIC 1 (Mining) 0.0728 0.1057** -0.0012 -0.0231
[0.2608] (0.0492) (0.0428) (0.0565)
SIC 2 (Light mfg) 0.1722 -0.1116* -0.1416** 0.0439
[0.3788] (0.0588) (0.0630) (0.0997)
SIC 3 (Heavy mfg) 0.1854 0.1748** -0.0640 0.1491
[0.3899] (0.0690) (0.0646) (0.1122)
SIC 4 (Transportation) 0.5497 -0.1366 0.1974** -0.1471
[0.4992] (0.0834) (0.0806) (0.1220)
SIC 5 (Distribution) 0.0132 -0.0215 0.0241 -0.0152
[0.1147] (0.0151) (0.0169) (0.0107)
SIC 6 (Real Estate) 0.0066 -0.0108 -0.0147 -0.0076
[0.0814] (0.0108) (0.0147) (0.0076)
Notes: Column (1) reports means for 1901 with standard deviations in brackets. Columns (2)
through (4) report differences in means estimated from regressions with a dummy for railroads
and present robust standard errors in parentheses. (The dummy variable identifying railroads is
excluded from the regressions for the industry classifications.)
127
Table 3.3: McKinley Assassination Event Analysis using Net Returns, Social Connections
JP Morgan Standard Oil Roosevelt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sept. 7 -0.0713*** -0.0737*** -0.0716*** -0.0736*** -0.0730*** -0.0754***
(0.0048) (0.0050) (0.0048) (0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0054)
Sept. 9 0.0248*** 0.0261*** 0.0243*** 0.0259*** 0.0246*** 0.0263***
(0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0034)
Sept. 13 -0.0618*** -0.0606*** -0.0608*** -0.0591*** -0.0604*** -0.0586***
(0.0053) (0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0045) (0.0055) (0.0048)
JP Morgan Firm 0.0006 0.0019
(0.0016) (0.0022)
JPM Firm x Sept. 7 -0.0193*** -0.0172***
(0.0058) (0.0059)
JPM Firm x Sept. 9 0.0193*** 0.0184***
(0.0040) (0.0042)
JPM Firm x Sept. 13 -0.0035 -0.0046
(0.0117) (0.0114)
Standard Oil Firm -0.0038 -0.0017
(0.0026) (0.0023)
SO Firm x Sept. 7 -0.0082 -0.0122
(0.0129) (0.0135)
SO Firm x Sept. 9 0.0118* 0.0106
(0.0065) (0.0072)
SO Firm x Sept. 13 -0.0098 -0.0159
(0.0171) (0.0186)
Roosevelt -0.0031* -0.0020
(0.0019) (0.0016)
Roosevelt x Sept. 7 0.0036 0.0036
(0.0099) (0.0105)
Roosevelt x Sept. 9 0.0058 0.0041
(0.0067) (0.0073)
Roosevelt x Sept. 13 -0.0095 -0.0144
(0.0130) (0.0135)
Log(Assets) -0.0010* -0.0008 -0.0007
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Log(Age) -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Leverage 0.0036 0.0032 0.0050
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0035)
Constant 0.0058*** 0.0226** 0.0064*** 0.0194** 0.0066*** 0.0196**
(0.0012) (0.0101) (0.0011) (0.0092) (0.0012) (0.0097)
Observations 973 907 973 907 973 907
R-squared 0.4301 0.4539 0.4309 0.4550 0.4302 0.4543
Net Return:
Mean 0.0009 0.0011 0.0009 0.0011 0.0009 0.0011
Std. Dev. 0.0385 0.0381 0.0385 0.0381 0.0385 0.0381
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
128
Table 3.4: McKinley Assassination Event Analysis using Net Returns, Banker Centrality
All firms Railroads Industrials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Banker centrality -0.0566* -0.0227 -0.0692* -0.0526 -0.0957 0.0542
(0.0338) (0.0344) (0.0367) (0.0364) (0.1124) (0.1234)
Sept. 7 -0.0765*** -0.0808*** -0.0954*** -0.0955*** -0.0566*** -0.0579***
(0.0071) (0.0075) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0094) (0.0127)
Sept. 9 0.0280*** 0.0307*** 0.0330*** 0.0330*** 0.0199*** 0.0251***
(0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0069) (0.0085)
Sept. 13 -0.0725*** -0.0690*** -0.0785*** -0.0784*** -0.0654*** -0.0510***
(0.0078) (0.0066) (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0147) (0.0123)
Centrality x Sept. 7 0.2458 0.3204* 0.6019*** 0.6057*** -0.2662 -0.5291
(0.1793) (0.1853) (0.1951) (0.1946) (0.4155) (0.5687)
Centrality x Sept. 9 -0.1352 -0.1943** -0.2420** -0.2431** 0.3388 0.1702
(0.0882) (0.0898) (0.0969) (0.0967) (0.2929) (0.4911)
Centrality x Sept. 13 0.4269*** 0.3467*** 0.5456*** 0.5460*** 0.1067 -0.7772
(0.1527) (0.1302) (0.1322) (0.1338) (0.6030) (0.7075)
Log(Assets) -0.0010* -0.0017** 0.0006
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0010)
Log(Age) -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Leverage 0.0042 0.0032 0.0072
(0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0097)
Constant 0.0064*** 0.0243** 0.0128*** 0.0429*** 0.0057*** -0.0076
(0.0012) (0.0101) (0.0017) (0.0153) (0.0016) (0.0167)
Observations 939 884 581 581 358 303
R-squared 0.4378 0.4535 0.5004 0.5026 0.3646 0.3893
Net Return:
Mean 0.0009 0.0013 0.0031 0.0031 -0.0027 -0.0022
Std. Dev. 0.0382 0.0378 0.0374 0.0374 0.0394 0.0384
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.5: McKinley Assassination Event Analysis using Net Returns, Antitrust Targets
All firms Railroads Industrials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Antitrust target 0.0002 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0006 0.0010 -0.0009
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0022)
Sept. 7 -0.0610*** -0.0635*** -0.0667*** -0.0668*** -0.0476*** -0.0529***
(0.0060) (0.0064) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0110) (0.0146)
Sept. 9 0.0161*** 0.0172*** 0.0178*** 0.0178*** 0.0121** 0.0152**
(0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0058) (0.0073)
Sept. 13 -0.0502*** -0.0505*** -0.0537*** -0.0535*** -0.0439*** -0.0439***
(0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0083)
Antitrust x Sept. 7 -0.0246*** -0.0239*** -0.0358*** -0.0357*** -0.0231* -0.0192
(0.0085) (0.0089) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0131) (0.0165)
Antitrust x Sept. 9 0.0231*** 0.0232*** 0.0257*** 0.0258*** 0.0228** 0.0219**
(0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0086) (0.0098)
Antitrust x Sept. 13 -0.0272*** -0.0248*** -0.0221** -0.0223** -0.0352* -0.0308*
(0.0101) (0.0088) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0179) (0.0158)
Log(Assets) -0.0007 -0.0013* 0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Log(Age) -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0002
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Leverage 0.0025 0.0015 0.0070
(0.0037) (0.0041) (0.0106)
Constant 0.0059*** 0.0194** 0.0105*** 0.0339** 0.0046*** -0.0020
(0.0012) (0.0097) (0.0014) (0.0142) (0.0014) (0.0145)
Observations 973 907 590 590 383 317
R-squared 0.4505 0.4734 0.5102 0.5116 0.3799 0.4180
Net Return:
Mean 0.0009 0.0011 0.0029 0.0029 -0.0021 -0.0021
Std. Dev. 0.0385 0.0381 0.0379 0.0379 0.0393 0.0381
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.6: McKinley Assassination Event Analysis using Net Returns, Community of In-
terest and Barriers to Entry
All firms Railroads Industrials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Monopoly 0.0028* 0.0025 0.0023 0.0022 0.0033 0.0030
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0023)
Sept. 7 -0.0534*** -0.0563*** -0.0613*** -0.0613*** -0.0409*** -0.0441***
(0.0064) (0.0073) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0084) (0.0129)
Sept. 9 0.0155*** 0.0165*** 0.0173*** 0.0173*** 0.0124** 0.0138*
(0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0054) (0.0073)
Sept. 13 -0.0459*** -0.0461*** -0.0490*** -0.0485*** -0.0418*** -0.0410***
(0.0060) (0.0068) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0083) (0.0111)
Monopoly x Sept. 7 -0.0305*** -0.0276*** -0.0317*** -0.0316*** -0.0229** -0.0196
(0.0086) (0.0093) (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0105) (0.0144)
Monopoly x Sept. 9 0.0169*** 0.0160*** 0.0156** 0.0156** 0.0188** 0.0174*
(0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0084) (0.0099)
Monopoly x Sept. 13 -0.0193** -0.0190** -0.0201* -0.0206* -0.0133 -0.0140
(0.0082) (0.0088) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0144) (0.0162)
Log(Assets) -0.0011* -0.0015* 0.0005
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Log(Age) -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0012
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Leverage 0.0025 0.0028 0.0005
(0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0086)
Constant 0.0027* 0.0220** 0.0091*** 0.0369** 0.0008 -0.0089
(0.0014) (0.0099) (0.0013) (0.0147) (0.0017) (0.0126)
Observations 879 832 590 590 289 242
R-squared 0.4511 0.4593 0.5010 0.5028 0.3443 0.3576
Net Return:
Mean 0.0008 0.0011 0.0029 0.0029 -0.0035 -0.0032
Std. Dev. 0.0369 0.0373 0.0379 0.0379 0.0344 0.0353
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.7: McKinley Assassination Event Analysis using Net Returns, JP Morgan Firms
All firms Railroads Industrials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Antitrust target -0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0009 -0.0010
(0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0023)
JP Morgan Firm -0.0052 -0.0061 -0.0110*** -0.0128*** 0.0037 0.0043
(0.0036) (0.0042) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Antitrust x JPM Firm 0.0073* 0.0104** 0.0127*** 0.0158*** -0.0009 -0.0017
(0.0039) (0.0047) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0072)
Sept. 7 -0.0606*** -0.0631*** -0.0665*** -0.0665*** -0.0475*** -0.0528***
(0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0111) (0.0148)
Sept. 9 0.0160*** 0.0170*** 0.0176*** 0.0176*** 0.0122** 0.0153**
(0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0059) (0.0074)
Sept. 13 -0.0503*** -0.0505*** -0.0539*** -0.0537*** -0.0437*** -0.0436***
(0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0074) (0.0087)
Antitrust x Sept. 7 -0.0239*** -0.0233** -0.0360*** -0.0359*** -0.0224 -0.0185
(0.0087) (0.0090) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0134) (0.0168)
Antitrust x Sept. 9 0.0228*** 0.0231*** 0.0258*** 0.0259*** 0.0224** 0.0216**
(0.0056) (0.0058) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0090) (0.0102)
Antitrust x Sept. 13 -0.0277*** -0.0254*** -0.0232** -0.0234** -0.0350* -0.0305*
(0.0105) (0.0091) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0182) (0.0160)
JPM Firm x Sept. 7 -0.0116* -0.0097 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0131* -0.0115
(0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0074) (0.0081)
JPM Firm x Sept. 9 0.0039 0.0026 0.0006 0.0006 0.0051 0.0030
(0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0072)
JPM Firm x Sept. 13 0.0062 0.0048 0.0093 0.0093 -0.0047 -0.0073
(0.0101) (0.0094) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0122) (0.0122)
Log(Assets) -0.0011* -0.0015* 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0013)
Log(Age) -0.0004 -0.0006 0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0010)
Leverage 0.0022 0.0015 0.0067
(0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0111)
Constant 0.0060*** 0.0257** 0.0107*** 0.0382** 0.0045*** 0.0008
(0.0012) (0.0110) (0.0014) (0.0157) (0.0014) (0.0216)
Observations 973 907 590 590 383 317
R-squared 0.4513 0.4745 0.5114 0.5132 0.3804 0.4185
Net Return:
Mean 0.0009 0.0011 0.0029 0.0029 -0.0021 -0.0021
Std. Dev. 0.0385 0.0381 0.0379 0.0379 0.0393 0.0381
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.8: McKinley Assassination Event Analysis using Net Returns, Standard Oil Firms
All firms Railroads Industrials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Antitrust target 0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0000 0.0021 -0.0006
(0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0023)
Standard Oil Firm -0.0041* -0.0031 -0.0024 -0.0020 -0.0064*** -0.0049
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0031)
Antitrust x SO Firm 0.0005 0.0030 0.0099*** 0.0094*** -0.0014 0.0005
(0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0037) (0.0044)
Sept. 7 -0.0606*** -0.0625*** -0.0649*** -0.0649*** -0.0476*** -0.0521***
(0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0114) (0.0154)
Sept. 9 0.0152*** 0.0161*** 0.0163*** 0.0163*** 0.0116** 0.0147**
(0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0055) (0.0070)
Sept. 13 -0.0493*** -0.0487*** -0.0517*** -0.0514*** -0.0441*** -0.0427***
(0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0074) (0.0089)
Antitrust x Sept. 7 -0.0244*** -0.0238*** -0.0361*** -0.0361*** -0.0235* -0.0194
(0.0085) (0.0088) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0131) (0.0165)
Antitrust x Sept. 9 0.0227*** 0.0232*** 0.0261*** 0.0262*** 0.0221** 0.0216**
(0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0093) (0.0100)
Antitrust x Sept. 13 -0.0270*** -0.0248*** -0.0232** -0.0234** -0.0354* -0.0290*
(0.0102) (0.0086) (0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0191) (0.0156)
SO Firm x Sept. 7 -0.0053 -0.0115 -0.0246 -0.0246 0.0015 -0.0053
(0.0137) (0.0135) (0.0166) (0.0168) (0.0126) (0.0127)
SO Firm x Sept. 9 0.0095 0.0103 0.0147** 0.0147** 0.0057 0.0051
(0.0073) (0.0080) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0129) (0.0156)
SO Firm x Sept. 13 -0.0077 -0.0156 -0.0157 -0.0159 0.0021 -0.0160
(0.0162) (0.0167) (0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0252) (0.0270)
Log(Assets) -0.0006 -0.0011 0.0006
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0009)
Log(Age) -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Leverage 0.0012 -0.0002 0.0077
(0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0117)
Constant 0.0064*** 0.0175* 0.0107*** 0.0327** 0.0051*** -0.0072
(0.0012) (0.0097) (0.0015) (0.0143) (0.0013) (0.0150)
Observations 973 907 590 590 383 317
R-squared 0.4524 0.4762 0.5150 0.5162 0.3838 0.4221
Net Return:
Mean 0.0009 0.0011 0.0029 0.0029 -0.0021 -0.0021
Std. Dev. 0.0385 0.0381 0.0379 0.0379 0.0393 0.0381
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.9: McKinleyAssassination Event Analysis usingNet Returns, Connections to Roo-
sevelt
All firms Railroads Industrials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Antitrust target 0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0028 -0.0001
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0027)
Roosevelt -0.0021 -0.0020 -0.0021 -0.0030 -0.0011 -0.0022
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0025) (0.0024)
Antitrust x Roosevelt -0.0022 -0.0002 0.0025 0.0042 -0.0059 -0.0032
(0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0042)
Sept. 7 -0.0617*** -0.0640*** -0.0666*** -0.0666*** -0.0483*** -0.0534***
(0.0066) (0.0071) (0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0120) (0.0167)
Sept. 9 0.0158*** 0.0169*** 0.0179*** 0.0179*** 0.0108* 0.0139
(0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0063) (0.0082)
Sept. 13 -0.0495*** -0.0489*** -0.0530*** -0.0528*** -0.0428*** -0.0393***
(0.0052) (0.0055) (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0074) (0.0085)
Antitrust x Sept. 7 -0.0249*** -0.0240*** -0.0359*** -0.0358*** -0.0236* -0.0194
(0.0085) (0.0089) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0130) (0.0168)
Antitrust x Sept. 9 0.0229*** 0.0231*** 0.0258*** 0.0259*** 0.0218** 0.0215**
(0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0085) (0.0098)
Antitrust x Sept. 13 -0.0267** -0.0241*** -0.0216** -0.0217** -0.0349* -0.0303*
(0.0103) (0.0087) (0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0186) (0.0154)
Roosevelt x Sept. 7 0.0047 0.0031 -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0038 0.0019
(0.0089) (0.0091) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0094) (0.0109)
Roosevelt x Sept. 9 0.0022 0.0020 -0.0015 -0.0015 0.0082 0.0071
(0.0055) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0092) (0.0108)
Roosevelt x Sept. 13 -0.0059 -0.0121 -0.0098 -0.0097 -0.0050 -0.0181
(0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0132) (0.0207) (0.0202)
Log(Assets) -0.0006 -0.0014* 0.0009
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Log(Age) -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0006
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0011)
Leverage 0.0037 0.0012 0.0112
(0.0036) (0.0041) (0.0086)
Constant 0.0065*** 0.0184* 0.0107*** 0.0373** 0.0048*** -0.0097
(0.0013) (0.0106) (0.0016) (0.0161) (0.0016) (0.0147)
Observations 973 907 590 590 383 317
R-squared 0.4519 0.4750 0.5110 0.5125 0.3838 0.4236
Net Return:
Mean 0.0009 0.0011 0.0029 0.0029 -0.0021 -0.0021
Std. Dev. 0.0385 0.0381 0.0379 0.0379 0.0393 0.0381
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.10: McKinley Assassination Event Analysis using Net Returns, Banker Centrality
All firms Railroads Industrials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Antitrust target -0.0002 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0009 0.0023 -0.0003
(0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0027)
Banker centrality -0.0503 -0.0314 -0.0768* -0.0604 0.0475 0.1692
(0.0365) (0.0387) (0.0410) (0.0429) (0.1109) (0.1082)
Antitrust x Centrality -0.0264 0.0302 0.0100 0.0246 -0.1953* -0.1427
(0.0485) (0.0444) (0.0480) (0.0534) (0.1026) (0.1917)
Sept. 7 -0.0632*** -0.0668*** -0.0789*** -0.0790*** -0.0471*** -0.0485**
(0.0085) (0.0095) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0129) (0.0197)
Sept. 9 0.0161*** 0.0182*** 0.0204*** 0.0205*** 0.0114* 0.0152
(0.0046) (0.0051) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0067) (0.0091)
Sept. 13 -0.0587*** -0.0571*** -0.0699*** -0.0697*** -0.0489*** -0.0402***
(0.0071) (0.0074) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0091) (0.0110)
Antitrust x Sept. 7 -0.0249*** -0.0241** -0.0336*** -0.0336*** -0.0201 -0.0162
(0.0087) (0.0093) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0128) (0.0161)
Antitrust x Sept. 9 0.0243*** 0.0235*** 0.0258*** 0.0258*** 0.0229** 0.0216**
(0.0053) (0.0056) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0097) (0.0104)
Antitrust x Sept. 13 -0.0290*** -0.0241*** -0.0161 -0.0163 -0.0487** -0.0309*
(0.0099) (0.0090) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0232) (0.0175)
Centrality x Sept. 7 0.1606 0.2001 0.4617** 0.4644** -0.0892 -0.4616
(0.1692) (0.1817) (0.1786) (0.1788) (0.4124) (0.5342)
Centrality x Sept. 9 -0.0515 -0.0843 -0.1236 -0.1247 0.0533 -0.0349
(0.0766) (0.0829) (0.0891) (0.0886) (0.2723) (0.4120)
Centrality x Sept. 13 0.3536** 0.2673** 0.4712*** 0.4713*** 0.6541 -0.4788
(0.1363) (0.1221) (0.1427) (0.1438) (0.7283) (0.6312)
Log(Assets) -0.0009 -0.0015* 0.0005
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0012)
Log(Age) -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Leverage 0.0032 0.0015 0.0086
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0113)
Constant 0.0067*** 0.0239** 0.0134*** 0.0395** 0.0045*** -0.0051
(0.0014) (0.0108) (0.0022) (0.0159) (0.0017) (0.0207)
Observations 939 884 581 581 358 303
R-squared 0.4623 0.4741 0.5240 0.5255 0.4004 0.4110
Net Return:
Mean 0.0009 0.0013 0.0031 0.0031 -0.0027 -0.0022
Std. Dev. 0.0382 0.0378 0.0374 0.0374 0.0394 0.0384
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.11: Northern Securities Event Analysis using Cumulative Returns, Antitrust
Targets
All firms Railroads Industrials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Antitrust target -0.0176* -0.0225** -0.0446*** -0.0453*** 0.0140 0.0031
(0.0097) (0.0086) (0.0107) (0.0111) (0.0152) (0.0145)
Log(Assets) -0.0138*** -0.0106* -0.0080
(0.0044) (0.0062) (0.0072)
Log(Age) -0.0124*** -0.0185*** -0.0055
(0.0047) (0.0065) (0.0070)
Leverage 0.0088 -0.0242 0.1009
(0.0310) (0.0273) (0.0815)
Constant 0.0151 0.2813*** 0.0195** 0.2711** -0.0016 0.1464
(0.0091) (0.0799) (0.0087) (0.1040) (0.0102) (0.1344)
Observations 90 83 52 52 38 31
R-squared 0.0306 0.2316 0.1755 0.4191 0.0225 0.1139
Cumulative Return:
Mean 0.0058 0.0060 0.0058 0.0058 0.0058 0.0064
Std. Dev. 0.0483 0.0460 0.0496 0.0496 0.0471 0.0401
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable used is net returns
cumulated from February 20th to March 1st, 1902.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.12: Coal Strike Event Analysis using Cumulative Returns, Industrials
and Railroads
All firms Railroads Industrials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Antitrust target -0.0110 -0.0025 -0.0123 -0.0118 -0.0098 0.0100
(0.0112) (0.0083) (0.0079) (0.0081) (0.0209) (0.0154)
Log(Assets) 0.0032 0.0033 0.0034
(0.0038) (0.0050) (0.0065)
Log(Age) 0.0018 0.0040 -0.0025
(0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0062)
Leverage -0.0025 -0.0019 -0.0100
(0.0249) (0.0264) (0.0549)
Constant -0.0222 -0.0885 -0.0421*** -0.1128 -0.0229 -0.0918
(0.0136) (0.0688) (0.0059) (0.0817) (0.0183) (0.1238)
Observations 99 91 53 53 46 38
R-squared 0.0395 0.0387 0.0309 0.0580 0.0055 0.0207
Cumulative Return:
Mean -0.0378 -0.0401 -0.0458 -0.0458 -0.0285 -0.0320
Std. Dev. 0.0513 0.0392 0.0323 0.0323 0.0660 0.0465
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable used is net returns
cumulated from October 1st to October 8th, 1902.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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APPENDIX A
Data Appendix
Education Data
The Georgia Department of Education collected a variety of statistics on the quantity of
schooling and measured school quality from the county superintendents on an annual basis.
Much of this information was then published in the Annual Report of the Department of
Education to the General Assembly of the State of Georgia. These reports for the years
1903 through 1922 provide data on enrollment, attendance, teachers, schools, term length,
and receipts for this work. With the exception of receipts, all of the statistics are provided
by race. Additionally, enrollment is provided by sex and by grade.
While the meaning of terms such as number of teachers, number of public schools,
length of the school term in days, and school board receipts are straightforward, what is
meant by enrollment and attendance merits clarification. Enrollment is the total number
of students enrolled in school during the term. A student was considered to be enrolled in
school if he or she was enrolled, or attended, at any point during the year (as opposed to
being present on the first day of school). Attendance, or average daily attendance, is the
average number of students attending school on any given school day during the term.
Where possible, care was taken to clean this data of typographical errors. The format
of the published tables provides sufficient information to identify and correct most all ty-
pographical errors for enrollment and teachers. For public schools, the format provides
enough information to identify errors in the published reports but not enough to correct
them. However, a comparison with data from surrounding years allows for the accurate
correction of larger errors. Unfortunately, the tables do not provide enough information to
identify or correct for typographical errors in term length or attendance.
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School-Age Population
In Georgia, the school-age population was legally defined as anyone aged 6 through 18.
The state conducted a census of the school-age population every five years starting in 1878.
The results from the censuses of 1908, 1918, and 1923 were published in the Annual Report
of the Department of Education to the General Assembly of the State of Georgia in relevant
years, but the results of the 1913 census was published separately in a report entitledCensus
of the School Population of Georgia 1913. These sources provide the school-age population
by race and sex for each county. Typographical and calculation errors were corrected by
consulting the original consolidation of returns of enumeration.1 The school-age population
was interpolated assuming a constant growth rate between census years.
Wealth
The annual Report of the Comptroller-General of the State of Georgia provides a wealth
of statistics on everything of taxable value in the state by county. It also provides many
statistics on the wealth of African Americans by county. The reports from 1909 through
1922 provide total assessed wealth, or “aggregate value of whole property,” at the county
level by race. White wealth is calculated as the total value of property in the county less the
value of property owned by African Americans.
Cotton Ginning Data
Annual data on cotton ginning at the county level are provided by reports of the US Bureau
of the Census entitled Cotton Production in the United States. For more information on this
source see Lange, Olmstead, and Rhode (2009).
1Georgia Department of Education, “School Censuses,” Record Group 12, Sub-Group 2, Series 60, Geor-
gia Archives, Morrow, GA.
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Presence of the Boll Weevil
The map of the boll weevil’s spread appears in Hunter and Coad’s (1923) report entitled
The Boll Weevil Problem. The boll weevil was coded as present in a given year if it was
found in any part of the county in that year.
Rainfall
Data on monthly total precipitation at weather stations in the US come from the United
States Historical Climatology Network (USHCN).2 Using this data, precipitation at each
county centroid was estimated from information provided by the six closest weather stations
using the inverse distance weighting method. Distance was computed using Vincenty’s
formula with GRS 80 ellipsoid parameters.
2The latest monthly weather data can be downloaded from ftp://ftp.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/ushcn/v2.5.
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APPENDIX B
First Grade Retention Rate
According to Finis Welch, “if all students complete at least the second grade, and if there
is no growth in total enrollment…then the ratio of enrollment of first to second graders is
the time required to complete the first grade relative to the time required to complete the
second” (1973, 59). Additionally, given that it takes at least one year to complete the second
grade, this ratio can also be interpreted as the lower bound of the average number of years
it takes to complete the first grade. Finally, under the conditions outlined by Welch, with
the additional assumption that all students complete second grade in one year, the ratio is
equal to one plus the first grade retention rate.
The use of the first to second grade enrollment ratio as a proxy for first grade retention
rate in this paper is problematic because Welch’s second assumption is clearly violated. I
find that the boll weevil had a significant impact on the enrollment rate of blacks. Thus, in
order to use this measure to correctly proxy for the retention rate it must be adjusted. To see
this more clearly, I present a simple multiperiod model of first and second grade enrollment
with retention and growth in enrollment.
Suppose that in year t, Nt new students enter first grade. Of the Nt students that enter
first grade, Rt are held back. All students that repeat first grade move on to second grade
the following year (that is, no student spends more than two years in first grade before
advancing to the second). Define rt  RtNt as the proportion of new first graders that are
held back. Let gt  Nt Nt 1Nt 1 be the growth rate in new first grade enrollment. Let the total
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enrollment in grade k at time t be given by Ekt. Then,
E2t = Nt 1  Rt 1 +Rt 2
= (1 + gt 1)Nt 2   rt 1(1 + gt 1)Nt 2 + rt 2Nt 2
= [(1 + gt 1)  rt 1(1 + gt 1) + rt 2]Nt 2
= [1 + gt 1   rt 1   rt 1gt 1 + rt 2]Nt 2;
(B.1)
and
E1t = Nt +Rt 1
= (1 + gt)Nt 1 + rt 1Nt 1
= (1 + gt + rt 1)Nt 1
= (1 + gt 1)(1 + gt + rt 1)Nt 2:
(B.2)
Since the Nt 2s cancel, the ratio of first to second grade enrollment can then be written as
E1t
E2t
=
(1 + gt 1)(1 + gt + rt 1)
1 + gt 1   rt 1   rt 1gt 1 + rt 2 : (B.3)
Making two assumptions, (1) rt 1gt 1  0 and (2) rt 2   rt 1  0, yields
E1t
E2t
=
(1 + gt 1)(1 + gt + rt 1)
1 + gt 1
= 1 + gt + rt 1: (B.4)
Which can be rewritten to solve for the first grade retention rate,
E1t
E2t
  (1 + gt) = rt 1: (B.5)
Recall, however, that gt is the growth rate in new first grade enrollments. Since new first
grade enrollments are not observed, I approximate for the growth rate in new enrollments
by using E1t E1t 1
E1t 1
.
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APPENDIX C
Details on the Case of Hancock County
Hancock County, situated just northeast of the center of Georgia, about halfway between
Atlanta and Augusta, was fairly representative of the rural population of the state as a whole.
Table C.1 compares population statistics of the county to those of the rural population of
Georgia in 1910. Hancock was a rural county with a population of 19,189 in 1910 (US
Bureau of the Census 1913). Sparta, Hancock’s only city and the county seat, had a popu-
lation of just 1,715. At 36.2 persons per square mile, population density was just slightly
higher in Hancock than the state average of 35.3 for the rural population. To provide a more
meaningful measure of population density, there were nearly 90 acres of land per family in
Hancock in 1910. In terms of literacy and school attendance, the citizens of Hancock per-
formed just a bit better than their rural counterparts in the rest of the state after controlling
for race. Yet there existed a significant racial gap in these educational statistics in both the
county and the state. The one aspect in which Hancock truly differs from the state average
is in terms of racial mix. Whereas rural Georgia was 46 percent black, 74.4 percent of Han-
cock residents were black and 25.6 percent were white. In this aspect, however, Hancock
is similar to many other cotton-centric counties in the state.
While the census figures indicate that Hancock was an average rural county, the annual
reports of the Georgia Department of Education suggest that Hancock had some unique
advantages. First, Sparta was merely 20 miles from Milledgeville, the site of Georgia’s
first normal school. Thus, Hancock likely had greater access to higher quality teachers
as well as new educational materials and methods. Second, in 1905 Hancock became the
5th county in Georgia to raise local taxes in support of schools to supplement the funds it
received from the state (GeorgiaDepartment of Education 1905, 1906). While local taxation
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to fund education was not unusual by 1913, when there were 39 local tax counties, Hancock
certainly enjoyed the benefits of a larger education budget for longer than most other rural
counties in the state. Third, through 1914, Sparta was the home of M. L. Duggan, then
State School Supervisor and former Hancock County Superintendent of Schools (Georgia
Department of Education 1914). Finally, one of eleven state agricultural high schools was
located in Hancock County. As these agricultural high schools were funded directly by the
state, this providedHancockwith a high school, albeit one geared toward farm instruction, at
no cost to the county’s education budget. These educational advantages should, if anything,
diminish the impact of the cotton economy on attendance and enrollment. Therefore, the
daily attendance information presented may in fact understate the impact of cotton.
Table C.2 shows statistics on cotton production in Hancock County for the agricultural
seasons of 1913 and 1914, the two periods for which daily attendance data are available. In
comparison to 1913, these figures suggest that cotton production in 1914 differed signifi-
cantly in at least two ways. First, it is evident that 1914 was a much better year for cotton
growers. In 1914, Hancock produced 24,561 bales of cotton (just shy of the county record),
while only 18,259 bales were produced in 1913; that amounts to a year-to-year increase of
34.5 percent.1 The second noticeable difference between these two years is the timing of
the cotton harvest. In particular, the cotton harvest concluded much earlier in Hancock in
1913, possibly because of the smaller size of the harvest in that year. Reports show that 92
percent of the cotton crop had been ginned by December 1, 1913, with 99 percent ginned
before the 13th. In comparison, by December 1, 1914, only 82 percent of that year’s crop
had been ginned, with 90 percent ginned before the 13th.2 The boll weevil did not enter
1While it is not clear why so much more cotton was produced in 1914, this amount of seasonal variation
was not unusual for Hancock or other cotton-producing counties. In the 10 years preceding 1913, the amount
of cotton produced in Hancock varied from 13,870 bales in 1906 to 25,933 bales in 1911, with the mean being
17,298 bales. Additionally, the price of cotton fails to explain this year-to-year variation, assuming there was
not a backward bending supply curve, as the price of cotton in Georgia fell from 12.9 cents per pound in 1913
to 7.44 cents in 1914 (US Bureau of the Census 1915, 19).
2The percent of cotton ginned is a good proxy for the percent of cotton picked, or the progress of the
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Hancock until 1916, and thus I am not able to examine its effects on schooling through
cotton production in this case. However, it is fortunate that the level and timing of the har-
vest differs substantially between these two years allowing for an examination of the direct
effects of changes in cotton production on daily school attendance.
The daily school attendance data were collected from a ledger likely kept by James L.
McCleskey, Hancock County Superintendent of Schools.3 Each page of the ledger allowed
the superintendent to track the male, female, and total daily attendance for each of twenty
schools over a month (20 weekdays). The ledger records daily attendance for 36 black
schools and 22 white schools over the 1913-14 school term. During the 1914-15 school
term, the ledger provides statistics for 23 black schools and 20 white schools. However,
since there are gaps in the data for some schools, Figures 1.4 and 1.5 were produced with
information from 8 white schools and 21 black schools in 1913-14 and 14 white schools
and 6 black schools in 1914-15.4 One additional problem with the data, which is evident
in Figure 1.4, is that the daily attendance information for whites was only recorded through
December 18, 1914, during the 1914-15 school term. However, this is only a minor issue
since attendance trends during the fall harvest are still observable.
Figure 1.4 presents the daily attendance data by race and sex for the 1914-15 school
year, and Figure 1.5 presents the same for the 1913-14 term. Several features of these
harvest, since ginning occurred contemporaneously with the harvest. Raw cotton was ginned directly after
picking for several reasons, the most important of which was cash. For the cotton farmer, ginning meant
income and thus the ability to pay off high interest lines of credit that had been extended throughout the year.
Additionally, the presence of 35 active ginneries in Hancock suggests that the distance from farm to gin was
small and there was plenty of ginning capacity, implying minimal delay between picking and ginning (US
Bureau of the Census 1915, 35).
3Hancock County School Superintendent, “Daily Attendance Record,” Record Group 170, Sub-Group 8,
Series 100, Georgia Archives, Morrow, GA.
The Hancock County ledger appears to be one of many ledgers that were commissioned by the state and
distributed to the county superintendents since it was clearly printed for the sole purpose of recording the
daily attendance ofmultiple schools. However, an exhaustive search of school records from the early twentieth
century at both the Georgia Archives and the University of Georgia Library yielded only the book for Hancock.
4While the records for 1914-15 are dated, the 1913-14 records are not. However, I was able to use school
closings for holidays and significant weather events to determine the dates.
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graphs of daily school attendance are suggestive of the impact of cotton production on
schooling and corroborate some of the statements made by county superintendents. Perhaps
the most obvious feature of the daily attendance graphs is that attendance in the fall starts
out much lower than the winter average for all terms, races, and sexes, suggesting that
the cotton harvest suppressed school attendance in the fall. A few additional observations
lend support to this hypothesis. First, in 1914-15, when cotton production was 35 percent
higher, fall school attendance was suppressed by a greater amount. The school attendance
for whites (blacks) on the second week of school was 70 (42.8) percent of attendance during
the last week of January in 1914-15, yet a higher 79.7 (53.6) percent in 1913-14.5 Second,
the timing of the convergence of daily attendance to the winter average corresponds closely
with the conclusion of the cotton harvest. For blacks in 1914-15, attendance trends upward
after winter break but makes a sustained jump on January 18 before converging to the winter
average. In 1913-14, black attendance makes a significant jump on January 5, the first day
of school following winter break, then continues to trend upward until it reaches the winter
average. As Table C.2 shows, the cotton harvest of 1913 concluded before January 1, 1914,
and thus black children who participated in the harvest were free to return to school at the
start of the winter semester. However, the harvest of 1914 dragged on beyond mid-January
1915, which provides an explanation for the delayed convergence of black daily attendance
in the winter of 1915.
Figure 1.4 shows a similar pattern for whites in 1914-15, but the upward jump in atten-
dance occurs much earlier, on November 9. At that date, the cotton harvest was only around
70 percent complete. Although white attendance trends upward throughout the fall of 1913,
when the cotton harvest was smaller, no discrete jump in attendance is evident. While the
5Since the daily attendance data for whites in 1914-15 are not available for the last week of January, the
statistic for whites in that school year (70 percent) was calculated using the attendance during the week of
December 14, the last week for which data on white schools is recorded. This likely overstates the relative
attendance of whites in the fall of 1914, thus providing a conservative estimate for comparison.
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timing of convergence in attendance across years might be explained by the progress of the
cotton harvest, the differential timing across race merits further explanation.
The racial difference in the timing of the convergence of school attendance to the winter
average may be explained by a feature of the cotton harvest. Rather than harvesting a field
all at once, as with grain, the cotton crop was picked over multiple times throughout the
harvest season, as with fruit. The first picking would take place in late September, with
subsequent pickings occurring at monthly intervals. Depending on the variety of cotton
planted and the weather, the field was picked over between three to five times in a season.
The first picking was the most fruitful because with each picking mature bolls became
sparser. Therefore, the returns to picking cotton fell as the season wore on, since pickers
were paid per pound picked. It is not surprising that whites, whowerewealthier, participated
in the cotton harvest at the beginning of the season when returns to picking cotton were
highest, but they returned to school as the returns to picking fell, before the end of the
harvest season.
A few other features of these graphs of daily school attendance are suggestive of the
impact of cotton production on schooling. First, schools for blacks opened six weeks after
the start of the white school year, suggesting a shorter term for blacks to accommodate the
cotton harvest. Indeed, the black term was 4 months in 1913-14 and 5 months in 1914-
15, while the white term lasted a minimum of 7 months (Georgia Department of Education
1915, 1916). The justification for the racial difference in term lengthmight be supplied by E.
W. Sammons, the superintendent in nearby Jones County, who claimed, “it is useless to try
to have a longer term than five or six months for the negroes… they are entirely agricultural,
and need their children to chop and pick cotton, and will not send regularly longer than the
time mentioned” (Georgia Department of Education 1909, 156). The low attendance rate of
blacks after the start of school in November, if indeed caused by the continued demand for
child labor in the cotton harvest, gives credence to this claim. This suggests that racial
147
differences in term length generated, or at least justified, by the cotton economy could
explain a significant amount of the black-white education gap. Second, in the fall of 1914,
with the larger cotton crop, white male children have much lower attendance than females,
but male attendance converges with female attendance by December 1. Interestingly, the
same trend does not appear in the fall of 1913, with the smaller cotton crop; instead white
male and female attendance are roughly equal throughout the term. This suggests that the
attendance of white males was more responsive to the demands of the cotton harvest than
was that of white females. Finally, the attendance, and likely enrollment, of black male
children is significantly lower than that of black females; this is especially true in the winter
when attendance is at its highest. While this fact is not necessarily related to the cotton
economy, it is possible that a higher demand for males on the farm kept them out of school
through January, when the returns to going to school for the one to two months remaining
in the term were low enough that many declined to enroll altogether.
Beyond observations that are suggestive of the impact of the cotton harvest, there are
a few additional features of these two figures that warrant explanation. The most obvious
feature of the 1914-15 graphs is a significant drop in the attendance of whites on November
20. While only one school was actually closed on this day, the explanation for that school’s
closing, simply “cold,” provides the cause of low attendance at schools across the county.
In the 1913-14 graphs for both blacks and whites, males and females, there are noticeable
drops in attendance on February 6, 13, and 20. Not coincidentally, these are also the only
weekdays in February 1914 on which rain was recorded at the closest weather station.6
Finally, the sharp drop-off in attendance of both races at the end of February 1914 is the
result of nine inches of snow fall on the 26th.
6The closest active weather station to Sparta, the county seat, in the United States Historical Climatology
Network (USHCN) was in Milledgeville, just over 20 miles away. Daily records for the Milledgeville
weather station can be viewed at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cdo-web/datasets/GHCND/stations/
GHCND:USC00095874/detail.
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Table C.1: Population Statistics for Rural Georgia and Hancock County, 1910
Rural Georgia Hancock County
Total White Black Total White Black
Population
Total 2,070,471 1,118,196 952,161 19,189 4,917 14,268
Race percent of total 54.0% 46.0% 25.6% 74.4%
Percent male 50.5% 50.9% 50.1% 49.9% 49.9% 49.9%
Illiteracy
Population 10+ 1,454,567 790,853 663,631 13,459 3,661 9,794
Percent illiterate 23.2% 9.5% 39.7% 26.1% 3.0% 34.8%
School attendance
Population 6 to 14 497,893 254,723 243,147 5,005 1,065 3,940
Percent attending 64.0% 74.0% 53.5% 59.7% 78.2% 54.7%
Land area (sq. miles) 58,725 530
Rural pop. per sq. mile 35.3 36.2
Notes: The sum of the reported figures for blacks and whites does not necessarily equal the total, due to
the presence of other races.
Source: US Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States: 1910, 1913.
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Table C.2: Cotton Ginned by Date in Hancock County, 1913 and 1914
1914 1913
Date Number of Bales Percent of Total Number of Bales Percent of Total
Sept. 1 168 0.68% 31 0.17%
Sept. 25 6,655 27.10 3,784 20.72
Oct. 18 12,587 51.25 10,892 59.65
Nov. 1 16,071 65.43 13,311 72.90
Nov. 14 18,340 74.67 14,699 80.50
Dec. 1 20,090 81.80 16,721 91.58
Dec. 13 22,199 90.38 17,997 98.57
Jan. 1 23,628 96.20 18,204 99.70
Jan. 16 23,793 96.87 18,254 99.97
Total 24,561 18,259
Sources: US Bureau of the Census, Cotton Production in the United States, 1914-1915.
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